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CHAPTER 1 
 
Identifying Multiple Epistemic Resources 
 
“For the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house.  They may allow us to 
temporarily beat him at his own game, but they will never enable us to bring about genuine 
change.  And this fact is only threatening to those women who still define the master’s house as 
their only source of support.” – Audre Lorde 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I propose to begin a conversation between two unlikely interlocutors – 
Audre Lorde and Hannah Arendt – on a topic neither of them ever explicitly addressed: 
epistemic injustice, or, “being harmed in one’s capacity as a knower” (Fricker, 1). I contend that 
these queer pairings of writers and topics converge in rich and unexpected ways, revealing a 
fecund path toward what has recently become known as “epistemic justice.” The works of 
Hannah Arendt and Audre Lorde have been plumbed for their ethical and political insights.  
There exist impressive literatures on both writers. However, an extended comparison of their 
work has, to my knowledge, never been attempted. Surely there are many reasons for this 
“lacuna,” but, as I will argue, a lack of similarities between what Lorde and Arendt wrote is not 
one of them.   
I will allow that the similarities between these two thinkers are not readily apparent: 
arrange their persons, their biographies, and/or their works side-by-side and few will initially 
make the comparison. And yet, when viewed through the lens of the burgeoning young field of 
social epistemology, similarities leap to the forefront. Since the phrase “social epistemology” 
didn’t officially enter into the philosophical lexicon until the early 1980’s,1 it’s not a wonder that 
neither of their corpuses has yet been subjected to extended analyses of their shared socio-
epistemic virtues. However, when viewed from the standpoint of the social epistemologist, Lorde 																																																								
1 Although work in this field has a much longer history, it was not subsumed under the heading “social 
epistemology” until the late 1970’s/early 1980’s. 
	 2	
and Arendt appear as natural predecessors to the movement from traditional epistemology to 
social epistemology.   
Within the field of social epistemology the ever-growing literature on the problem of 
epistemic injustice has significantly been influenced by Miranda Fricker’s 2007 groundbreaking 
work, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Fricker’s outline of the problem of 
epistemic injustice has invigorated recent debates centering on the ethical and/or political aspects 
of everyday epistemic practices. Following current trends that I hope ultimately to call into 
question, we will appeal to Fricker’s work in framing the basic structure of the problem of 
epistemic injustice; and let it serve as our guide to better understanding what might constitute an 
effective response to the problem.  
By placing our imaginative conversation between Lorde and Arendt into Fricker’s 
framework we will begin to see how certain key aspects of their works, which have always 
resisted categorization, might be viewed as socio-epistemic in nature. While Fricker’s framework 
can serve usefully as our way into the problems upon which we will bring Lorde’s and Arendt’s 
socio-epistemic insights to bear, it can no more contain those insights than conventional 
categories of thought can: Arendt’s and Lorde’s work will challenge the very framework that 
brings the socio-epistemic nature of it to light. Nonetheless, there is good reason to begin with 
Fricker’s overall account of the problem of epistemic injustice, particularly with regard to 
Fricker’s proposed solution to the problem. 
As helpful as Fricker’s work has been to a large number of social epistemologists doing 
some excellent work on the problem,2 and even though we too will rely on it as our introduction 																																																								
2 See, for example, José Medina’s expert handling of several of the more challenging aspects of the issues 
Fricker raises in his book-length contribution to these discussions in his recent work, The Epistemology of 
Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistant Imaginations. 
Additionally, numerous recent articles and commentaries on the problem of epistemic injustice that 
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into it, we will ultimately part ways with Fricker’s approach. Contesting Fricker’s account at 
even very basic levels, we will soon find ourselves in need of offering a radically changed 
framework for understanding the deeper contours of the problem of epistemic injustice. This 
renewed outlook on the problem will open up alternative, more effective, approaches to 
combatting it. 
I contend that the recent widespread adoption of Fricker’s framework within the field of 
social epistemology has led to a problematic overemphasis on the epistemic responsibilities of 
only those socially and politically privileged epistemic agents most likely to bear the guilt of the 
ethico-epistemic harm of silencing. It is in an effort to correct for this misdirected focus on the 
perpetrators of the harm of epistemic injustice that I argue in favor of taking another look at a 
particular approach to the problem that has been all too quickly dismissed in recent literature. 
Inspired by the works of Arendt and Lorde, my approach begins with taking seriously the 
epistemic responsibilities of silenced and/or oppressed speakers in any given testimonial 
exchange.  
Most social epistemologists adhering to almost any aspect of Fricker’s overall framework 
tend to agree at least on this much: surely it is the perpetrators of the harm of epistemic injustice 
who should be held most responsible for the work of combatting it. In part, I agree. To place the 
responsibility for overcoming any injustice on the shoulders of those suffering from it seems, 
prima facie, a rather unreasonable and ethically dubious thing to do. Not only does it smack of 
victim blaming, it appears also to allow the perpetrators of the injustice blissfully to ignore their 																																																																																																																																																																																		
directly reference Miranda Fricker’s groundbreaking work have recently emerged from such influential 
figures as Charles Mills (“White Ignorance and Hermeneutical Injustice: A Comment on Medina and 
Fricker,” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 3, no. 1 (2013): 83-43), Elizabeth Anderson 
(“Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions”, Social Epistemology 26, no. 2 (2012): 163-173), 
and Linda Martín Alcoff (“Epistemic Identities” Episteme 7, no. 2 (2010): 128-137), just to name a few. 
Fricker’s work has further ignited conversations among many newer scholars to the field, indicating that 
her influence will likely continue to be felt for some time.   
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harmful behavior and to continue engaging in it with impunity. Nonetheless, and for reasons that 
will become clear, I will in fact endorse a view that emphasizes the ethico-epistemic3 
responsibilities of the victims of epistemic injustice and downgrades the importance of the 
contributions of the perpetrators of the harm. Following Lorde and Arendt, I am skeptical of 
approaches that over-emphasize the possible benefits of appealing to the perpetrators of the 
harms of epistemic injustice to recognize their ethico-epistemic vices and exchange them for 
ethico-epistemic virtues. To be clear, I’m all for such conversions – I just don’t believe that 
maintaining the focus on the epistemic practices of the perpetrators of the harm of epistemic 
injustice is particularly beneficial to the cause of overcoming it. I aim instead to focus on those 
voices repeatedly being silenced in unjust epistemic exchanges.   
As we will see, this redirected focus on responsibility for overcoming silencing bears 
significantly on all aspects of the problem of epistemic injustice. As we shift our focus from the 
ethico-epistemic responsibilities of privileged hearers to the ethico-epistemic responsibilities of 
underprivileged or oppressed speakers attempting to engage in knowledge conveying practices, 
we will at the same time effect a fundamental shift in our understanding of the problem of 
epistemic injustice as a whole. This shift in thinking about the whole of epistemic injustice will, 
as noted, call us to reconstruct the very framework within which we have come to understand it. 
It will also call us to rethink many other aspects of the problem in the new light of the, now 
reconstructed, framework of epistemic injustice. Ultimately, this “hermeneutic circle” of 
understanding has no end. Importantly though, it does have a very particular beginning: it begins 
in media res, or, in the midst of things.   																																																								
3 As Fricker explains, the harms of epistemic injustice, as well as the virtues she extolls as effective in 
combatting those harms are “hybrid in kind: both intellectual and ethical” (6, 124). I will adopt Fricker’s 
account of the hybridity of the harms of epistemic injustice, and refer to them as “ethico-epistemic” 
throughout this work in order to highlight this hybridity.   
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A Brief Note on the Method 
The structure of this hermeneutical approach to epistemic injustice, wherein the 
examination of a part of the problem occasions a re-examination of the whole of the problem, 
which in turn sheds new light on other aspects or parts of the problem, will find several 
counterparts in this work. We will not trouble ourselves with searches for the origins of the 
phenomena to be discussed, but will instead jump in “mid-stream,” so-to-speak. These jumps 
into the midst of the issues to be addressed will not be entirely haphazard. We will always begin 
with a part and proceed to the whole, which is another way of saying that our theory will be 
derived from our facts. However, it’s worthwhile to remember that the facts with which we begin 
are only salient to us because of the underlying theoretical commitments we hold. In other 
words, there are no “pre-theoretical” facts of the matter to be revealed here, there are only facts 
that appear in the mode of dokei moi or “it seems to me” as a particular socially/ politically/ 
economically situated epistemic agent.4   
Questions concerning the origins of the theoretical commitments with which we approach 
the facts we choose to foreground will at times be addressed in this work; but it will be important 
to remember that whatever ontological and/ or metaphysical implications these questions and/or 
their answers may seem to suggest, ours is not a search for fixed foundations – be they historical, 
theoretical, political, or otherwise. Ours is not a foundationalist approach. Although we will not 
shy away from origin stories, following Lorde and Arendt, we will look to them only for clues on 
how best to understand and confront present predicaments, not to pinpoint the moment of their 
conception. In other words, we will, in a very real sense, give testimony to certain historical facts 																																																								4	As we will see, this methodological approach, wherein we attempt to derive theory from experience, 
mirrors both Lorde’s and Arendt’s approaches to problems that are ethico-epistemic in nature. This fact 
will prove crucial to the task of identifying they ways in which their works go beyond what Fricker offers 
in her groundbreaking work. 
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by placing them within a context – be it a theoretical framework, narrative or story5 – which will 
(re)create the framework/ narrative/ story, and shed new light on other aspects of it.   
Given the situated starting point within which Lorde and Arendt contextualize their 
theoretical concerns, and the fact that ours will be a hermeneutical approach to the problems they 
address, I would like to suggest that there are many compelling reasons not to attempt neatly to 
separate their written works from their personal biographies. If we fail to take into account the 
interplay between the personal histories of these thinkers and the social and political contexts 
within which they wrote we fail to take seriously the works themselves, which repeatedly 
emphasize the need for such contextualization. Therefore, as we commence with the 
conversation we will imaginatively engage in, we will find ourselves (re)constructing pertinent 
parts of each writer’s experiential journeys as embodied thinkers.   
While we will draw heavily on the testimony of both authors in this enterprise, it’s 
important to recognize that we are ourselves engaged in an act of epistemic agency throughout 
this work. We are making sense of Lorde’s and Arendt’s written works through many lenses, 
including the lenses of their own life stories; but that sense will ultimately be a product of our 
own creation. To that end, I want to invite the reader to join me on a journey in which we will 
																																																								5	Theoretical frameworks, narratives, and stories all carry importantly different connotations; however the 
common thread between the three that bears significantly on our discussion is the fact that they all offer a 
context within which ethico-epistemic judgments can be made. As will be further clarified, one of the 
primary functions of the types of frameworks with which we’re here concerned is to provide a measure 
against which epistemic agents and their testimony (in the form of truth claims, for example) can be 
critically judged. It is this functional aspect of theoretical frameworks, narratives, and stories I want to 
highlight here. However, functional definitions are only one type of definition among many. Viewed from 
the standpoint of, for instance, the literary critic, the thread tying theoretical frameworks, narratives, and 
stories can appear rather frayed if not completely broken. While a significant goal of this work is to 
unearth and investigate the ways in which theoretical frameworks, narratives, and stories can function 
similarly, I am not suggesting that the similarities between them that we will here investigate hold across 
all possible ways of defining or using these words.	
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fashion meanings from the work and lives of these two powerful and innovative thinkers; 
meanings that, while shared, call each of us to take personal responsibility for.  
We will not here purport to speak for Lorde or Arendt but only for ourselves, 
acknowledging that the meanings we formulate throughout this journey are, though shared, in 
many ways our “ownmost” creations. I submit that although they are articulated within and 
limited by specific social/ economic/ political contexts in many ways, ultimately no one can take 
responsibility for the unique and creative work of our hearts/ minds/ hands but our own selves – 
even if we owe a debt of gratitude, or for that matter, a “debt” of resentment (for not all of one’s 
inherited contexts are positive), for these personal productions to others. And on that note, I’d 
like to pause and reflect for a moment on some of the historical works that paved the way for 
Fricker’s work to thrive.  
Some of The Historical Underpinnings of the Problem of Epistemic Injustice 
While Miranda Fricker’s account of the harms of epistemic injustice did, in many ways, 
carve out the theoretical space within which some very lively discussions and important work on 
the problem have been able to thrive, it’s instructive to remember that Fricker is drawing upon an 
existing cache of ideas originated in theoretical works from across the socio-political spectrum. 
Even though she did impressively draw together many seemingly disparate strands of thought 
into a cohesive theoretical framework from within which to address the problem of epistemic 
injustice, Fricker did not actually identify any new problems, neither did she coin the terms she 
used to address them.   
I point this out not to detract from the importance, or even novelty,6 of Fricker’s work, 
but as a modest corrective to the rather sparse historical framework within which she places the 																																																								
6 Since I include rearrangements of existing facts or ideas in the definition of “novelty,” (more on this to 
come) Fricker’s work is indeed, on many counts, novel. 
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problem of epistemic injustice. As presented, it seems all-too-easy to surmise that Fricker herself 
both identified the problem of epistemic injustice, and offered its first systematic solution. 
However, not only did the two theorists at the heart of this critique of Fricker’s account of 
epistemic injustice both identify and address the problem long before she did, so too did many 
earlier theorists within the traditions from whence they hail.   
The groundwork for addressing the problem of epistemic injustice was laid long ago by 
many who will likely never receive due credit for their work, but also by some feminist theorists 
who are quite easy to identify and credit. Audre Lorde, who offers a uniquely powerful voice on 
the topic, fully acknowledges her debt to those Black feminist theorists who came before her and 
paved the way. Within the Black feminist tradition, for instance, the compelling question 
Sojourner Truth put to the Ohio Women’s Rights Convention back in 1851, “Ain’t I a woman?” 
and the entire speech within which she asked it, can easily be construed as an early, powerful 
plea for epistemic justice. As she effectively picks apart the specious arguments against women’s 
suffrage one-by-one, Truth performatively argues for Black women’s right to have their voices 
included in meaning-making practices such as those that define the meaning of concepts like 
“women.”7   
More recently, Bell Hooks8 and Patricia Hill Collins9 have repeatedly and often explicitly 
addressed multiple aspects of the problem of epistemic injustice throughout their careers. Both 
																																																								
7 In responding to a clergyman who had argued against women’s right to vote based on their supposed 
weaknesses and helplessness, Truth famously points out that, “Nobody ever helps me into carriages, or 
over mud-puddles, or gives me any best place!” and drives her point home with the repeated refrain, “And 
ain’t I a woman?”  “Look at me!  Look at my arm!” she demands, “I have ploughed and planted, and 
gathered into barns, and no man could head me! And ain’t I a woman?”  
8 From her earliest book, Ain’t I a Woman: Black Women and Feminism, in which she challenges the 
epistemic hegemony of “the white face of reason,” to her recent account of the credibility deficits suffered 
by Black women teachers in Teaching Community: A Pedagogy of Hope, Bell Hooks has eloquently and 
often addressed the problem of epistemic injustice. 
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Hooks and Collins mounted challenges to traditional epistemic categories of thought and 
addressed ethico-epistemic questions relating to, for instance, the role that prejudices might play 
in credibility assessments (Hooks), and in judgments regarding the value of certain knowledges 
(Collins). These are just a few of some of the more high-profile historical examples of 
examinations of the problem of epistemic injustice within Black feminist thought.   
Hannah Arendt, a German-born Jewish theorist who worked on an impressive range of 
topics, was able to draw on both German and Jewish traditions, and, for that matter, German-
Jewish traditions, in her work on the problem of epistemic injustice. Arendt offers a provocative 
account of both the ethical and the epistemic resources and agency of Jewish “pariahs,” one that 
owes much to the German Sociologist Max Weber, who referred to European Jews as a “pariah 
people.” In her 1944 essay on “The Jew as Pariah,” Arendt explores the ways in which “the 
concept of the pariah as a human type – a concept of supreme importance for the evaluation of 
mankind in our day,” has “endured from Salomon Maimon in the eighteenth century to Franz 
Kafka in the early twentieth” (“The Jew as Pariah”, 100). 
 Arendt outlines several Jewish “types” in this essay, including Heinrich Heine’s 
schlemihl, Bernard Lazare’s “conscious pariah,” and even Charlie Chaplin’s10 “grotesque 
portrayal of the suspect” (“The Jew as Pariah”, 100-01). But, for Arendt, each of these types 
ultimately fall into two overarching archetypes: those who embraced their outcast status, the 
pariahs, and those who attempted to deny or flee from it, the parvenus.11 In marking out this 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
9 See Patricia Hill Collins’ Black Feminist Thought, particularly chapter 11, “Black Feminist 
Epistemology,” (pgs. 251-272) for more.	
10 Although, as Arendt notes, “Chaplin has…declared that he is of Irish and Gypsy descent,” she explains 
that, “he has been selected for discussion because, even if not himself a Jew, he has epitomized in an 
artistic form a character born of the Jewish pariah mentality” (“The Jew as Pariah”, 101).   
11 Arendt’s lifelong preoccupation with contrasting what she sees as the ethical and epistemic advantages 
that accrue to Jewish pariahs, and the ethical and epistemic deficits suffered by the Jewish Parvenus 
began with her earliest work on the life of the Jewess Rahel Levin Varnhagen. Varnhagen’s extensive 
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distinction between pariahs and parvenus, Arendt was concerned with addressing the ethico-
epistemic virtues of pariahs, and the ethico-epistemic vices of parvenus.   
Arguing that self-conscious acceptance of their status as “outsiders” provides Jewish 
Pariahs unique insights into both ethical and epistemic concerns, Arendt champions their ability 
to resist blindly accepting mainstream interpretations of what constitutes just ethical and 
epistemic practices. Unconcerned with maintaining any semblance of belonging to “respectable” 
society, Pariahs, Arendt insists, are free to think and to judge for themselves, appealing to 
whatever ethico-epistemic criteria they find fit. Parvenu’s, on the other hand, owing to their 
overriding desire to assimilate themselves into mainstream society, regularly fail adequately to 
determine ethico-epistemic judgment criteria of their own. Arendt argues that this leaves them 
susceptible to committing the same ethical and epistemic injustices that mainstream actors might. 
Writing in the wake of the atrocities committed by Hitler’s Nazi regime, whose actions, as 
Arendt controversially argued, the mainstream German public – including those “ most respected 
members of respectable society” – either failed to resist, or even in certain instances helped to 
facilitate, the stakes of these ethico-epistemic distinctions could not have been higher for her (RJ, 
42-3).   																																																																																																																																																																																		
correspondence with the various Jewish intellectuals who frequented her famous Salons has seen renewed 
interest since Barbara Hahn’s encyclopedic, six volume edition, Rahel – Ein Buch des Andenkens für ihre 
Freunde, has made it infinitely more accessible to scholars. The impact that Arendt’s studies on 
Varnhagen had on her entire corpus are difficult to overstate. Throughout her writings Arendt never 
relinquished the lens through which she viewed Varnhagen’s life – which focused almost entirely on 
Varnhagen’s ability to overcome her parvenu tendencies in favor of finally embracing her status as a 
Jewish pariah (see, Barbara Hahn’s insightful “Im Schlaf bin ich wacher” Die Träume der Rahel Levin 
Varnhagen, Frankfurt: Luchterland, 1990, for more on	this). As the political theorist Judith Shklar	
explains, “Arendt deeply identified with Rahel as their common world was coming to an end, but she was 
also quite critical of Rahel’s moral cowardice and her frantic assimilation that ended in baptism, when she 
married Varnhagen. It was as if Arendt were warning herself not to lapse into Jewish self-hatred.  
Heinrich Heine eventually saved Rahel from this blight, as Arendt learned to save herself” (Shklar, 
“Hannah Arendt as Pariah”, 362). Shklar’s assessment of Arendt’s “severe judgment” of “German Jews 
for many of their own troubles” remains a subject of some, surprisingly long-lasting and yet still very 
heated, debate, but her conclusion that Arendt’s “return to this theme over and over [came] often at 
considerable cost to herself and others” is surely on target (ibid, 363).			
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These examples illustrate the point that work on the problem of epistemic injustice has a 
long and rich lineage. These two thinkers’ roots go much deeper than I’ve briefly outlined here. 
Though they draw on vastly different resources, all of them are, in Lorde’s words, “ancient…and 
deep” (SO, 37). Ignoring the historical insights we can glean from within these traditions would 
only cripple our work on this, as it turns out, rather hoary problem. And so, as noted, we begin in 
media res, or, in the midst of things – each of us bearing the marks of the various traditions that 
have most impacted us, as do our main interlocutors on this journey. 
A Final Note on the Method 
 
This brings me to a final note on the method I will use throughout this chapter.  Although 
the conversation I hope to begin is indeed a conversation between Hannah Arendt and Audre 
Lorde, we will spend scant time on their works in this chapter. Rest assured, ample time will be 
allotted to excavating Lorde’s and Arendt’s insights into the problem of epistemic injustice in the 
coming chapters. But we will spend the bulk of this chapter introducing the problem of epistemic 
injustice itself; drawing heavily on Miranda Fricker’s influential account of the problem. Before 
we delve into Fricker’s work, we will explore some of the underpinnings of the movement from 
traditional epistemology to social epistemology, taking Patricia Hill Collins as our guide. This 
brief review of the motivations behind the recent shift from traditional to social epistemology 
will help lay the groundwork, both for situating Fricker’s work within its historical context, and 
for beginning to identify how the problem of epistemic injustice has come to inhabit the center of 
so many recent debates within the field of social epistemology.   
Part I: The Turn from Traditional to Social Epistemology 
 
In her germinal work, Black Feminist Thought, Patricia Hill Collins explores some of the 
underpinnings of what would become known as the field of social epistemology by challenging 
	 12	
widely accepted definitions of traditional epistemology. Collins begins rather un-controversially 
by explaining how, “Epistemology constitutes an overarching theory of knowledge…It 
investigates the standards used to assess knowledge or why we believe what we believe to be 
true” (252). But she continues with this more controversial disclaimer: “Far from being the 
apolitical study of truth, epistemology points to the ways in which power relations shape who is 
believed and why” (252). Collins’ introduction of power relations into the study of knowledge 
marks her point of departure from what are now often considered to be “traditional” 
epistemological approaches; from there she begins laying some of the groundwork for what she 
terms “Black Feminist Epistemology.”12   
In calling her work a new epistemology instead of a new methodology or epistemological 
paradigm, Collins is both aligning herself with, and creatively challenging, the works of other 
pioneers like Sandra Harding13 and Lorraine Code14 who, in the early 1980’s, began to contest 
the univocity of the study of knowledge by introducing what they, and others alongside them, 
termed “feminist epistemology.” The claim that there can be a new type of epistemology, or even 
multiple epistemologies, flies in the face of traditional epistemology, for no matter how heated 
exchanges between epistemologists might become, disputes over such things as the nature of 
knowledge and /or the most reliable procedures for obtaining it have largely been considered 
intermural. This is not to suggest, however, that there haven’t been deep cracks in the 
foundations of ‘traditional epistemology’ from the beginning. We will review a few of these 
shortly. 
																																																								
12 See esp. chapter 11 of Collins’ Black Feminist Thought, entitled, “Black Feminist Epistemology.”  
13 See, for instance, Harding’s 1982 Feminism and Methodology (Indiana University Press). 
14 Code’s 1981 article “Is the Sex of the Knower Epistemologically Significant?” in Metaphilosophy (12: 
267-276) was, for instance, one of the earliest works of feminist epistemology.	
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 Although Harding’s and Code’s work builds upon earlier challenges posed to traditional 
epistemic practices – recall, for instance, Sojourner Truth’s contributions to these discussions 
mentioned above – since they explicitly rejected many of the core commitments of traditional 
epistemology while yet situating their work within the overall field of epistemology, it was 
considered quite groundbreaking nonetheless. Early feminist epistemologists like Harding and 
Code aimed to shatter what was left of the veneer of the, supposedly singular, unified body of 
work known as ‘epistemology’ when they introduced feminist social and political concerns into 
the study of knowledge.  
But before feminist epistemologists got very far along in the project of articulating the 
ways in which feminist epistemology differed from traditional epistemology, early Black 
feminist epistemologists like Kimberlé Crenshaw and Patricia Hill Collins began to contest the 
characterization of what was being termed feminist epistemology. They pointed to the ways in 
which the epistemological issues being articulated as “feminist” often failed to account for many 
of the epistemological questions and concerns of Black feminists. Collins, drawing on 
Crenshaw’s work that challenged mainstream epistemic paradigms,15 boldly began laying the 
foundations for what she termed “Black Feminist Epistemology” in order to correct for these 
lacunas.   
Since then we’ve seen multiple iterations of feminist epistemologies, epistemologies of 
ignorance, Black feminist epistemologies, etc. And while each of these fall under the rubric of 
social epistemology, what we’re calling ‘social epistemology’ is no more univocal than are they 
– what we have are actually social epistemologies. As Collins helpfully explains,  
Distinguishing among epistemologies, paradigms, and methodologies can prove to be 
useful in understanding the significance of competing epistemologies. In contrast to 																																																								
15 See Crenshaw’s “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, Violence Against Women 
of Color” Stanford Law Review (1985) Vol. 43: 1241. 
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epistemologies, paradigms encompass interpretive frameworks such as intersectionality 
that are used to explain social phenomena. Methodology refers to the broad principles of 
how to conduct research and how interpretive paradigms are to be applied. The level of 
epistemology is important because it determines which questions merit investigation, 
which interpretive frameworks will be used to analyze findings, and to what use any 
ensuing knowledge will be put. (252)  
 
On the importance of ‘the level of epistemology’ Harding and Code et al agreed with 
Collins and other black feminist epistemologists. Finding many of their epistemological 
questions discarded as not ‘merit[ing] investigation’, their choices of interpretive frameworks 
questioned, and the uses to which they aimed to put ‘any ensuing knowledge’ regularly degraded 
by mainstream epistemologists, early feminist epistemologists set out, not to reform traditional 
epistemology, but to create an entirely new epistemology. They concerned themselves with 
questions about how one’s gendered “standpoint” could affect the type of knowledge she might 
produce, how it might color her epistemic judgments, and vivify certain political goals, for 
instance. What these early feminist epistemologists largely failed to ask, among other things, was 
whether and how the standards used to assess what counts as knowledge and why might differ 
between white women and Black women. What might the role of experience, for instance, play 
in the credibility assessments of white women versus Black women?   
As Collins explains, “For most African-American women those individuals who have 
lived through the experiences about which they claim to be experts are more believable and 
credible than those who have merely read or thought about such experiences. Thus lived 
experience as a criterion for credibility frequently is invoked by U.S. Black women when making 
knowledge claims” (257). As Collins perceptively notes, however, even if those early feminist 
epistemologists and the pioneering Black feminist epistemologists who challenged them had 
shared in the assessment that lived experience should outweigh “book learning” as a criterion for 
assessing one’s credibility, the fact that not all experiences are equally valued might still 
	 15	
preclude white feminists from seeking out Black feminist voices – no matter how experienced. 
Collins, expanding on Crenshaw’s insights, points out, for instance, that, “knowledge about the 
dynamics of intersecting oppressions…has been so essential to U.S. Black women’s survival,” 
that it is often highly prized among Black women in the U.S. (257). Thanks to their different 
experiences in the world, white women in the U.S. may not easily perceive the value of this type 
of knowledge, and therefore never care even to seek out those experienced epistemic agents who 
might credibly speak to such issues.   
Just as Collins suggests, differences of opinion over, 1) ‘which questions merit 
investigation’, 2) ‘which interpretive frameworks will be used to analyze findings’, and 3) ‘to 
what use any ensuing knowledge will be put’ amount to differences in epistemologies. And 
although they may in many ways be quite substantial, the distance between the various social 
epistemologies on these questions begins to appear rather navigable when compared to the gulf 
that separates them from traditional epistemologies. What Harding, Code and Collins all agreed 
on was that whatever criteria might be used to determine ‘which questions merit investigation’, 
‘which interpretive frameworks will be used to analyze findings,’ and ‘to what use any ensuing 
knowledge will be put’, it won’t be impartially or apolitically determined. It will, just as with all 
epistemic criteria, be determined by socially, economically, and politically situated epistemic 
agents who can be swayed by any number of factors generally eschewed as “non-epistemic” 
throughout the history of Western epistemology: power relations, prejudices, socio-economic 
inequalities, and the like. This means that epistemic practices, no matter how theoretical, are still 
social phenomena, and the study of epistemology is, whether recognized or not, a social study.  
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Part II: A Taxonomy of Epistemic Injustice – Miranda Fricker’s Neo-Aristotelian 
Framework 
 
Miranda Fricker’s important contribution to the long history of theoretical work centering 
on the social aspects of everyday epistemic practices, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics 
of Knowing, takes much of what Collins’ and others before her had to say about the social, 
political, and ethical aspects of our epistemic practices as given. Hoping first to clarify what she 
sees as the somewhat nebulous ethico-epistemic concerns raised by Collins et al, Fricker begins 
by offering a simple taxonomy of what she identifies as the domain of “epistemic injustice,” and 
proceeds methodically through to the enumeration of various genera and species of the problem. 
This reconstruction of the problem of epistemic injustice aims at yielding clearly identifiable 
epistemic vices, vices which Fricker associates with particular instances of epistemic injustice 
that exemplify what she deems to be central cases of the two main forms of epistemic injustice 
her work addresses: testimonial injustice, and hermeneutical injustice. Once identified, Fricker 
offers a set of ethico-epistemic virtues capable of effectively combatting the ethico-epistemic 
vices present in the central cases of both forms of epistemic injustice.  
As we can already begin to see from her focus on vices and virtues, Fricker’s self-
identified “neo-Aristotelian” approach to the problem of epistemic injustice relies, not only on 
methods of categorization reminiscent of that great categorizer Aristotle, but also on a distinctly 
neo-Aristotelian conception of virtue ethics, applied to the realm of epistemology. Finding both 
“Anglo-American epistemology” and Anglo-American ethics ill equipped to address “Ideas with 
a politicizing portent for how we think about our epistemic relations – ideas such as that 
epistemic trust might have an irrepressible connection with social power, or that social 
disadvantage can produce unjust epistemic disadvantage,” Fricker seeks to identify an alternative 
approach that takes both ethics and epistemology into account, and finds it in virtue epistemology 
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(2). Attempting to engineer a hybrid approach capable of addressing both ethical/ social /political 
and epistemic concerns, Fricker explains, “I hope to show that virtue epistemology provides a 
general epistemological idiom in which these issues can be fruitfully discussed” (2).   
While I take issue with both her reconstruction of the problem of epistemic injustice and 
her preferred method of addressing it, ultimately I find in Fricker’s work a useful starting point 
for our excursion into the problem. Fricker’s explicit adoption of an Aristotelian “form of moral 
cognitivism in the virtue ethical tradition which advances the idea of moral perception,” for 
instance, provides particularly fruitful ground for a reconsideration of what constitutes epistemic 
injustice, or ‘being harmed in one’s capacity as a knower’ in the first place (71). The intimate 
connection between knowledge and perception was a concern of both Hannah Arendt’s and 
Audre Lorde’s. While Fricker is right to attribute many of the harms of epistemic injustice to 
failures in ethico-epistemic vision, without the aid of Arendt’s and Lorde’s insights into the 
nature of the link between knowledge and perception, Fricker’s account founders on several 
counts.  
Fricker fails adequately to address the ways in which novel knowledges might be 
perceived and begin to enter into our everyday epistemic practices, for instance. As we will see 
further in the coming chapters, both Lorde and Arendt move decidedly beyond Fricker’s account 
of the problem of epistemic injustice. They both, for example, exploit the nature of the link 
between knowledge and perception in ways that can capture how such epistemic phenomena as 
novel meanings, unique epistemic concepts, and even new knowledges might come to be 
perceived and subsequently understood. In identifying the key role that moral perception plays in 
the problem of epistemic injustice, Fricker’s work provides an excellent entry into a discussion 
of the ethico-epistemic import of Arendt’s and Lorde’s socio-political writings.   
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It is Fricker’s ability to highlight such key aspects of what constitutes the problem of 
epistemic injustice, coupled with her emphasis on identifying the potential pitfalls into which any 
intervention into epistemically unjust practices may stray, that recommend her groundbreaking 
work on epistemic injustice as a fruitful starting point for our intervention into current debates 
surrounding the problem of epistemic injustice. We will spend the greater portion of the 
remainder of this chapter elucidating Fricker’s account of the problem of epistemic injustice, 
focusing primarily on her preferred “solution” to it. Fricker’s defense of the virtue epistemic 
framework she employs is perhaps most illuminating in its identification of the challenges that 
any adequate solution to the problem of epistemic injustice must address. We will therefore, in 
some detail, explore Fricker’s self-identified motives for championing the neo-Aristotelian, 
virtue-epistemic framework she used to situate both the problem and its solution. But before we 
begin our examination of Fricker’s response, let’s start with a brief overview of her account of 
the problem itself.   
The Two Forms of Epistemic Injustice 
Throughout her work, Fricker attempts to “bring to light certain ethical aspects of two of 
our most basic everyday epistemic practices: conveying knowledge to others by telling them, and 
making sense of our own social experiences” (Fricker, 1). In drawing our attention to the ethical 
aspects of these epistemic practices, Fricker hopes to clarify the ways in which they are disrupted 
in cases of epistemic injustice. She identifies two primary forms of epistemic injustice that 
correlate to the basic everyday epistemic practices listed above:  
…testimonial injustice occurs when prejudices cause a hearer to give a deflated level of 
credibility to a speaker’s word; hermeneutical injustice occurs at a prior stage, when a 
gap in collective interpretive resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage when it 
comes to making sense of their social experiences. An example of the first might be that 
the police do not believe you because you are black; an example of the second might be 
that you suffer sexual harassment in a culture that still lacks that critical concept. (1)  
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Fricker’s example of testimonial injustice, ‘that the police do not believe you because you 
are black,’16 serves to illustrate what Fricker calls “the central case of testimonial injustice… 
[which occurs wherein] a speaker suffers in receiving deflated credibility from the hearer owing 
to identity prejudice on the hearer’s part” (4). In the case of testimonial injustice, it is the group 
identity of the knowledge giver and not the supposed dubiousness of the content of her testimony 
that leads to her unfair credibility assessment. When certain epistemic agents are deemed less 
trustworthy than others, not because of the poor quality of their testimony, but instead due to 
identity prejudices against them, testimonial injustice occurs. Fricker further clarifies, “We might 
say that testimonial injustice is caused by prejudice in the economy of credibility,” and 
concludes, “Thus the central case of testimonial injustice can be defined…as identity-prejudicial 
credibility deficit” (Fricker, 1,4). It is important to note that “the economy of credibility” from 
whence the prejudice in question is drawn is presented as the singular economy, and not one 
economy among a plurality. It is from this singular economy of credibility that the hearer in the 
above example presumably draws his identity-prejudicial negative credibility assessment.  
Fricker contends that the “primary form of epistemic injustice [is] testimonial injustice” 
(4). Owing ostensibly to its primacy, Fricker spends the greater part of her book elucidating the 
harms of testimonial injustice, and scant space on the secondary form of epistemic injustice: 
hermeneutical injustice, which, recall, occurs at a prior stage, when a gap in collective 
interpretive resources puts someone ‘at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to making sense of 
their social experiences.’ The women who suffered sexual harassment before the term “sexual 																																																								
16 Although I find this example problematic in a number of ways, starting with the fact that some 
members of the police force are Black, a fuller critique of it here would lead us too far astray from our 
current focus, which is to outline Fricker’s account of the problem of epistemic injustice. Although it is 
surely the case that racial prejudices all-too-often play a major role in the unjust ethico-epistemic 
interactions between police and Black folk, there are important ways in which we will begin to trouble 
this overly simplistic example in the fourth and final chapter of this work. (See pages ** for more.) 
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harassment” even existed, for instance, suffered also from a hermeneutical injustice, on Fricker’s 
account: they experienced the sexual harassment while at the same time not being able to make 
sense of it.17 In cases of hermeneutical injustice, one’s inability to make sense of her own social 
experiences, Fricker explains, “stem[s] from a gap in collective hermeneutical resources – a gap, 
that is, in our shared tools of social interpretation” (6). In this case, what’s important to note is 
that the ‘collective hermeneutical resources’ in which the gap appears is, like ‘the economy of 
credibility,’ a singular collective consisting of ‘our shared tools.’ 
Hermeneutical injustice differs from testimonial injustice in several ways, on Fricker’s 
account. Most importantly, hermeneutical injustice is structural, whereas testimonial injustice is 
perpetrated on a one-to-one basis by individual interlocutors, themselves each responsible for 
their own ethico-epistemic prejudices. Fricker is careful to point out that, owing to its structural 																																																								
17 In detailing the features of this example, Fricker compellingly relates the story (originally told in Susan 
Brownmiller’s memoir about the early days of the feminist movement) of Carmita Wood, single mother 
of two, suffering from what came to be known as sexual harassment. Wood had been repeatedly sexually 
harassed by a “distinguished professor” in Cornell’s department of nuclear physics, where she worked as 
a lab assistant. Eventually developing physical pains that she understood as related to the psychological 
stresses that she had been under, Wood finally gave up on devising ways to avoid her aggressor and quit 
her job. She was subsequently denied unemployment benefits because she had left “voluntarily.” It was 
not until Wood tried to explain her experiences to other women at Cornell, all of whom (staff and 
students alike) had experienced similar issues that she had the opportunity to come to grips with the 
character of her experiences.	Together,	the	group	decided	to	push	back	and	fight	Wood’s	
unemployment insurance decision. They further arranged speak-outs in order to break the silences 
surrounding the phenomenon of sexual harassment – but before they could articulate their arguments, or 
identify the content of their speak-outs, the needed to name the problem they wished to address. They 
knew that it wasn’t quite sexual ‘intimidation’ or ‘coercion’ or ‘exploitation’, but they were also 
determined not to call it something so benign as unwanted ‘flirting’. It was certainly more than that. 
When they finally arrived at the right moniker, there was an instantaneous, unanimous agreement among 
them: the target of their fight was sexual harassment, two words never before put together in such a way 
as to describe the widespread phenomenon occurring across the country. Once named, they quickly 
formed a movement around it, ultimately leading to the laws prohibiting sexual harassment that (still to 
disquieting degrees of success) we have in the U.S. today. In the language of Fricker’s framework, what 
Carmita Wood suffered alongside her experience of sexual harassment was hermeneutical injustice, 
wherein the gap in hermeneutical resources left out the name and concept of sexual harassment, rendering 
her understanding of her experiences in some important ways, unintelligible even to herself.  (See pages 
149-162 of Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing for more on this story.) Note: 
I will take issue with some of the assumptions Fricker makes in detailing this example in the coming 
pages (see pgs. 23-26).	
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nature, there is no individually identifiable perpetrator of the harm of hermeneutical injustice. 
Detractors of her theory may object that where there is no perpetrator there can be no injustice, 
but Fricker is well prepared for this objection; arguing that there is more to hermeneutical 
injustice than mere “epistemic bad luck” by pointing out that “it is no accident that the cognitive 
disadvantage created by this gap impinges unequally on different social groups” (6).   
Fricker argues that the harms of hermeneutical injustice accrue most often to those 
epistemic agents who are socially /politically /economically underprivileged or oppressed, for it 
is most often the meanings of their experiences that fail to appear in the ‘collective interpretive 
resources’. Fricker identifies this group, whose meanings regularly fail to appear in the collective 
interpretive resources, as “hermeneutically marginalized – that is, they participate unequally in 
the practices through which social meanings are generated on the basis of their group identities” 
(6). This marginalization is an actual ethico-epistemic harm and not mere bad luck insofar as it 
results from social and political structures heavily influenced and maintained by relations of 
power, wherein those in powerful positions uphold the status quo in myriad ways that work 
together to institute and perpetuate the marginalization that systematically excludes certain 
epistemic agents from meaning-making practices.   
The Nature of the Relationship Between the Two Forms of Epistemic Injustice 
When it comes to the nature of the relationship between these two forms of epistemic 
injustice, Fricker’s account is woefully underdeveloped. Her taxonomy of epistemic injustices is 
elegantly simple, and involves a rather straightforward hierarchy: testimonial injustice is the 
‘primary’ form of epistemic injustice, and therefore that with which she is primarily interested in 
explicating. Hermeneutical injustice is a background injustice operating in some shadowy form 
at the structural level, on which she exerts few resources. But, as Fricker points out, the common 
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denominator between them is clearly the social groups within which both forms of epistemic 
injustice are most likely to appear: those socially, politically, and economically underprivileged 
or oppressed groups, whose testimony is unfairly pre-judged and whose meanings fail to appear 
in the collective interpretive resources.  
While it seems that there is much more to be said about the relationship between 
testimonial and hermeneutical injustices, Fricker goes no further than to briefly acknowledge 
their “deep connection” in a single aside in her one, rather anemic chapter on hermeneutical 
injustice, she notes: 
The primary harm of (the central case of) testimonial injustice concerns exclusion from 
the pooling of knowledge owing to identity prejudice on the part of the hearer; the 
primary harm of (the central case of) hermeneutical injustice concerns exclusion from the 
pooling of knowledge owing to structural identity prejudice in the collective 
hermeneutical resource. The first prejudicial exclusion is made in relation to the speaker, 
the second in relation to what they are trying to say and/or how they are saying it. The 
wrongs involved in the two sorts of epistemic injustice, then, have a common epistemic 
significance running through them – prejudicial exclusion from participation in the 
spread of knowledge. (162, emphasis mine) 
 
After acknowledging that at the heart of all epistemic injustice lies what Fricker calls ‘identity 
prejudice,’ or “prejudices against people qua social type,” manifesting in ‘prejudicial exclusion 
from participation in the spread of knowledge’, Fricker all but draws her discussion of the 
relationship between testimonial and hermeneutical injustice to a close (4).    
While the above acknowledgement points to the facts that both testimonial injustice and 
hermeneutical injustice 1) stem from the same source: identity prejudices, and 2) result in a 
significant form of shared harm: ‘prejudicial exclusion from the participation in the spread of 
knowledge’, it also clarifies some important differences between the two forms of epistemic 
injustice. First, it highlights the fact that the prejudicial exclusion involved in testimonial 
injustice ‘is made in relation to the speaker,’ whereas the prejudicial exclusion involved in 
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hermeneutical injustice is made ‘in relation to what they are trying to say/ how they are saying 
it.’ Second, it identifies the source of testimonial injustice as ‘the hearer’ and the source of 
hermeneutical injustice as ‘structural inequalities.’    
What I want to highlight here is the following fact: the prejudicially negative credibility 
assessments involved in testimonial injustice are made by hearers in regards to certain speakers, 
and the negative intelligibility assessments involved in instances of hermeneutical injustice are 
made by both speakers and hearers in regards to the testimony of, once again, certain speakers. 
Although, as Fricker notes, the hearers, in cases of hermeneutical injustice, may well assess the 
intelligibility of hermeneutically marginalized speakers as less than optimal, what constitutes the 
primary harm of hermeneutical injustice is the fact that hermeneutically marginalized speakers 
can’t make sense of their own social experiences, even to themselves. Fricker highlights this 
aspect of hermeneutical injustice when she refers to it as “an asymmetrical cognitive 
disadvantage” that accrues mainly to the hermeneutically marginalized (161). Fricker is careful 
to point out that the asymmetry of this ‘cognitive disadvantage’ is not the fault of the 
hermeneutically marginalized, but instead results from the harm of hermeneutical injustice. 
Because it limits the hermeneutically marginalized from contributing equally to meaning-making 
practices, the ‘gap in the collective hermeneutical resources’ that hermeneutical injustice creates 
is one that “prevents [the hermeneutically marginalized] in particular from making sense of an 
experience which it is strongly in their interests to render intelligible” (7).   
I find these and other descriptions of hermeneutically marginalized epistemic agents 
throughout Miranda Fricker’s work in many ways troubling. Fricker refers to hermeneutically 
marginalized epistemic agents as not only, ‘cognitively disadvantaged,’ but also “cognitively 
disabled,” “cognitively and expressively handicapped,” and indicates that they often find 
themselves “struggling to make [themselves] intelligible” (151,159, 170). To be clear, Fricker 
not only places no blame on those hermeneutically marginalized epistemic agents for their 
‘disablement,’ she further stresses that because both the hermeneutically marginalized and the 
hermeneutically privileged are drawing from the same, singular ‘collective hermeneutical 
resources,’ the hermeneutically privileged share in each of these ‘disadvantages,’ ‘disablements,’ 
and ‘handicaps.’ She even takes pains to point out that, for instance, in the case of Carmita 
Wood, whose experience of sexual harassment we reviewed earlier, “the lack of proper 
understanding of women’s experience of sexual harassment was a collective disadvantage more 
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or less shared by all” (151). Fricker further clarifies that, “harasser and harassee alike are 
cognitively handicapped by the hermeneutical lacuna – neither has a proper understanding of 
how he is treating her” (151). However, at this point, I want to object.   
It may well be the case that both ‘harasser and harassee’ had trouble fully appreciating 
the level and /or the nature of harm being committed against Carmita Wood at the time it was 
committed; but if nothing else is clear from her story it must be appreciated that Ms. Wood at 
least grasped something of the level and nature of the harms she suffered. I expect that most 
women who suffered from sexual harassment prior to the time that it was labeled as such 
understood much more than Fricker allows about their own experiences. I also expect that in 
their cases there was some kind of evidence that might have supported their objections to such 
harassment if indeed they were ever able to speak them.   
In the case of Carmita Wood, the evidence supporting the claim that she understood 
something of the nature of her victimhood seems substantial. First, as Fricker explains, Wood 
“went out of her way” to avoid her aggressor, then suffered “stress…[that] brought on a host of 
physical symptoms” (150). Fricker continues, “Wood developed chronic back and neck pains. 
Her right thumb tingled and grew numb. She requested a transfer to another department, and 
when it didn’t come through, she quit” (150). And upon return from her trip to “Florida for some 
rest and recuperation,” Wood attempted to speak of her experiences with other women, who, “to 
a person, every one of [them] – the women on staff, Carmita, the students – had had an 
experience like this at some point” (150).   
Now I’ll readily grant that the hermeneutical injustice at play in this case served to  
hamper Carmita Wood’s attempts to speak of it to others, but I disagree with the way in which 
Fricker characterizes the hermeneutical injustice that occurred. What I want to suggest is that 
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though there are ‘gaps in collective interpretive resources’ that impinge unequally on the 
hermeneutically marginalized and the hermeneutically privileged, there exists more than one set 
of collective hermeneutical resources. Whether or not the gaps in one affect the others is up for 
debate; my point here is to suggest that these are the kinds of debates we should be having, not 
debates over who was more or less ‘cognitively disabled’ by the gaps in only the mainstream 
collective hermeneutical resources.   
But for the record, I submit that it is almost always the socially, politically, and 
economically privileged epistemic agent who suffers most from the kinds of ‘cognitive 
handicaps’ of which Miranda Fricker speaks. Fricker’s blind spot as to the existence of 
alternative epistemic resources is simply stunning, as is her description of the ways in which 
“social power has an unfair impact on collective forms of social understanding,” which is to 
suggest that we: 
…entertain the idea that relations of unequal power can skew shared hermeneutical 
resources so that the powerful tend to have appropriate understandings of their 
experiences ready to draw on as they make sense of their social experiences, whereas the 
powerless are more likely to find themselves having some social experiences through a 
glass darkly, with at best ill-fitting meanings to draw on in the effort to render them 
intelligible. (148) 
 
As José Medina convincingly argues, with respect to “the hermeneutical gaps that emerge 
from structures of oppression and identity prejudices…Not only are the privileged subjects not 
exempted from the hermeneutical harms, but they are in fact more negatively affected in some 
areas of their experience” (Medina, “Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism” 
213). In other words, on Medina’s account, Wood had a much higher chance of possessing an 
‘appropriate understanding’ of her experiences ‘ready to draw on’ as she made sense of them 
than did her harasser. I think Medina is entirely right in this assessment. And of Fricker’s 
suggestion that the hermeneutically marginalized experience their lives ‘through a glass darkly,’ 
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Medina makes short work. In a direct reference to Fricker’s claim he suggests that it is in fact 
“the powerful who tend to have ‘some social experiences through a glass darkly,’ enjoying 
precarious interpretive resources (if any at all), as seems to be the case in the phenomenon of 
white ignorance” (213, emphasis in original).18   
 Although there is much more to be said in regards to the plurality of both testimonial and 
hermeneutical resources, we will leave our in-depth analyses of the multiple ‘economies of 
credibility’ and ‘collective hermeneutical resources’ that might exist for the coming chapters.  
Audre Lorde and Hannah Arendt offer invaluable insights into the possible contours of such 
resources, and into the kinds of ethico-epistemic riches we might expect to find there. As we will 
further explore in the next section of this chapter, because she failed to offer an account of these 
alternative epistemic resources, Fricker, far from offering a solution to the problem of epistemic 
injustice, has unknowingly and unintentionally offered instead yet another instance of it.  
Challenging Fricker’s Monological Intervention 
 
Had she further explored the complex relationship between testimonial and hermeneutical 
injustices with an eye for the ways in which those hermeneutically marginalized epistemic agents 
suffering from the harms of both forms of epistemic injustice experienced them, Fricker might 
have seen that there is not one pool of epistemic resources constituting a single reference point 
wherein all of our ‘collective hermeneutical resources’ lie. There are instead many pools offering 
a variety of resources from within which various epistemic agents can draw the meanings by 
which they understand their lives. Structural injustice entails many harms, but it does not destroy 
																																																								
18 Medina’s reference to ‘the phenomenon of white ignorance’ is anything but beside the point here, see 
Charles Mills’ White Ignorance, as well as his “Comment on Medina and Fricker” in Social Epistemology 
Review and Reply Collective, (2013) Vol. 3, No. 1, 38-43 for more on this.  I will return to Mills’ account 
of white ignorance in chapter three in order to flesh out some of the key differences between Fricker’s 
concept of hermeneutical injustice and Mills’ account of white ignorance (see pgs **).   
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the “social imaginaries”19 of underprivileged or oppressed groups entirely. All epistemic agents, 
by virtue of the fact that they inhabit a pluralistic socio-political world, have access to more than 
one social imaginary.  
And this multiplicity of collective hermeneutical resources, or social imaginaries, entails 
a multiplicity of economies of credibility from within which a plurality of epistemic agents may 
draw the strength to testify to the meanings found in their group’s social imaginaries. That is to 
say, however devastating the effects of epistemic injustice might be to those epistemic agents 
suffering from it, its effects are never totalizing. However denied or ignored from within 
mainstream epistemic practices, there are resources available to those epistemic agents 
attempting to give voice to meanings not yet imagined in mainstream social imaginaries, and not 
yet valued in mainstream epistemic economies.  
The harms of epistemic injustice are not neutralized by the presence of alternative 
epistemic resources from which hermeneutically marginalized epistemic agents can draw the 
meanings that sustain and make sense of their lives. The fact that one has alternative 
hermeneutical resources available to her (and again, I submit that we all have multiple social 
imaginaries from which we draw the meanings of our lives) does not mean that she doesn’t 
suffer when her credibility or epistemic agency has been prejudicially negatively assessed by 
those appealing primarily to mainstream social imaginaries. This is especially true when one has 
a vested interest in being perceived as credible or as a capable contributor to meaning-making 
																																																								19	Originally coined by Cornelius Castoriadis, this useful term, “social imaginary,” is now employed by 
many social epistemologists working on epistemic injustice to refer to the kinds of pooled hermeneutical 
resources to which Fricker here refers.  (See Medina, Alcoff, et al.) Although Fricker shies away from 
using this particular phrase thanks to its complex “psychoanalytic roots,” (Fricker, 38) I find it a helpfully 
descriptive concept, in part because of its complex psychoanalytic roots, which help explain how 
unconscious biases can be internally conflicting and yet impact our judgments – ethical, epistemic, and 
otherwise.				
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practices from within mainstream social imaginaries.  
Fricker had nothing to lose by acknowledging the existence of multiple social 
imaginaries, for there remains a serious ethico-epistemic harm being committed and requiring 
imaginative and thoughtful responses. So what was it that caused Fricker to hold to such a rigidly 
monological account of the problem of epistemic injustice? To answer this question we must 
investigate Fricker’s preferred response to the problem of epistemic injustice in some detail.   
Part III: Miranda Fricker’s Virtue-Epistemic Response 
 
In this section we will review Miranda Fricker’s response to the problem of epistemic 
injustice in order to flesh-out her primary motivations for offering the particular solutions she 
chose. Although I will, as indicated, ultimately reject Fricker’s proposed solution to the problem 
of epistemic injustice, I do find her elucidation of the motivations she had for formulating her 
response in the way that she did quite compelling. In fact, I submit that any adequate response to 
the problem of epistemic injustice must take these motivations just as seriously as does Fricker’s. 
And so, in the name of identifying the important issues that any alternative account must address, 
let’s review Fricker’s response to the problem of epistemic injustice. 
As noted earlier, Fricker considers testimonial injustice to be the “primary form of 
epistemic injustice,” and she therefore not only begins with it, but spends the greater part of her 
book on it, offering only one slim chapter on hermeneutical injustice at the end of her book (EI, 
4). Fricker’s motivations for offering a non-inferentialist, virtue epistemic response to the 
problem of epistemic injustice as a whole is therefore almost entirely tied up with the ways in 
which identity prejudices, which, recall, lie at the heart of both forms of epistemic injustice, 
impact testimonial injustice. Although much more needs to be said about the problem of 
hermeneutical injustice and the ways in which identity prejudices impact it, for now we will 
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follow Fricker in focusing on the problem of testimonial injustice in order to identify her reasons 
for offering the non-inferentialist, virtue-epistemic solution that she chose.  
We will return to the problem of hermeneutical injustice towards the end of our critique 
of Fricker’s response to the problem of testimonial injustice. As we will see, Fricker’s failure 
fully to flesh out the complex nature of the relationship between testimonial and hermeneutical 
injustice is what led to her problematic under-theorization of the mechanism whereby epistemic 
agents can begin to overcome the negative impact that the prejudicial images in their social 
imaginaries can have on their ethico-epistemic judgments. Fricker ultimately offers an anemic 
account of epistemic resources, one that falls in line with her overall epistemological 
commitments which include, most problematically, a commitment to a universal and univocal 
conception of reason that all-too-narrowly delimits the boundaries of what counts as a rational 
speech. I argue that my more robust account of epistemic resources, which includes multiple 
pools of ‘collective hermeneutical resources’ and ‘economies of credibility’, better appreciates 
the nature of the relationship between hermeneutical and testimonial injustice. Since the seeds of 
Fricker’s failure to fully flesh out this relationship were sown in her handling of her solution to 
the problem of testimonial injustice, we will now turn our attention to it. 
Identity Prejudices at the Testimonial Level: Perception v. Belief 
 
Since the problem of testimonial injustice finds its genesis in identity-prejudices that have 
hardened into inveterate practices of prejudicially perceiving certain speakers as unreliable 
testifiers, Fricker argues that any solution to the problem must begin by addressing prejudicial 
perceptions instead of prejudicial beliefs. There is much appeal to this approach: first, it 
acknowledges how difficult it is to combat identity-prejudices given their tendency to operate at 
a non-doxastic level. Identity prejudices wouldn’t be prejudices (pre-judgments) if they relied on 
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beliefs formed by identifying and articulating conceptual categories of ‘credible’ and ‘non-
credible’ under which various types of speakers could be subsumed.20 For Fricker, the fact that 
credibility assessments are often predicated on non-doxastic perceptions instead of doxastically 
mediated beliefs helps clarify why the problem of testimonial injustice can appear to be so 
intractable.  She explains:  
If we think of a social stereotype as an image which expresses an association between a 
social group and one or more attributes, and which thereby embodies one or more 
generalizations about that social group, then it becomes clearer how its impact on 
judgment can be harder to detect than that of a belief with the same content. Images are 
capable of a visceral impact on judgment, which allows them to condition our judgments 
without our awareness...This is most starkly illustrated when the influence of prejudicial 
images from the social imagination persists in a hearer’s pattern of judgment even where 
their content conflicts with the content of her beliefs. (36-7) 
 
In other words, one can hold entirely non-prejudicial beliefs and yet still act on unconscious 
biases informed by prejudicial perceptions that contradict those beliefs, resulting in epistemically 
unjust behaviors.   
In these cases, there is no merit in attempting to bring the perpetrator of the harm to 
embrace non-prejudicial beliefs about how best to perceive her interlocutors, for she already 
embraces them. And yet she may continue to behave in epistemically unjust ways thanks to the 
unreflective, prejudicial images found in her social imaginary, which can impact her behaviors 
on an unconscious level. This non-doxastic reconstruction of the problem of testimonial injustice 
highlights one of the main challenges to any account of epistemic injustice that takes the problem 																																																								
20 Although Fricker does acknowledge that there are certainly instances of testimonial injustice that 
involve prejudicial stereotypes that are “in part doxastically mediated,” she choses to focus “chiefly on 
the operation of prejudice at the non-doxastic level” (EI, 36). She offers the following reasons for this 
approach: first, she argues, “concentrating on beliefs would lead us to underestimate the incidence of 
testimonial injustice,” and second, since it is “significantly harder reliably to filter out the prejudicial 
stereotypes that inform one’s social perceptions directly, without doxastic mediation…the more 
philosophically interesting prospect is that we may very frequently do it [commit testimonial injustices] in 
spite of them” (EI, 36). As we will see later in the chapter, Fricker returns to the question of how 
prejudicial perceptions and those ‘in part doxastically mediated’ bear on the question of ethico-epistemic 
justification or verification.  
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of prejudices seriously. It also leads to Fricker’s identification of an important hurdle for her 
account to overcome: if prejudicially negative credibility assessments often result from non-
doxastic dispositions and not from the improper application of a set of rules by which one 
categorizes epistemic agents as ‘credible’ or ‘non-credible,’ then how is one to determine 
whether her credibility assessments of speakers are justified? In other words, how can a non-
inferentialist response to the non-doxastic problem of testimonial injustice yield epistemic 
assessments that are critical?   
Testimonial Sensibility Training 
As noted, Fricker turns to a quasi-Aristotelian ‘virtue epistemic’ framework in order to 
craft her solution. Drawing an analogy between “a virtuous agent’s ethical sensibility [and an 
ethico-epistemically virtuous agent’s] well-trained testimonial sensibility” (71, emphasis in 
original). She explains, “The idea of a testimonial sensibility is introduced as a form of rational 
sensitivity that is socially inculcated and trained by countless experiences of testimonial 
exchange, individual and collective. This real-life training instills in the virtuous hearer 
empirically well-grounded habits of epistemically charged social perception, and thus reliable 
perceptual judgments of speaker credibility” (5, emphasis in original).   
Just as Aristotle’s ‘virtuous man’ (sic) is the one who habitually acts virtuously, thereby 
cultivating a virtuous ethical sensibility that allows him to perceive the world virtuously, so 
Fricker’s ‘virtuous hearer’ is the one who habitually listens virtuously, thereby cultivating a 
virtuous testimonial capacity that allows her to perceive epistemic agents and their testimony in a 
virtuous manner. Fricker concludes, “The analogy points us to a way of philosophically 
substantiating the idea that credibility judgments can be perceptual, and I suggest that we have 
here what the epistemology of testimony cries out for: a model for non-inferential judgment” 
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(72). On this account, the responsible epistemic agent’s main duty in regards to the problem of 
testimonial injustice becomes the cultivation of a ‘well-trained testimonial sensibility’ that can 
inform non-prejudicial perceptions grounded in habits of virtuously perceiving epistemic agents.     
Relying on the parallel she draws between a virtuous moral agent and a virtuous 
epistemic agent, Fricker insists that, “The virtuous hearer does not arrive at her credibility 
judgment by applying pre-set principles of any kind, for there are none precise or comprehensive 
enough to do the job. She ‘just sees’ her interlocutor in a certain light, and responds to his word 
accordingly” (75-6). Fricker notes, “In advancing the idea of a testimonial perceptual capacity 
analogous to the virtuous person’s moral perceptual capacity, I have been invoking the 
Aristotelian notion of moral training. But I need to say a little more about how this notion applies 
to the testimonial side of the parallel” (81).   
In regards to the training of one’s testimonial sensibility, Fricker relies on an 
interpretation of cognition that does not neatly separate it from affective content, which she also 
draws from the analogy between Aristotelian virtuous moral agency and virtuous epistemic 
agency:  
…the more Aristotelian conception of emotion allows us to represent the hearer’s feeling 
of trust or distrust, or any other feelings associated with a particular empathetic 
engagement, as making a positive contribution to her epistemically loaded 
perception…When it comes to epistemic trust, as with purely moral trust, it can be good 
advice to listen to one’s emotions, for a virtuous hearer’s emotional responses to different 
speakers in different contexts are trained and honed by experience. (80) 
 
Of course, the experience that counts in this case is that of the virtuous epistemic agent, who has 
already developed a virtuous testimonial sensibility, one “that is socially inculcated and trained 
by countless experiences of testimonial exchange…[which has instilled] in the virtuous hearer 
empirically well-grounded habits of epistemically charged social perception, and thus reliable 
perceptual judgments of speaker credibility” (5).   
	 33	
Fricker also acknowledges the persistent existence of the converse of such virtuous socio-
epistemic habits of perception, namely, that there are empirically grounded habits of 
epistemically charged social perception that are trained by social experiences that are anything 
but virtuous, leading to unreliable perceptual judgments of speaker credibility. These vicious 
habits are, of course, just what lead to the problem of testimonial injustice in the first place: 
So far we have focused on the idea of the well-trained sensibility, but it is well to 
remember the source of bad training that is of central interest to our project: prejudice, 
and most particularly prejudicial stereotypes…We need a conception of human beings as 
formed by the attitudes of their time yet capable of taking a critical stance towards those 
attitudes, and so we need a more historicist and more reflexive conception of ethical 
training than we find in Aristotle. (81-2)  
 
It is here, where her account of virtuous epistemic agency attempts to move beyond the analogy 
she draws with Aristotle’s virtuous moral agency, that Fricker begins to wrestle with the ancient 
epistemic problem of justification, or verification, – in this case, of one’s credibility assessments.  
The problem Fricker here identifies is that if the prejudicial images existing in one’s 
social imaginary were the only possible source of “input” into a hearer’s ethico-epistemic 
perceptual judgments, then there would be no mechanism whereby a hearer might be prompted 
to exchange their ethico-epistemically ‘vicious’ behaviors for more just ones. Although she fails 
to prescribe the proper solution to the problem, Fricker does at least acknowledge that she must 
attempt to move beyond the Aristotelian model and offer a more ‘reflexive conception’ of ethico-
epistemic training. For unless there is some as-yet-unexplained catalyst that might prompt a 
hearer to reflect on her prejudicial perceptions, allowing her to perceive them as ethico-
epistemically vicious, then there is no hope that she will ever attain, or even begin to seek out, 
the kind of ethico-epistemic virtues that Fricker champions.   
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Historicism and Reflexivity: Moving Beyond the Aristotelian Model 
 
 Turning towards her ‘more historicist’ approach Fricker explains, “There have always 
been prejudices (think of Aristotle on slaves and women), but the prejudices that may be in the 
air at any given time change with history” (EI, 81-2). As Fricker’s parenthetical aside attests, 
historical prejudices might not change so very much ‘with history’. However to her point about 
the reflexivity that her account of ethico-epistemic judgments requires, she next observes, 
“Ethical sensibility is given its first form by our being inculcated into the attitudes of the day. 
But we are soon in a position to criticize these attitudes, and so we may, social pressures 
permitting, come to distance ourselves from any given commitment. Historicism brings 
responsibility for who we are” (EI, 82). In regards to ethico-epistemic responsibility, Fricker 
asserts that although one’s particular ethico-epistemic “inheritance” is determined by forces 
beyond the purview of any individual epistemic agent’s capacity to change it, one’s response to 
that inheritance is not. According to Fricker a virtuous testimonial sensibility is forged by one’s 
critical responses to her particular ethico-epistemic historical inheritance. 
While I find Fricker’s appeal to ‘historicism’ as the bringer of ethico-epistemic 
responsibility and agency misguided, her appeal to a more contextualized, historical account of 
how epistemic agents might come to reflect on their own ethico-epistemic prejudices is a 
welcome move. I agree, for instance, with her claim that “One develops an ethical sensibility by 
becoming inculcated into a historically and culturally specific way of life – or, as Alisdair 
MacIntyre puts it, an ethical ‘tradition’” (EI, 82). I further agree that a “responsible hearer’s 
sensibility can mature and adapt in the light of ongoing testimonial experience” (84). What I 
want to reject is Fricker’s claim that the kind of “cognitive dissonance” that might prompt the 
‘maturation’ and ‘adaptation’ of one’s testimonial sensibility arises solely out of the clash 
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between one’s individual and her (singular) social “streams of input…in that order” (EI, 82).   
 Ironically, Fricker insightfully diagnoses exactly what her non-inferentialist, virtue-
epistemic response to the problem of epistemic injustice will need in order to make sense of how 
virtuous epistemic agents may come to perceive their epistemic judgments as either just or 
unjust: some form of dialectic that can provide what Wittgenstein aptly refers to as epistemic 
“friction.”21 Sadly, thanks to her rigidly monological framework, the only potential interlocutors 
she discovers when surveying her all-too-homogeneous ethico-epistemic landscape are the 
epistemic players “I” and a woefully under-defined “we.” The only partners Fricker finds 
available for the kinds of dialogues that might serve as a catalyst for an epistemic agent to reflect 
critically on her socially inculcated testimonial sensibility are one’s self, and a group to which 
this self in dialogue, and apparently every other epistemic agent on the planet, belong, in this 
case, a remarkably nondescript group Fricker refers to as simply “the ethical community” (82).   
An A-Social Social Epistemology? 
 
 There is a curious tension that runs throughout Fricker’s book in regards to her handling 
of the social aspects of social epistemology. She clearly endorses the view that membership in a 
social group bears significantly on one’s socio-epistemic experiences, and acknowledges that 
there are a variety of different types of social groups, some much more ethico-epistemically 
privileged than others. Fricker further recognizes the key role that dissonance plays in an 
epistemic agent’s ability to identify areas in which critical reflection on one’s epistemic practices 
is warranted – it’s what supplies the epistemic friction about which Wittgenstein speaks. 
However, the ways in which an epistemic agent’s experiences of ethico-epistemic dissonance 
come about remain problematically under-theorized in Fricker’s account.   
																																																								21	See	Philosophical	Investigations,	§	107.	
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Though there are a variety of epistemic agents who come from a wide array of social, 
political, and economic backgrounds included in Fricker’s analysis, the fact that she has 
accorded them all only one social imaginary from which to draw their meanings, and one 
economy of credibility by which to measure their knowledge claims, leaves her with a very 
narrow range of ethico-epistemic differences that can actually be accounted for. And it is in the 
differences that are so vast that they cannot even be detected that the lion’s share of epistemic 
injustices occur: when a hearer simply cannot imagine, for instance, that the speaker before her 
might be either a credible testifier or a competent meaning-maker. We will further review the 
ways in which Fricker’s account erases these kinds of differences toward the end of our critique. 
For now, let’s return to Fricker’s handling of how epistemic agents come to reflect critically 
upon their own social imaginaries. 
Forming the Critical Link: An Aristotelian Retreat 
 
Although she earlier declared that she must move beyond the analogous Aristotelian 
account of virtue ethics in order to address the problem of justification for one’s epistemic 
judgments, Fricker quickly retreats to the Aristotelian analogy for aid in constructing her account 
of justifying or evaluating epistemic judgments. She asks,  
What of our ability as hearers to form a critical link with this great passive inheritance 
that conditions the credibility judgments we make? Here again the task is to identify an 
analogy with the ethical case. I have said that an individual’s testimonial sensibility is in 
the first instance passively inherited. But once light has dawned for a hearer… (83) 
 
But Fricker doesn’t follow this up with an adequate explanation as to whence this light 
originated or how it came to such a fortuitous dawn (83).   
As I noted earlier, on Fricker’s account testimonial sensibility is, like its Aristotelian 
counterpart, moral sensibility, informed by “two distinct streams of input: social and individual – 
in that order” (82). Fricker describes the social stream of input as “a passive social inheritance,” 
	 37	
and characterizes the individual stream as “a sometimes-passive-sometimes-active individual 
input from the hearer’s own experience” (83). She contends that “Together the individual and 
collective streams of input are what explain how our normal unreflective reception of what 
people tell us is conditioned by a great range of collateral experience – our informal background 
‘theory’ of socially situated trustworthiness” (83). As to whither and how the ‘critical link with 
this great passive inheritance that conditions the credibility judgments we make’ comes about, 
Fricker has all-too-little to say. She simply refers the reader back to her original “analogy with 
the ethical case,” which she formulates thusly:  
Ethical responsibility demands that the individual generate an appropriate critical link 
between the traditional moment in which she gains her primary ethical socialization and 
the experiences that life offers her – experiences which may sometimes be in tension with 
her ethical socialization so as to prompt critical reflection on the sensibility which she has 
otherwise simply inherited. The epistemic socialization through which virtuous hearers 
gain their testimonial sensibility has a similar structure. (82) 
 
I suppose this means that something like “Ethico-epistemic responsibility” demands that a hearer 
‘generate an appropriate critical link’ between the two streams of input that generate her 
testimonial sensibility.   
 Apart from the fact that she is invoking the supposed ‘demands’ of disembodied 
“entities” like ‘Ethical responsibility’, ‘Ethico-epistemic responsibility’, and finally (as we will 
see below), simply ‘responsibility’,22 (and we will return to these ‘entities’ and their supposed 
‘demands’ shortly) there are several other problems with Fricker’s account of how an epistemic 
agent might come to reflect critically on her own testimonial sensibility. Although Fricker allows 
that, “It takes a special feat of self-consciousness to be alert to…prejudice in one’s thinking, let 																																																								
22 Although Fricker attempts to justify such appeals to various kinds of disembodied ‘responsibility’ by 
drawing a parallel between moral perception, which she asserts is both “intrinsically motivating” and 
“intrinsically reason-giving,” epistemic perception, since I find all arguments in favor of the view that 
moral perception is intrinsically motivating suspect, I find Fricker’s drawing of this parallel as evidence 
that ethico-epistemic perception is also ‘intrinsically motivating’ to be unconvincing (80).  
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alone to correct it” she suggests that, “once light has dawned for a hearer, she will come to find 
that sometimes her experiences of testimonial exchange are in tension with the deliverance of the 
sensibility she has passively taken on, in which case responsibility requires that her sensibility 
adjust itself to accommodate the new experience” (38, 83).  
Note the tentativeness with which Fricker, who otherwise confidently makes her claims 
throughout her book, outlines how this ‘dawn’ might break for a hearer (Although this is a 
hypothetical example, I find Fricker’s suggestions about what ‘might’ take place more 
circumspect than usual here):  
Her experience of politicians might, for instance, be that there are proportionally just as 
many female politicians she respects as male politicians she respects. And she might 
notice a certain cognitive dissonance between her beliefs on the one hand – her belief, for 
instance, that women are the equal of men in political life – and the spontaneous 
deliverances of her testimonial sensibility on the other – a sensibility which time and 
again leaves her not quite taking women’s political word as seriously as men’s. As she 
reflects on her judgment processes, she might detect the influence of a traditional 
stereotypical image of women as not cut out for political life, even while her own 
experience has led her to believe that stereotype to be mere prejudice.  
 
At this point, what I want to know is how this particular (hypothetical) ‘hearer’ was ever able to 
originate a belief – for instance ‘that women are the equal of men in political life’ – that 
contradicts the testimonial sensibility that is her social inheritance, which ‘leaves her not quite 
taking women’s political word as seriously as men’s’ in the first place.   
 The images populating one’s social imaginary are, on Fricker’s account, that which 
enable her to “see [her] interlocutors in epistemic colour” (71). The hearer perceives her 
interlocutor as, for instance, non-credible, because her “perceptual capacity…[is] informed by a 
background ‘theory’ (body of generalizations)…of the competences and motivations of this or 
that social type in this or that context” (71). But if a hearer’s perceptual capacity is so informed, 
then wouldn’t her experiences be ‘coloured’ by this inherited ‘background theory’ or ‘body of 
	 39	
generalizations’ in such a way as to render her ability to perceive her experiences only by the 
lights of that ‘background theory’ or ‘body of generalizations’? If so, and Fricker has not yet 
identified any alternative way to interpret this, then the woman in the above example would 
never have been able to originate the belief that is supposedly so at odds with the ‘spontaneous 
deliverances of her [inherited] testimonial sensibility’, namely ‘that women are the equal of men 
in political life’.   
 Let’s consider Fricker’s suggestion that her hypothetical epistemic agent might 
experience a situation wherein she respected ‘just as many female politicians…as male 
politicians’. If the ‘spontaneous deliverances of her testimonial sensibility’ contain ‘traditional 
stereotypical image[s] of women as not cut out for political life’, then – because she has only this 
one (corrupt) social imaginary to draw on – our epistemic agent would be left to surmise that her 
experience of respecting just as many female as male politicians must represent either an 
exception (she just happens to have encountered a disproportionate number of ‘respectable’ 
female politicians), or worse, a moral and /or epistemic failing on her part (she is incorrectly 
perceiving certain female politicians as ‘cut out for political life’). The ‘epistemic colour’ in 
which she would see female politicians as ‘not cut out for political life’ would render any 
alternative interpretation of her experiences either 1) incorrect or unreliable, or 2) incoherent.  
The point is, since experiences don’t come packaged with their own ‘inherent’ meanings 
inscribed on them, one’s experiences alone cannot trigger her to reflect critically on her own 
testimonial sensibility. Further, without some sort of radical intervention (and Fricker has closed 
off one of the most important possible resources for such an intervention by insisting that there is 
only one pool of collective hermeneutical resources for all epistemic agents to draw on), seldom 
do people in relatively safe circumstances like the Ivory Tower or, perhaps Connecticut, question 
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their entire framework of understanding. If they experience something that seems at odds with 
their social streams of input, they will simply explain it away – according to the lights of that 
‘body of generalizations’ upon which they have come to rely. They have a vested interest in 
calling their anomalous experiences “exceptions,” “mysteries,” or “miracles,” based on their 
‘background theory’ of how the world works. Again, meanings are not intrinsic to experiences, 
which means that even the most bizarre of experiences won’t necessarily (or even probably) 
trigger an epistemic agent to begin to reflect critically on his or her socially inculcated 
testimonial sensibility. In a world as homogeneous and insulated as the one Fricker’s account 
constructs (it’s not quite Connecticut, but close), I submit that this kind of reflection simply will 
not occur. 
Fricker’s austere account of epistemic resources offers no explanation as to how the kinds 
of experiences that might cause epistemic friction could ever be perceived as something other 
than what one’s ‘spontaneous deliverances of her testimonial sensibility’ – or prejudicial 
perceptions – indicate that they are. In other words, since her epistemic landscape is so sparse 
and homogeneous, there simply are no experiences an epistemic agent could have that could 
pierce through the armor or her ‘background theory’, ‘body of generalizations’, or understanding 
of the world, in such a way as to prompt her to recalibrate her understandings. Unless there are 
alternative interpretive resources by which any given epistemic agent might begin even to 
perceive her experiences as contradicting her corrupt inherited ‘background theory’ that colors 
her ethico-epistemic perceptions so poorly, then Fricker’s account of rehabilitating one’s 
testimonial sensibility cannot even get off of the ground. However there is more to Fricker’s 
account than what we’ve thus far examined.  
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Unconditioned Conditioners: Fricker’s Ethico-Epistemic Universalism 
 
Throughout our reconstruction of Fricker’s response to the problem of testimonial 
injustice we’ve made an assumption that Fricker has not: we’ve assumed that there are no  
“unconditioned” influences on an epistemic agent’s ethico-epistemic judgments, perceptual or 
otherwise. However on Fricker’s account there are certain “capacities” that every human being 
possesses: an “emotional cognitive capacity,” or empathy, for instance, and a “capacity of 
reason” so central to being human that it, “lends humanity its distinctive value” (80, 68, 44).  
Both empathy and reason are assumed to be universal and univocal, their meanings so 
obvious as to not merit much reflection, for Fricker. Since, on this account, there are 
unconditioned cognitive capacities that help people make reliable credibility assessments – they 
reliably feel that their interlocutor is trustworthy, or they reliably reason that they are – Fricker 
surmises that all that’s left to do in order to trigger the kind of cognitive dissonance that might 
prompt an epistemic agent to reflect critically upon her unjust ethico-epistemic behaviors is to 
put her prejudicially corrupted ‘social stream of input’ in conversation with her unconditioned 
and therefore uncorrupted ‘individual stream of input’.   
Fricker explains that because stereotypes, which can carry either a positive or a negative 
valence, are a “proper part – indeed, an essential part – of credibility judgments…it is only when 
the stereotypes are prejudiced that something alien – a counter-rational current of identity power 
– has entered in” (71). According to Fricker this ‘alien…counter-rational current of identity 
power – has entered in’ at the social level, where the structural influences of ‘identity power’ 
inevitably corrupt one’s social imaginary. Fricker assumes that one’s individual ‘stream of input’ 
– into which, presumably, nothing ‘alien’ has yet entered in – retains its inherent ability to render 
unconditioned (or at least non-alien-corrupted) emotional and rational cognitive deliverances. 
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These individual, unconditioned cognitive deliverances are what constitute the differences 
between one’s unconditioned individual stream of input and the conditioned cognitive 
deliverances of her social stream of input. They allow for the kinds of cognitive dissonance upon 
which Fricker’s account of the mechanism whereby an epistemic agent might be prompted to 
critically reflect upon her ethico-epistemic perceptions relies.  
Since the viability of Fricker’s entire account of the problem of epistemic injustice and its 
possible solutions relies on the claim that there exist universal, univocal, unconditioned cognitive 
capacities, further investigation into this claim is warranted. We will further explore the claim, 
its implications, and possible alternative accounts in the next chapter. However at this point it’s 
important to note that even though hers is a non-inferentialist response to the problem of 
epistemic injustice, Fricker’s account does, at least in part, rely on an epistemic agent’s capacity 
to make ethico-epistemic reflective judgments capable of overcoming her prejudicial perceptions. 
Fricker asserts, for instance, that, “testimonial responsibility requires a distinctly reflexive critical 
social awareness. The hearer must factor into his net credibility judgment the likely impact on his 
spontaneous perception – and if possible the impact on the speaker’s actual performance too – of 
the relation of identity power that mediates between himself and the speaker” (91).  
Although she indicates that this ‘reflexive critical awareness’ need not always be “a 
matter of conscious, deliberative reflection,” the fact that ours is a non-ideal social world leads 
Fricker to acknowledge that in order to possess the virtue capable of overcoming the epistemic 
vice of testimonial injustice, which Fricker rather telegraphically calls “the virtue of testimonial 
justice,” some level of reflexive awareness will be required (91). She notes, “Full possession of 
the virtue…in a climate that has a range of prejudices in the social atmosphere, requires the 
hearer to have internalized the reflexive requirements of judging credibility in that climate, so 
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that the requisite social reflexivity of her stance as hearer has become second nature” (97).     
As we can see, Fricker’s non-ideal approach is sensitive to certain ethico-epistemic, 
historical contingencies. However, as we can also see, her historical contextualism only goes so 
far. Not only does Fricker appeal to supposedly universal, unconditioned cognitive capacities, 
her approach aims also to “honour the universalist trajectory of moral psychology and language” 
by taking as given the notion of moral absolutes. While she acknowledges the unlikelihood that 
any individual epistemic agent or even any historical community could ever attain the virtue of 
testimonial justice “with respect to every prejudice that may suggest itself,” Fricker nonetheless 
asserts that one can achieve “exceptional moral judgments” with regard to her particular 
historical situation. When one is able to make morally virtuous ethical judgments even when the 
resources to make them are, due only to historical contingency, lacking in her particular 
historical circumstance, she has made an ‘exceptional moral judgment’, according to Fricker 
(97).  
Fricker’s assertions here rely on the notion that, regardless of whether or not one has 
access to them in her present historical circumstances, there are moral “facts of the matter.” Even 
so, she urges caution in leveling moral blame toward epistemic agents of the past whom we 
might now – by the lights of our own current historical circumstance – regard as exhibiting poor 
moral judgment. She asserts that, “one cannot be blamed for failing to do something if one was 
not in a position to access the reason to do it” (100-01). In other words, because there may be 
just moral judgments that are beyond the moral capacities of a particular historical community to 
render, those epistemic agents living within them who fail to make those kinds of just moral 
judgments are not morally culpable, but instead suffer from a case of moral bad luck.  
However, when it comes to the epistemic side of this parallel, Fricker asserts that, “it 
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could not be controversial to assume that epistemic subjects considered as such possess in their 
actual set of motivations some general motivation to truth…for all may agree that, in general, 
any epistemic subject will have a reason to get at the truth” (102). This means that epistemically 
speaking, historical contingencies offer no cover, for every epistemic agent is, on Fricker’s 
account, ‘in a position to access the reason to’ act in ethico-epistemically just ways. At this point 
Fricker’s sensitivity to context has all but disappeared as she makes appeals to exactly the kind 
of supposedly non-specific, universal subject who has inhabited the center of traditional 
epistemology for centuries – an ‘epistemic subject considered as such’, and ‘any epistemic 
subject’ in general. 
The Immediate and Ultimate Ends of the Hybrid Virtue of Testimonial Justice 
 
Fricker considers testimonial justice to be a hybrid virtue, one that is at once ethical and 
epistemic. She acknowledges that although its “ultimate ends” will differ according to context – 
“considered as an intellectual virtue…its ultimate end will be truth” and “considered as an ethical 
virtue…its ultimate end will be justice,” – she insists that its “immediate end” is always 
“neutralizing prejudice in one’s credibility judgments” because neutralizing prejudices in one’s 
credibility judgments is required for both the intellectual goal of truth and the ethical goal of 
justice (122). Its hybridity notwithstanding, Fricker contends that although the ethical goal of 
justice may be occluded by historical circumstances beyond the control of any individual 
epistemic agent, the intellectual goal of truth is never similarly beyond the pale.  
This leaves a certain open-endedness to moral questions in Fricker’s account, for we can 
never be sure how proximate the historically specific moral goals in our sights might be to the 
trans-historical moral goal of justice writ large. However on the epistemic side, no such open-
endedness exists, for on Fricker’s account the trans-historical goal of truth is always within sight. 
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This leaves Fricker willing to allow a certain level of moral relativism in her account – at least 
insofar as she allows that, “judgments of blame may be out of order across even quite small 
historical distances” – but rejecting any such relativism on the epistemic side out-of-hand (106).  
This global rejection of epistemic relativism is key to understanding just why Fricker 
failed even to consider the possibility that there might be multiple ‘collective hermeneutical 
resources’ and ‘economies of credibility’ from which various epistemic agents might draw the 
meanings and knowledges by which to make sense of their lives. For if there are equally viable 
yet multiple epistemic resources, meanings, and knowledges, then it seems that the supposedly 
unconditioned, univocal, and ‘always within sight’ epistemic goal of truth must not be so very 
unconditioned, univocal, or always within sight. If there exist multiple viable knowledges then 
there exist multiple viable truths. And if truth is not accepted as the unconditional and univocal 
goal of an unconditioned, univocal reason, then Fricker is left grappling with the problem of 
relativism at the epistemic level, a possibility that she finds rather abhorrent.   
Although I reject Fricker’s characterization of truth as unconditioned and univocal, I am 
not suggesting that we endorse either moral or epistemic relativism. What I propose instead is to 
reject the dualisms that Fricker has embraced, particularly in regards to the possibilities of 
epistemic certainty vs. skepticism about knowledge. Fricker’s worry is that if there are no trans-
historical, unconditioned human cognitive capacities like empathy and reason delivering trans-
historical, unconditioned univocal truths, skepticism about knowledge would inevitably result 
because all truth would then be relative to the particular historical circumstances that conditioned 
it. But this worry is based on several false dichotomies, themselves the result of a faulty 
conception of the nature and goal of reason. What I propose, therefore, is nothing short of a 
revision of Fricker’s concept of reason. Following Hannah Arendt, I will offer an account of 
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public reason that is pluralistic by virtue of the fact that it is a plurality of actors, or epistemic 
agents, who contribute to it in the ongoing “conversation” of politics.23 Since this conversation is 
continually ongoing and never closed, my account of public reason frames it as always in the 
process of being created and recreated.   
Public Reason: a Universalism Which is Not One24 
 
While the epistemic problem of justification does, just as Fricker, along with traditional 
epistemologists, suggests, rely on “the authority of reason,” since, on my account, reason is 
never a static, closed category, the authority it entails is always limited spatio-temporally. The 																																																								
23 Arendt’s account of what constitutes “the political” or even the polis is notoriously difficult to pin 
down. In suggesting that the problem of epistemic injustice is a “political” one, I am following Arendt’s 
assertion that, “Wherever the relevance of speech is at stake, matters become political by definition” 
(THC, 3). As Arendt clarifies, “The polis, properly speaking, is not the city-state in its physical location; 
it is the organization of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking together, and its true space lies 
between people living together for this purpose, no matter where they happen to be. “’Wherever you go, 
you will be a polis’: these famous words became not merely the watchword of Greek colonization, they 
expressed the conviction that action and speech create a space between the participants which can find its 
proper location almost any time and anywhere. It is the space of appearance in the widest sense of the 
word, namely, the space where I appear to others as others appear to me, where men exist not merely like 
other living or inanimate things but make their appearance explicitly. The space does not always 
exist…[it] comes into being wherever men are together in the manner of speech and action” (THC, 198).  
We will return to this suggestion in chapter three, and follow up on Arendt’s all-too-brief discussion of 
the problem of access to public realms. As she notes, “This space does not always exist, and although all 
men are capable of deed and word, most of them – like the slave, the foreigner, and the barbarian in 
antiquity, like the laborer or craftsman prior to the modern age, the jobholder or businessman in our world 
– do not live in it” (THC, 199). This thorny issue will require more reflection than is offered in the 
insights shared by Hannah Arendt. 
24 This subtitle, as well as the main thrust of my argument here, is drawn from Linda Zerilli’s review of 
Earnest Laclau’s Emancipation(s) entitled, “This Universalism Which is Not One.” This is a case wherein 
the meaning of a phrase depends on which word within it takes the emphasis: in our case as with Zerilli’s, 
the emphasis should be placed on the word “One.” It’s not a, ‘Universalism Which is not One’ – isn’t a 
universalism, that is. It’s instead a ‘Universalism Which is not One’. This is not an ideal approach – I’m 
not at all suggesting that what’s universal is an ideal. I’m simply suggesting that, as with judgments of 
taste, political judgments aim at generating agreement through universal rhetorical appeals as to what 
might constitute a ‘good’. To be clear, the ‘good’ is not universal, it’s only the rhetorical appeal that is: it 
attempts to persuade others to agree by claiming that all of one’s interlocutors, at a particular time and 
place and in regards to a particular ‘good’, ought to agree with its, highly contextualized, particular 
judgment. The universalism of the appeal is limited to the spatio-temporal ‘universe’ of any given 
“language-game,” as Wittgenstein would have it, at the time and place the language-game is being played. 
It attempts to impinge only on those actively involved in the game that is being played – all of the 
players, that is. We will return to this ‘universalism’ in the following chapters in order to further explore 
both its plural aspects, and its political limitations. 	
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authority of public reason comes from the authors of it – those who join in conversation together 
to discuss what seems reasonable to call “true” – and lasts only as long as their conversation 
does. It is defined whenever those in conversation stop to, as Arendt puts it, “think what we are 
doing,” but it is never defined once and for all (THC, 5). In other words, when it comes to public 
reason the kind of consensus by which our ethico-epistemic judgments are justified or evaluated 
is the goal rather than the starting point of our ethico-epistemic endeavors. This means that our 
ethico-epistemic judgments can never be final, and the conversations that create the always open-
ended public reason against which they are judged are never-ending. 
Since the content of ‘the rational’ is, on this account, never “filled in,” as it were, 
beforehand, then what counts as rational speech can never be defined before the conversations in 
which it is created occur.25 The process whereby such defining occurs is called reflection – or 
sometimes its just called thinking. Either way, what it leads to is a reflective judgment wherein 
those prejudicial perceptions that arise from the prejudicial images in one’s social imaginary are 
reflected upon and ethico-epistemically judged. What prompts this kind of reflection are, just as 
Fricker suggests, experiences with cognitive dissonance that arise from moments of dialectically-
induced ethico-epistemic friction. But on Fricker’s account, this friction comes from the dialectic 																																																								
25 I owe this particular insight to Linda Zerilli’s excellent essay on the differences between Hannah 
Arendt’s and John Rawls’ accounts of “public reason” entitled, “Value Pluralism and the Problem of 
Judgment: Farewell to Public Reason,” wherein she argues that Rawls’ “method of avoidance” leads him 
to offer a “highly constrained idea of public reason” (8). Zerilli convincingly argues that, “To reclaim 
judgment as a practice of democratic citizenship, we need to think about the reasonable as something 
other than a mode of political speech, and a way of engaging fellow citizens, that is based on the method 
of avoidance” (9). Rawls’ ‘method of avoidance’ aims to avoid what he calls “comprehensive claims,” the 
kinds of claims that appeal to one’s ‘comprehensive’ reasons – including both public and private ones – 
should be avoided in public deliberation. Rawls wants to limit what counts as acceptable public debate by 
limiting it only to what is “reasonable” public discourse – that which “can be reasonably justified to 
others” (PL, 61). But as Zerilli points out, “Unshackled from the constraints of public reason, the 
reasonable might also be understood as a form of making political judgments and claims that generates 
agreement on matters of common concern by enlarging our sense both of what so much as counts as a 
common matter and who counts as a political speaker” (9). It is this Arendtian-inspired conception of 
reason which I will endorse. 
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between one’s individual and her social “streams of input,” and on my Arendtian-inspired 
account it arises out of the dialectic engagements between significantly different others (82). 
What an epistemic agent offers in conversation with others is an account of her 
knowledge, which is comprised of the images within her social imaginary which are coloring her 
perception in a particular way. And because she is in conversation with others who differ from 
her, the knowledges or perceptions that they have to offer present additional images, new images 
that our epistemic agent will need to reconcile with the images already existing in her social 
imaginary. In determining whether to accept or reject these new images, epistemic agents must 
appeal to the authority of public reason as their guide. What public reason offers is a shared 
background framework against which new images are perceived as either ‘credible’ or ‘non-
credible’. This shared, public reason constitutes, in other words, one’s understanding. But this 
understanding is, as noted, always a work in progress. As Arendt explains, “Understanding, as 
distinguished from having correct information and scientific knowledge, is a complicated process 
which never produces univocal results. It is an unending activity by which, in constant change 
and variation, we come to terms with and reconcile ourselves to reality, that is, try to be at home 
in the world” (EU, 307-8).   
While there is much more to say about this distinction that I’m beginning to draw 
between knowledge and understanding, we will leave most of it for the coming chapters. At this 
point, suffice it to say that while there while are many issues that beg for further explanation, like 
the question of how one gains access to these consensus-building ‘conversations’ in the first 
place, what we can at least begin to see here are the contours of a basic distinction that needs 
further exploration. In discussing one’s perceptions, including those images that one ‘beholds’ in 
her social imaginaries, Fricker is addressing questions of knowledge, and in discussing reason, 
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which is, on Fricker’s account, the standard according to which ethico-epistemic judgments are 
made, she is addressing questions of understanding.   
This distinction – between knowledge and understanding – lies at the heart of my critique 
of Fricker’s overall account of the problem of epistemic injustice. As we will see more clearly in 
the following chapter, it maps on to the distinction between testimonial and hermeneutical forms 
of injustice. Testimonial injustice occurs whenever an epistemic agent prejudicially negatively 
assesses the credibility of another’s knowledge claims, and hermeneutical injustice occurs 
whenever an epistemic agent prejudicially negatively assesses the intelligibility of her own or 
another’s background understanding of the world. Because Fricker focused almost entirely on 
the problem of testimonial injustice with an eye toward arriving at a just and final, or closed, 
rational consensus instead of focusing on ways in which to incorporate new knowledges coming 
from within the diverse understandings of others, she failed fully to flesh out the nature of the 
complex and intimate relationship between testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. It was this 
failure that ultimately led her to the monological, epistemically unjust, non-inferentialist, virtue-
epistemic approach that characterizes her response to the problem of epistemic injustice as a 
whole.  
The details of my dissatisfaction with Fricker’s response will be further explained in the 
coming chapters, but it begins with the concern I’ve already identified as primary. As one 
insightful reviewer points out, Fricker’s non-inferentialist, virtue-epistemic solution to the 
problem of epistemic injustice leads her to offer a:  
fundamentally asymmetrical [account of it]: with respect to the victim Fricker offers 
detailed ethical and psychological investigations into the various forms of harm; with 
respect to (possible) perpetrators, she puts forward ethical-epistemological demands.  
This division of perspectives has the – no doubt unwanted – effect of portraying the 
victim as invariably passive and the perpetrator alone as holding all the keys to an 
improvement. (Kusch, 173)   
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Because she limited the hands that hold the ‘keys to an improvement’ to only those of the 
socially, politically, and economically privileged epistemic agents most often perpetrating the 
harms of epistemic injustice, Fricker effectively erased the multiple and varied voices of 
hermeneutically marginalized epistemic agents offering unique solutions to the problem of 
epistemic injustice from her account. It is with this concern in mind that we look to alternative 
approaches of the problem of epistemic injustice.  
Part IV: Toward An Alternative Account of Epistemic Resources 
 
Audre Lorde and Hannah Arendt each suffered the harms of epistemic injustice in 
various ways and to different degrees, but in their writings there exists a firm commitment to 
epistemic justice that manifests itself in their exhortations to ethico-epistemically harmed 
subjects to claim epistemic responsibility for themselves and thereby cultivate a sense of 
epistemic agency. These exhortations come in an array of different varieties throughout their 
works, and some are much more socially, culturally, and racially sensitive than others. But all 
rely on the belief that our epistemic practices are intimately tied to our ethical practices, and, 
because they are sufficiently pluralistic, all are able to take seriously the voices of those ethico-
epistemically harmed subjects attempting to break the silences imposed on them. Fricker’s work 
highlights Lorde’s and Arendt’s shared concern for ethico-epistemic injustice by offering an 
insightful example of the ways in which this concern can be cashed out in the language of social 
epistemology. For this I am truly grateful. At the same time, Fricker’s work sheds new light on 
the remarkable similarities in Lorde’s and Arendt’s responses to the problem of epistemic 
injustice, but in this regard, as noted, Fricker’s work diverges significantly from theirs.   
Following Lorde and Arendt, I would like to suggest that keeping the focus solely on 
those epistemically privileged hearers perpetrating the harms of epistemic injustice serves mainly 
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to exacerbate its harms. It underwrites and extends the silencing effects of epistemic injustice on 
those underprivileged or oppressed epistemic agents in its apparent assumption that such 
epistemic agents simply lack the ability to offer meaningful contributions toward the goal of 
epistemic justice. It was Fricker’s failure to offer an account of the ethico-epistemic resources 
available to underprivileged or oppressed speakers that led her to overlook their important 
contributions to the problem of epistemic injustice. By identifying only those epistemic resources 
from within which mainstream epistemic agents supposedly draw the meanings that make sense 
of their lives, Fricker unwittingly upholds the notion that they alone possess the power 
effectively to combat epistemic injustice.   
Drawing on Lorde’s and Arendt’s conceptual work, I will counter Fricker’s framework 
by offering a thoroughly pluralistic account of the epistemic resources available to 
underprivileged or oppressed speakers; resources that Fricker’s account overlooks entirely. I will 
argue that those subjects who are hermeneutically marginalized within mainstream epistemic 
practices can draw from these alternative resources both the meanings and the strength needed to 
fund the, at once both resistant and creative, ethico-epistemic practices that can begin to 
overcome the epistemic injustices from which they suffer. We will focus on the epistemic 
responsibilities of underprivileged or oppressed epistemic agents not in order to suggest that it is 
their responsibility to teach socially, politically and economically privileged epistemic agents 
how to cultivate epistemic virtues, but instead to expand the horizons of all who are engaged in 
epistemic practices by increasing the number and type of their pools of epistemic resources.   
Because there have been many ethico-epistemically harmed epistemic agents who have in 
fact already addressed the problem of epistemic injustice, there are “other” epistemic resources 
available, offering “other” tools with which to, as Audre Lorde would have it, “dismantle the 
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master’s house…[and] enable us to bring about genuine change” (112). Change toward epistemic 
justice is still the goal of this inquiry, but we will no longer “define the master’s house as [our] 
only source of support” (Lorde, 112). Instead, we will investigate other “houses” – other social 
imaginaries and all of the meanings they carry within, and other “tools” – other words and ways 
of speaking and revealing ourselves and our meanings. It is my hope that this engagement with 
multiple social imaginaries will help foster the kind of Kantian “enlarged mentality” (Arendt, 
KPP, 74) that, whether explicitly drawing on Kant or not, both Arendt and Lorde invoked in their 
work. It is this reflective work, culminating in the kinds of informed judgments that alone can 
overcome prejudices, that can engender the kind of epistemic justice that Fricker and other social 
epistemologists seek.   
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Diagnosing The Relationship Between Testimonial and Hermeneutical Injustices – A 
Therapeutic Approach 
 
“Is my understanding only blindness to my own lack of understanding? It often seems so to me.” 
- L.W., On Certainty 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter we examined the ways in which Miranda Fricker’s non-doxastic 
reconstruction of the problem of testimonial injustice led to her problematic non-inferentialist, 
virtue-epistemic solution to the problem of epistemic injustice as a whole. However the question 
remains: how does this non-doxastic reconstruction of the problem of testimonial injustice relate 
to Fricker’s handling of the problem of hermeneutical injustice? How might the perceptual 
failures involved in instances of testimonial injustice, for instance, differ from those involved in 
instances of hermeneutical injustice? 
As explained in the previous chapter, in cases of testimonial injustice, it’s the hearer who 
pre-judges, or as we’ve most recently construed it, perceives, the speaker in a certain light: the 
hearer sees the speaker as, for instance, belonging to a social group whose members he is 
prejudicially predisposed to perceive as non-credible. And in the case of hermeneutical injustice, 
it’s both the speaker and the hearer who pre-judge, or as we can now render it, perceive, the 
speaker’s testimony in a certain light: both the speaker and the hearer see the speaker’s testimony 
as, for instance, unintelligible speech, because they are prejudicially predisposed to perceive it as 
unintelligible, on Fricker’s account.   
What’s importantly different about these two forms of prejudicial perception is the fact 
that the prejudicial perceptions that inform credibility assessments, resulting in testimonial 
injustices and the prejudicial perceptions that inform intelligibility assessments, resulting in 
hermeneutical injustices aim at two very different ethico-epistemic goals: knowledge, on the one 
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hand, and understanding, on the other. In order better to grasp just how the prejudicial 
perceptions involved in hermeneutical injustice differ from those involved in testimonial 
injustice, we will need to further flesh out this distinction between knowledge and understanding. 
To that end, we will begin with a new taxonomy of epistemic injustice which will lead to a 
clarification of the distinction between knowledge and understanding, and then proceed to see 
how our clarification sheds new light on the differences between the kinds of identity-prejudicial 
perceptions that drive testimonial injustice, and the identity-prejudicial perceptions that lead to 
hermeneutical injustice. This will lead to a substantially revised account of both testimonial and 
hermeneutical injustice. 
Once outlined, our revised, thoroughly pluralistic account of testimonial and 
hermeneutical injustice will stand in stark opposition to Fricker’s monological approach. This 
chapter will draw to a close once the turn toward more pluralistic approaches to the problem of 
epistemic injustice has adequately been motivated. Leaving the more reconstructive work to our 
Arendtian and Lordian-inspired approaches to the problem of epistemic injustice to chapters 
three and four, this chapter will be dedicated mainly to clearing the ground for these 
interventions. On that note, let’s begin with a new taxonomy of the problem of epistemic 
injustice that aligns with what will be our revised understanding of the distinctions between 
knowledge and understanding, and testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. 
Part I: A New Taxonomy of Epistemic Injustice 
 
The first thing to notice about these two activities – knowing and understanding – is that 
they both rely on some form of sense experience (perceptions, for instance) and some form of 
meaning-making activity (theoretical frameworks, stories, or narrative accounts, for example). 
Since even single-celled organisms like amoebas or paramecia are capable of some forms of 
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sensory ‘perception’ (the amoeba responds to light and the paramecium responds to heat), but (as 
far as we know) lack the capacity either to construct, or draw on, existing theoretical 
frameworks, stories, or narrative accounts of their sensory inputs, we would not attribute either 
knowledge or understanding to them.26 Beings capable of both sensory inputs and meaning-
making are beings that are potentially capable of knowledge and understanding: their sensory 
inputs provide the raw material for their knowledge, and their meaning-making activities provide 
the fodder for their understanding. 27  However there is no knowledge without understanding and 
there is no understanding without knowledge. To see how this interdependence works, I propose 
that we begin to outline a new taxonomy of the problem of epistemic injustice, focusing on the 
question of how one arrives at the kinds of judgments that are capable of overcoming the 
problem: reflective judgments. 
It will be important to remember throughout our reconstruction of the process involved in 
forming reflective judgments that although we will be breaking the process down into six 
discrete steps, it’s not the case that these steps always occur in an orderly, sequential fashion. 
Many of the steps involved in arriving at reflective judgments overlap with each other in various 
ways – at times happening sequentially, and at other times happening concurrently, for instance. 
Further, because they form a hermeneutical circle of understanding, step six will lay the 
foundation for step one, which means that there is always already more “happening” in step one 
than we can say “up front,” before we’ve reviewed the six-step process in its entirety. In fact, 
																																																								
26 The nature-writer/ essayist Annie Dillard refers her readers to the work of Donald E. Carr on this point. 
Carr “points out that the sense impressions of one-celled animals, unlike those of more complex species 
such as ourselves, are not edited for the brain” by poignantly noting that, “‘This is philosophically 
interesting in a rather mournful way, since it means that only the simplest animals perceive the universe 
as it is’” (Pilgrim At Tinker Creek).   
27 While this group may not extend to the “lowly” (but apparently all-seeing) amoebae, I’m perfectly 
willing to accept that it may well extend beyond the human race alone. But to further explore this 
possibility would be to go well beyond the goals of this dissertation.	
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because they often do not occur in an “orderly,” sequential fashion, there is always already more 
happening in each of the six-steps we will review than what’s being articulated in each 
individual step.  
There is, nonetheless, good reason to break this process down into its discrete parts in 
order better to understand just what’s involved in the formation of reflective judgments. As I will 
argue, the difficulties we encounter in coming to better appreciate just what’s involved in the 
formation of a reflective judgments are mirrored in the difficulties we encounter in coming to 
better appreciate the ways in which the “fixity” of our knowledge claims are challenged by the 
fluidity of the meaning-making practices within which those knowledge claims are made and 
according to which those knowledge claims are measured. When we make a knowledge claim, 
even if we expect that we might soon have to revise it, we aim to state what is the case, as it 
appears to us at the time we claim it. But when we try to state the meaning of the knowledge 
claims we make, we tell stories that move – they unfold in space and time. Meanings are made 
and re-made on a regular basis. Since their substance is our knowledge, or ‘what is the case, as it 
appears to us’ at a particular space and time, meanings rely on those knowledges to be durable 
enough to hold for at least a time (sometimes, just until the end of a story we might happen to be 
telling, sometimes much, much longer).  
Arendt explains that, “Knowing certainly aims at truth, even if this truth, as in the 
sciences, is never an abiding truth but a provisional verity that we expect to change against other, 
more accurate verities as knowledge progresses” (LOM, 61). However no matter how 
provisional the truths that comprise our knowledge claims might be, there is some measure of 
fixedness to the claims themselves. Again, Arendt: “For our desire to know, whether arising out 
of practical or purely theoretical perplexities… leaves behind a growing treasure of knowledge 
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that is retained and kept in store by every civilization as part and parcel of its world. The loss of 
this accumulation and of the technical expertise required to conserve and increase it inevitably 
spells the end of this particular world” (LOM, 62).  
Since the ‘knowledge that is retained and kept in store by every civilization’ is ‘part and 
parcel of its world’, if we don’t ‘hold’ our knowledges, we lose our world. On the other hand, we 
must accept that often times (and perhaps always, since this seems always to be a possibility) our 
knowledges are only provisional – regardless of whether they are the ‘provisional verities’ of the 
sciences, or the more stately truths that we “hold to be self-evident,” such as the equality of all 
human beings. If we don’t accept this, then we are dogmatists, stubbornly holding our 
knowledges above revision come what may. If we do accept it, we are tossed into the moving 
world of our time-bound storytelling holding onto knowledges that may well move at a much 
slower clip. This leaves us forever coming to grips with the incongruities that result from the 
(even if only provisional) “fixity” of our knowledge as it is conveyed in the fluidity of the time-
bound practice of making meanings out of that knowledge, or making sense of it. In other words, 
our stories make a sense of our knowledges, but in so doing they may well alter the meanings of 
those knowledges – leaving behind newly minted knowledges for future stories to weave 
together into new tales that will again alter the substance of their substance – or our knowledges. 
As we delineate the six-step process involved in forming reflective judgments, it will be 
important to keep in mind these incongruities, as they are mirrored in the six-step process. In 
some ways, to break this process down into its discrete parts is to do violence to it – for it simply 
is not the case that we come to know and understand in such a rigid, mechanistic way as our six-
step process may seem to suggest. However since we often learn to tell stories, or make sense of 
our knowledges in exactly such ways – we learn that the elements of storytelling include a 
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sequential relating of a conflict, climax, and conclusion, for instance – I want to further explore 
the incongruences that arise between our explanations and our truths, or our meanings and our 
knowledges, and not shy away from these often puzzling incongruities.  
One can – as will be evidenced in what follows – make sense of the process involved in 
forming reflective judgments by breaking it down into its discrete parts. While this may not 
capture certain aspects of that process, it is one way among many in which to render it. And I 
believe that we can learn much from this kind of linear thinking, even in the face of its rather 
glaring shortcomings. We will return to this point towards the end of this chapter. For now, let’s 
outline the six-step process involved in forming reflective judgments. 
The Six-Step Process Involved in Forming Reflective Judgments 
 
Thus far we’ve identified two of the six steps required in order for one to form a 
reflective judgment: first, one needs to receive sensory inputs (i.e. perceptions), and second, one 
must be able to draw on existing socially inherited meaning-making activities. But there are four 
additional steps along the way to forming a reflective judgment. What’s needed thirdly is what 
Fricker calls a ‘perceptual judgment’, wherein one puts her sensory inputs into “conversation” 
with her inherited social meanings in such a way as to render her sensory inputs meaningful and 
her inherited social meanings knowledge conveying. Fourth, an epistemic agent must be able to 
re-present her sensory inputs in a “de-sensed” form in her imagination.28 Fifth, an epistemic 
agent must associate meanings with her mental representations of sensory inputs, which, as we 
will see, calls for an articulation of one’s mental representations in a meaningful way. These 
articulations lead to, finally, step six: another ethico-epistemic judgment of some kind – which, 
as in step #3, requires a “conversation” of sorts. In this secondary conversation, the players are 																																																								
28 We will return to this step in order to further explain what these ‘re-presenting’ and ‘de-sensing’ 
activities have to do with epistemic injustice. See pages 19-21 of this chapter for more on this. 
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one’s mental representations of her sensory perceptions, which are formed in step #4; the 
meanings to which she attaches them, which are formed in step #5; and her initial ‘perceptual 
judgments’ from step #3 – all of which are rendered in her imagination, then reflected upon and 
subsequently reflectively judged. These six steps are all that are required for one to arrive at a 
reflective judgment. 
As we will see, Fricker’s account of the problem of epistemic injustice includes each of 
these six steps; however she does not single them out in such a way as to render them fully 
visible or intelligible. A more detailed review of each step will reveal some of the fundamental 
and yet faulty assumptions upon which Fricker’s account relies. We will offer a corrective for 
these missteps; looking primarily to Hannah Arendt’s final, unfinished work The Life of the 
Mind, for aid in both diagnosing and reconstructing Fricker’s account. We will begin with step 
one: perceptions or sensory inputs, and see what Fricker has to say about them. But as will soon 
become clear, Fricker jumps from step to step. In order to cover them all methodically, we will 
need to focus on them one-by-one in our Arendtian-inspired and Lordian-inspired revisions to 
Fricker’s assessment of each of their roles in the problem of epistemic injustice. Since Fricker’s 
analyses of the problem of epistemic injustice are, as we have seen, mainly focused on the 
problem of testimonial injustice, we will again begin with it, focusing at this point on the role 
perceptual judgments play in testimonial injustice. We will pivot to the problem of 
hermeneutical injustice in our revisions to Fricker’s account in order to flesh out just how 
hermeneutical injustices and testimonial injustices relate one to another. 
Since the six steps one must traverse in order to arrive at a reflective judgment are part of 
a hermeneutic circle of understanding, step six, which is the formation of an ethico-epistemic 
judgment, will become the scaffolding upon which step one begins. However there are two 
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different kinds of ethico-epistemic judgments contained in our six-step process, and it will be 
important to be able to distinguish between them. The perceptual judgments formed in step #3 
are pre-judgments, prejudicial perceptions of, for instance, certain speakers as non-credible. The 
perceptual judgments that form step six in our six-step process are reflective judgments.29 In 
order to distinguish the pre-judgments involved in step #3 from the reflective judgments 
involved in step #6, we will label them preliminary judgments, and call the other, reflexively 
informed judgments, reflective judgments.  
Since these two types of judgment result in two distinct forms of both knowledge and 
understanding, we will need also to distinguish between the kinds of knowledge and 
understanding involved in perceptual judgments– implicit knowledge which is informed by the 
sensory inputs received in step #1, and preliminary understanding which is informed by the 
social meanings inherited in step #2 – from the kinds of knowledges and understandings that 
result from reflective judgments – explicit knowledge which is informed by the mental 
representations of one’s sensory inputs formed in step #4 and reflective understanding which is 
informed by the meanings articulated in step #5. 
To recap: our six-step process leading to reflective judgments involves the following 
steps:  
1.) The reception of sensory inputs. 
2.) The ‘inheritance’ of social meanings. 
3.) The formation of a preliminary judgment (or what Fricker calls a ‘perceptual 
judgment’), wherein one unreflexively associates her sensory inputs from step #1 
with social meanings from step #2 and thereby forms implicit knowledges and 
preliminary understandings. 
4.) The re-presentation of sensory inputs in de-sensed form in the imagination. 																																																								
29 As will become clear – reflective judgments are, like preliminary judgments, ‘perceptual’. In both cases 
what’s perceived is an image in the mind, which is compared, not to “the real world,” but to one’s 
particular, socially, politically, economically (etc.) influenced apprehension of appearances through one’s 
sensory organs. As mentioned in the previous chapter: there are no “pre-theoretical facts of the matter “ to 
be revealed here. Only facts that appear in the mode of dokoi moi – the “as it seems to me.”  
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5.) The association of meanings with the mental representations formed in step #4 in the 
form of articulations. 
6.) The formation of reflective judgments – wherein one reflects upon her preliminary 
judgments formed in step #3, the mental images formed in step #4, and the 
articulations made in step #5 and then judges whether or not they need altering in 
accordance with the situation that confronts her at the time she reflects upon them, 
which results in explicit knowledges and reflective understandings.  
 
The First Three Steps 
 
In regards to one’s initial, pre-reflective perceptions – those perceptions that are 
‘affectively loaded’ and /or ‘theory-laden’ perceptions, Fricker recommends caution in using the 
“idiom of ‘theory’ and ‘theory-ladenness’” to describe them (73). At this point, when 
characterizing one’s unreflective ‘seeing as’, Fricker notes that such theoretical language is not 
quite fitting, “for neither the morally virtuous agent nor the epistemically virtuous hearer comes 
to her perceptual judgment (a moral judgment and a credibility judgment, respectively) by 
applying generalizations to the case confronting her” (73). In other words, an initial perceptual 
judgment, or in our terminology, a preliminary judgment, is non-doxastically mediated – for it 
involves no belief formations – and non-inferentially “applied,” to the situation confronting an 
epistemic agent at the time she makes the preliminary judgment. As Fricker explains, “although 
some relevant generalizations or principles are surely formulable (and invaluable in contexts 
where the shift to a more reflective mode of judgment is called for) the virtuous subject does not 
arrive at her perceptual judgment by way of obedience to any codification of the endlessly 
complex norms implicit in her judgment” (73).   
Fricker is engaging here with the first three of the steps involved in our six-step process 
leading to explicit knowledge and reflective understanding: she is attempting to determine how it 
is that the sensory inputs from step #1 become associated with the generalizable ‘background’ 
meanings in step #2 in the formation of perceptual judgments, or as we have rendered it, 
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preliminary judgments, in step #3. If this were an inferential process, then an epistemic agent 
would simply apply whichever “rules of inference” she had been taught in regards to assessing 
the credibility of others to her sensory inputs and inherited social meanings in order to arrive at a 
belief about the credibility of the speaker before her. If she had been taught, for instance, that the 
inability to look another in the eyes when testifying was generally indicative of dishonesty, then 
whenever she was confronted with a speaker whose gaze could not meet her own, she would 
adjust her credibility assessment downward. In these cases the hearer infers that the meaning 
“dishonest” should be associated with the sensory inputs that confront her – the visual 
impression of a speaker whose gaze cannot meet her own – in forming her judgment, which 
would result in a belief. 
Since this happens non-inferentially, Fricker characterizes step #3 quite differently. 
Drawing once again on her Aristotelian analogy, Fricker explains: 
According to the kind of cognitivism that grows out of the virtue tradition in ethics, the 
virtuous agent is marked out by his possession of a capacity for moral perceptual 
judgment. He is someone who, thanks to a proper moral ‘upbringing’ or (as I would 
prefer) a proper moral socialization, has come to see the world in moral color. When he is 
confronted by an action or a situation with a certain moral character, he does not have to 
work out that the action is cruel or kind or charitable or selfish; he just sees it that way. 
(72) 
 
Although the virtuous moral agent’s ability to “just see” an action as ‘cruel or charitable or 
selfish’ cannot occur absent his ‘proper moral upbringing /socialization’, which has served to 
populate his social imaginary with non-prejudicial images for him to draw on, without a 
‘cognitive’ intervention in the form of a perceptual, or in our language, preliminary, judgment 
on his part, he will fail to connect the predicates ‘cruel or kind or charitable or selfish’ with the 
‘action or situation’ confronting him. Fricker continues,   
Now this kind of perceptual judgment is spontaneous and unreflective; it involves no 
argumentation or inference on the agent’s part. The virtuous agent’s perceptual capacity 
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is accounted for in terms of a sensitivity to morally salient features of the situation 
confronting him. In the testimonial case, the parallel suggestion is that the virtuous 
hearer’s perceptual capacity be understood in terms of a sensitivity to epistemically 
salient features of the situation and the speaker’s performance.  
 
The hearer’s perceptual capacity is, in other words, informed by his moral and epistemic 
socialization, which directs him to see certain moral and epistemic ‘features of the situation and 
the speaker’s performance’ as ‘salient’.  
If the hearer has been taught, for instance, that trustworthiness is an important feature to 
look for when determining a speaker’s credibility, he will automatically look for “various social 
cues that relate to trustworthiness – cues relating to the sincerity and competence of the speaker 
on the matter at hand” (72). These social cues come in the form of images: the hearer knows 
what sincerity and competence in a speaker look like because he has inherited a model of sorts in 
the form of a stereotype – which, as Fricker explains, can have either “a positive or negative 
valence” (31). If the ‘situation in confronting him’ is a speaker whose aspect closely 
approximates the model image of sincerity and competence in the image of the stereotype our 
speaker has internalized, then he will perceptually judge the speaker as a credible testifier.  
It’s important at this point to remember that the stereotypical images that inform a 
hearer’s perceptual credibility assessments are part of what populate his social imaginary. As 
Fricker explains, “prejudices typically enter into a hearer’s credibility judgment by way of the 
social imagination in the form of a prejudicial stereotype” (4). Since one’s credibility 
assessments draw on the ethico-epistemic resource Fricker calls ‘the economy of credibility’, it 
follows that one’s economy of credibility is filled with images coming from one’s social 
imaginary. In other words, one’s social imaginary is, through its influence on one’s economy of 
credibility, the source of the prejudicial images or stereotypes that inform her credibility 
assessments, which can be either positive or negative. 
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Because this process of reading social cues and perceptually judging speakers 
accordingly involves no appeals to “advance rules” detailing how to assess the credibility of 
speakers – which is to say, because it’s non-inferential – Fricker asserts that virtuous hearers are 
freed to “adapt and rework” their “thinking to identify [the] diverse contexts liable to confront 
[them]” (73). As I indicated in the previous chapter, I have some reservations about the extent of 
this supposed “freedom from…dependence on advance rules” (73). I worry, for instance, that no 
matter how large the cache of images in one’s social imaginary, if it does not contain any images 
of, say, speakers who are at once Black and credible, then it seems that no matter how closely a 
Black speaker’s testimonial performances might approximate the model image in one’s social 
imaginary in terms of embodying the ‘cues relating to the sincerity and competence of a speaker 
on the matter at hand’, her testimony will nonetheless be prejudicially negatively assessed.  
In other words, a hearer’s ability to respond sensitively to the ‘diverse contexts liable to 
confront’ her will require more than just ‘freedom from dependence on advance rules’. No 
matter how free from advance rules an epistemic agent might be to preliminarily judge the 
credibility of a speaker, the fact that her social imaginary, which is what funds ‘the economy of 
credibility’ from which an epistemic agent draws her credibility judgments, is, as Fricker fully 
recognizes in her discussion of hermeneutical injustice – which we will turn to in a moment – 
impoverished, means that there are certain limits to the ways in which she can respond to the 
‘diverse contexts liable to confront’ her.30 This worry is not sufficiently addressed in Fricker’s 
work; a lacuna we will need now to address.  
The preliminary judgments we’ve been discussing involve steps 1-3, but we’ve been 
focusing on the ways in which the perceptual judgments formed in step three relate to the 																																																								
30 As we will see, there is a crucial link between both forms of epistemic injustice, testimonial injustice 
and hermeneutical injustice, that is formed at the level of the social imaginary, which funds both one’s 
‘economy of credibility’ and her ‘collective interpretive resources’.  
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problem of testimonial injustice. While it is true that the sensory inputs from step #1 are always 
already “affectively loaded,” or “theory laden,” which means that they are always already 
meaningful, it’s important to pause for a moment to reflect on the meanings to which those 
sensory inputs are attached: the ‘inherited’ social meanings from step #2 (72). This will require 
us to explore the ways in which the preliminary judgments formed in step #3 relate to the 
problem of hermeneutical injustice.  
Hermeneutical injustice occurs when the meanings that a hermeneutically marginalized 
epistemic agent needs to draw on in order to make sense of their social experiences are lacking in 
‘the collective hermeneutical resources’. As I indicated above,  ‘the economy of credibility’, 
from which an epistemic agent draws in making her credibility assessments is funded by the 
social imaginary. Crucially, ‘the collective hermeneutical resources’ from which an epistemic 
agent draws in making her intelligibility assessments is also funded by the social imaginary. The 
social imaginary is then, that which forms the critical link between testimonial injustice and 
hermeneutical injustice. I propose we further investigate the nature of this link, and then return to 
our six-step procedure for forming reflective judgments to flesh out just how it impacts one’s 
ethico-epistemic judgments.  
The Critical Link Between Testimonial and Hermeneutical Injustice 
 
There is an important link between one’s ‘economy of credibility’, which informs 
testimonial injustice, and her ‘collective hermeneutical resource’, which informs hermeneutical 
injustice, that needs to be fleshed out at this point. As we’ve seen, one’s economy of credibility 
is funded by images coming from her social imaginary. These images are, as noted, stereotypes, 
which, as Fricker explains, are “widely held associations between a given social group and one 
or more attributes” (30, emphasis in original). Stereotypes involve making “generalization[s] 
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about a given social group” which can be “more or less strong” insofar as, on one end of the 
spectrum, the generalizations are universal “(‘all women are intuitive’),” and on the other they 
are very diluted “(‘many women are intuitive’)” (31). What I want to point out here is that one’s 
set of ‘collective hermeneutical resources’ is also impacted by stereotypes, which are not simply 
images but images of ‘a given social group’ associated with ‘general attributes', which means 
that they are meaningful images. And the “place” where meanings and images collide is the 
social imaginary, which forms the critical link between the two forms of epistemic injustice 
we’ve been exploring: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice.  
We’ve seen that hermeneutical injustice occurs when there is a “gap in collective 
interpretive resources [that] puts someone at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to making 
sense of their social experiences” (1). On Fricker’s account, when, for instance, “extant 
collective hermeneutical resources can have a lacuna where the name of a distinctive social 
experiences should be,” a hermeneutically marginalized epistemic agent attempting to give voice 
to those experiences for which there is no name can suffer an “acute cognitive disadvantage” 
(151). Because, according to Fricker, there is only a single set of ‘collective hermeneutical 
resources’ for apparently all speakers in any given community to draw on, the hermeneutically 
marginalized are not the only ones who suffer from a ‘cognitive disadvantage’ when there are 
gaps in them. On Fricker’s account, “the lack of proper understanding” of social experiences 
which occurs when there are no hermeneutical resources with which to make sense of them 
creates “a collective disadvantage more or less shared by all” (151). However, this ‘cognitive 
disadvantage’ is “asymmetrical” insofar as it impacts only hermeneutically marginalized 
epistemic agents in an unjust way (151).  
The reason that the gap in the collective hermeneutical resources is only an injustice for 
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the hermeneutically marginalized is because 1.) the experiences they wish to understand but 
cannot due to the gaps are ones that are, “strongly in their interests to understand,” and 2.) by 
virtue of their hermeneutical marginalization they are systematically excluded from 
“participation in the spread of knowledge,” which means that they have little hope of ever 
repairing the gaps of their own accord (151, 162). In the case of Carmita Wood,31 for instance, 
her inability to make sense of her own social experience with sexual harassment caused her 
extreme emotional distress – on top of suffering from the harassment in the first place, Wood 
was “left deeply troubled, confused, and isolated” because she could neither share her experience 
with others nor understand it herself.  
“Women’s position at the time of second wave feminism,” which is when Wood’s 
experiences with sexual harassment occurred, Fricker explains, “was still one of marked social 
powerlessness in realtion to men; and, specifically, the unequal relations of power prevented 
women from participating on equal terms with men in those practices by which collective social 
meanings are generated” (152). In Wood’s case, the fact that she could not equally participate in 
‘those practices by which collective social meanings are generated’ meant that 1.) her hopes of 
“filling” the hermeneutical gaps were slim, and 2.) left with no way meaningfully to voice her 
objections to it, Wood was left open to being subjected to continued sexual harassment.  
There are many ways in which one can suffer from hermeneutical marginalization, and 
many reasons why one might belong to one or another hermeneutically marginalized group, on 
Fricker’s account. Because social subjects “have more or less complex social identities,” one 
might be marginalized in some respects but not others: she may, for instance, be hermeneutically 
marginalized as a woman, but not as white. “Sometimes,” Fricker continues, “a person’s 
																																																								
31 See pages 20-25 of chapter one for a detailed account of ‘the case of Carmita Wood’. 
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marginalization will be an effect of material power, so that their socio-economic background” 
puts certain jobs, like “a well-paid job in a large corporation with a macho work ethic…out of 
their reach” (154, emphasis mine). However, “Sometimes it will be an effect of identity power, 
so that part of the explanation why they do not have those jobs is that there are prejudicial 
stereotypes in the social atmosphere that represent them as unsuitable, and which negatively 
influence the judgments of employers” (154, emphasis mine). Often, Fricker notes, “it may be a 
mixture of the two,” and she concludes therefore that, “Hermeneutical marginalization need not 
be the result of identity power as well as plain material power, but it often will be” (154).  
Fricker defines social power as “a capacity we have as social agents to influence how 
things go in the social world,” and indicates that it works in myriad ways and on several levels 
(9). By defining social power as a ‘capacity’, Fricker is asserting that it “exists even while it is 
not being realized in action” (10). Although she finds this “an unproblematic metaphysical 
point,” she admits that it is “not without dissenters,” pointing to Foucault’s claim that ‘Power 
exists only when it is put into action’ as an example of such dissent (10). Fricker dismisses 
Foucault’s claim about the transiency of power, suggesting that her readers should also “reject 
the claim…because even in the context of Foucault’s interests, the idea that power is not a 
capacity but rather pops in and out of existence as and when it is actually operative lacks 
motivation” (10). Because this point will become important later – once we embark on our 
discussion of imagination and its relationship to social power – I want at this point at least to 
mention that among the objectors to Fricker’s claim that power can be passively held and “stored 
up,” is Hannah Arendt. We will follow Arendt in her assertion, echoed in Foucault’s work, that, 
“power cannot be stored up and kept in reserve for emergencies, like the instruments of violence, 
but exists only in its actualization” (THC, 200). However Fricker’s main point about social 
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power in general is that it can be exercised by particular agents, but “can also operate purely 
structurally, so that there is no particular agent exercising it” (10).  
When it comes to identity power, which, as we’ve seen, is operative in the ‘central cases’ 
of both forms of epistemic injustice, what Fricker is eager to highlight is the fact that its effects 
go beyond matters of “purely practical co-ordination” (14). As she explains,  
[T]here is at least one form of social power which requires not only practical social co-
ordination but also an imaginative social co-ordination. There can be operations of power 
which are dependent upon agents having shared conceptions of social identity – 
conceptions alive in the collective social imagination that govern, for instance, what it is 
or means to be a woman or a man, or what it is or means to be gay or straight, young or 
old, and so on. Whenever there is an operation of power that depends in some significant 
degree upon such shared imaginative conceptions of social identity, then identity power is 
at work. (14) 
 
In what Fricker refers to as an example of the “central case of hermeneutical injustice,” 
the case of Carmita Wood, it was identity power manifesting itself in the form of ‘prejudicial 
stereotypes in the social atmosphere’ that rendered Wood a hermeneutically marginalized 
epistemic agent. This hermeneutical marginalization is what set the stage for her to suffer 
hermeneutical injustice. As Fricker explains, although “No agent perpetrates hermeneutical 
injustice – it is a purely structural notion. The background condition for hermeneutical injustice 
is the subject’s hermeneutical marginalization” (159). The “dormant…hermeneutical inequality 
that exist[ed]” in Wood’s “situation of hermeneutical marginalization erupt[ed] in 
injustice…when [her] actual attempt at intelligibility [was] handicapped by it” (159).  
Importantly, identity power also plays an important role in testimonial injustice. As 
Fricker argues, “identity power is an integral part of the mechanism of testimonial exchange 
because of the need for hearers to use social stereotypes as heuristics in their spontaneous 
assessments of their interlocutor’s credibility” (16-17). And as we saw above, “prejudices 
typically enter into a hearer’s credibility judgment by way of the social imagination, in the form 
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of a prejudicial stereotype – a distorted image of the social type in question” (4). Taken together, 
these two statements mean that, just as Fricker suggests, “The influence of identity prejudice in a 
hearer’s credibility judgment is an operation of identity power” (28). The identity prejudices that 
‘enter into a hearer’s credibility judgment by way of the social imagination in the form of a 
prejudicial stereotype’ are then the result ‘operation[s] of identity power’ which negatively 
influence a hearer’s credibility judgments by corrupting her economy of credibility, causing 
testimonial injustice.  
When identity power plays a role in hermeneutical marginalization, as we have seen, 
‘prejudicial stereotypes in the social atmosphere’ are to blame; which means that one’s 
‘collective hermeneutical resources’ are corrupted whenever stereotypical images from her social 
imaginary enter into her intelligibility assessments, causing hermeneutical injustice. So we can 
now conclude that prejudicial stereotypes existing in one’s social imaginary fund both one’s 
‘economy of credibility’ and her ‘collective hermeneutical resources’, which means that 
prejudicial stereotypes existing in one’s social imaginary and reinforced by social identity power 
are the root cause of both forms of epistemic injustice.  
Before we return to our six-step procedure for arriving at reflective judgments, I want to 
pause for a moment to reflect upon Fricker’s account of the “alien counter-rational current of 
identity power” that we’ve been discussing (71). As we saw in the previous chapter, and will 
continue to more fully flesh out later in this chapter, Fricker’s responses to both forms of the 
problem of epistemic injustice rely on methods of ameliorating their negative effects. Although 
she offers glimmers of hope for the possibility of actually eradicating certain negatively 
prejudicial stereotypes in ‘the collective social imaginary’ through the widespread cultivation of 
just testimonial sensibilities, these are presented as hopeful by-products of the virtues of 
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testimonial and hermeneutical justice that she hopes to engender. Fricker aims not to eliminate 
negative stereotypes, but to correct for them.32  
In offering ethico-epistemic virtues capable of correcting for negatively prejudicial 
stereotypes, Fricker puts forth personal virtues aimed at neutralizing personal epistemic vices 
and structural inequalities manifesting in ethico-epistemic harms (i.e. “alien counter-rational 
currents of identity power” manifesting in negatively prejudicial stereotypes) instead of actually 
cultivating a more virtuous socio-political ethico-epistemic climate. As will become clear, our 
approach diverges significantly from hers in this respect. At this point what I want to point out is 
the fact that Fricker’s entire project hinges on the assumption that neutralizing prejudices is the 
best way to combat the problem of epistemic injustice. The unspoken premise of this project is 
that, left to our own “natural” devices, human beings are basically ethical and rational creatures. 
If we are, for the most part, ethical and rational, Fricker theorizes, then the removal of all “alien 
counter-rational” forces will return us to our “native” state. And in our native state, Fricker 
assumes, we will more or less fare well when it comes to behaving in ethically and epistemically 
just ways. This rather Rousseauian faith in the nobility of our native ethico-epistemic powers is 
what led Fricker to recommend the particular virtue-epistemic response to the problem of 
epistemic injustice that she did.33  
																																																								
32 Fricker explains early on that the ethical-intellectual virtues that she hopes can “improve our lives as 
both subjects and objects of knowledge” are “corrective ethical-intellectual virtues” (7). That she presents 
the possibility of actually eradicating certain negatively prejudicial stereotypes in the collective social 
imaginary as ‘hopeful by-products’ of these ethical-intellectual virtues can be seen most clearly in regards 
to testimonial injustice on pages 40 and 84-97, and in regards to hermeneutical injustice on pages 169-
175. 
33 Fricker asserts that the virtue of testimonial justice can be held in a “naïve form” wherein “someone 
was brought up in a relevantly prejudiced society but whose native capacity for unprejudiced social 
perception remained sufficiently untouched,” explaining that if one’s “native perceptual capacity has 
somehow escaped the prejudicial corruptions of the day” she will hold the virtue naïvely  (93). Although 
she later concedes that, “the State of Nature, minimally social though it remains, contains both sufficient 
social identity concepts and sufficient practical pressures to produce some basic identity-prejudicial 
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As we turn to review the next three steps required for an epistemic agent to arrive at a 
reflective ethico-epistemic judgment, it will be important to bear these fundamental assumptions 
of Fricker’s in mind. As will become clear, our response to the problem of epistemic injustice is 
not predicated on any kind of faith in the overall ethico-epistemic prowess of humankind in the 
State of Nature. We are not seeking a return to nature, or any other kind of ethico-epistemic 
Garden of Eden. Ours is the path of the fallen with no hope of a virtuous return. But as we will 
see, our faithlessness in regards to humanity’s “native” ethico-epistemic virtues is more than 
made up for in our fundamental optimism towards the power of a plurality of human beings 
striving together to create a better, more just, ethico-epistemic socio-political world.  
The Next Three Steps (Steps 4 – 6) To Arriving at Reflective Judgments 
When it comes to the next three steps involved in our six-step process of forming 
reflective judgments, the effects of these unjust, negatively prejudicial stereotypes can be 
mediated. What allows for these mediations is the fact that an epistemic agent can “shift into a 
more reflective mode of judgment” (73). As we saw in chapter one, Fricker acknowledges that 
although one’s “individual testimonial sensibility is in the first place inherited…once light has 
dawned for a hearer she will come to find that sometimes her experiences of testimonial 
exchange are in tension with the deliverances of the sensibility she has passively taken on, in 
which case responsibility requires that her sensibility adjust itself to accommodate the new 
experience” (83). Once a hearer has made the ‘shift into a more reflective mode of judgment’ she 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
stereotypes,” she stipulates that credibility “markers in the State of Nature are reliable in the main” (117). 
In allowing that this minimal ethico-epistemic “corruption” occurs even in the State of Nature, Fricker 
suggests that she has avoided “step[ping] too far in the direction of a rational idealization” in her State of 
Nature story (117). I wholeheartedly disagree with this assessment, but to further explore the reasons why 
would be to go beyond the scope of this dissertation. Since we will attempt to avoid sweeping statements 
about human nature per se, and will entirely avoid State of Nature stories, we need not venture further 
into this disagreement. But it is important to keep in mind the assumptions upon which Fricker’s account 
relies. 
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will, on Fricker’s account, be able to determine that her testimonial sensibility has been 
“invaded” by “an alien… counter-rational current of identity power,” which has been delivering 
irrational, unjust negatively prejudicial stereotypes to ‘the collective social imagination’ that 
funds both her economy of credibility and her collective hermeneutical resources. And, Fricker is 
sure that, as a rational epistemic agent, the hearer will find it incumbent upon herself to break 
free from the deleterious effects of the ‘alien counter-rational current of identity power’ by 
correcting for its errors when making her credibility assessments and her intelligibility 
assessments.  
Since steps 4 – 6 of our six-step procedure for arriving at reflective judgments are made 
after an epistemic agent has made this “intellectual shift of gear, out of that unreflective mode 
[that characterizes steps 1-3] and into a reflective, more effortful mode of active critical 
assessment,” there are certain additional requirements that must be met in order for the steps 
successfully to be traversed (64). Steps 4 – 6 of our six-step process for arriving at reflective 
judgments detail the move from implicit knowledge and preliminary understanding to explicit 
knowledge and reflective understanding and require at least the following three things: First, they 
require an ability to imagine, or ‘re-present sensory inputs in a de-sensed form in the 
imagination’ in preparation for association with the meanings being articulated in step #5. 
Second, since step #5 involves an articulation in the form of a “conversation,” it requires 
plurality, or the presence of at least two interlocutors, even if the conversation is, as Arendt, 
paraphrasing Socrates, put it, “the soundless dialogue between me and myself” that we call 
thinking (THC, 185). And finally, the move from implicit knowledges and preliminary 
understandings to explicit knowledges and reflective understandings requires the faculty of 
remembrance. Let’s take these three requirements one by one. 
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On the Roles of Imagination, Pluralism, and Remembrance in Forming Reflective 
Judgments 
 
Hannah Arendt calls the ability to “make present what is actually absent…the mind’s 
unique gift…this gift is called imagination, defined by Kant as ‘the faculty of intuition even 
without the presence of the object’” (LOM, 76). Before one can engage in the kinds of dialectic 
within which she begins to articulate her knowledges and understandings to herself or another, 
she must “de-sense” her sensory inputs in order to re-present them in her imagination (step #4). 
Although the object of a sense-impression may remain well within view whenever an epistemic 
agent begins to reflect upon it in her “mind’s eye,” Arendt suggests that once we begin these 
reflections, “we have removed ourselves surreptitiously from our surroundings and are 
conducting ourselves as though we were already absent” (LOM, 78). In other words, even if the 
object of our reflection is present, we ourselves are in some sense ‘absent’ whenever we reflect 
upon it. It is in this ‘absence’ from the world of appearances that we engage in the process of 
thinking, during which we “prepare the particulars given to the senses in such a way that the 
mind is able to handle them in their absence; it must, in brief, de-sense them” (LOM, 77).34  
It would be difficult to overstate the import of this step to the project of arriving at 
reflective judgments. As Arendt explains,  
It is inconceivable how we would ever be able to will or to judge, that is, to handle things 
which are not yet and things which are no more, if the power of representation and the 
effort necessary to direct mental attention to what in every way escapes the attention of 
sense perception had not gone ahead and prepared the mind for further reflection as well 																																																								
34 In speaking of ‘images in the mind’, the ‘mind’s-eye’, and an‘absence from the world of appearances’ I 
am speaking metaphorically. As Arendt explains, “No matter how close we are from what is close at 
hand, the thinking ego obviously never leaves the world of appearances altogether. The two-world theory, 
as I have said, is a metaphysical delusion although by no means an arbitrary or accidental one; it is the 
most plausible delusion with which the experience of thought is plagued. Language, by lending itself to 
metaphorical usage, enables us to think, that is, to have traffic with non-sensory matters, because it 
permits a carrying-over, metapherein, of our sense experiences. There are not two worlds because 
metaphor unites them” (LOM, 110). We will return to the ways in which metaphor ‘unites’ the so-called 
“life of the mind” with the “world” in chapters three and four.  
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as for willing and judging. (LOM, 76) 
 
So thinking, willing, and judging – the topics which would have formed (had she not died before 
she could write the last section on judging) the tripartite structure of Arendt’s final work, all rely 
on this ability to “de-sense” sensory inputs and then “re-present” them as a “vision in thought” or 
a “thought-object” (LOM, 77). They all rely, in other words, on ‘the faculty of intuition even 
without the presence of an object’, or imagination. Since our goal at this point is, like Arendt’s in 
The Life of the Mind, to understand what’s involved in forming reflective judgments, it’s not 
surprising that this faculty of imagination is just as crucial to our project as it was to hers. 
Because it is so important for our project, we will return to it once we’ve covered steps 4 – 6 and 
all that they require. For now, let’s move on to the next requirement.  
 Interestingly, the second requirement for traversing steps 4 – 6 of our six-step procedure 
for arriving at ethico-epistemic judgments – ‘the presence of at least two interlocutors’ – also 
importantly engages with the imagination. If the “conversation” within which we begin to 
associate the prejudicial images from step #3, the mental images from step #4 and the meanings 
from step #5 is a conversation with ourselves, which, as noted, Arendt calls thinking, then one 
must be able to imagine her “other self” – the self with whom she is in dialogue. Arendt calls this 
“the Socratic two-in-one [which] heals the solitariness of thought; its inherent duality points to 
the infinite plurality which is the law of the earth” (187).  
Whenever one thinks she finds herself in company with herself and striving to arrive at a 
consensus with herself in the form of a reflective judgment. This ‘two-in-oneness’ of the self 
explains Socrates’ otherwise odd-sounding assertion in the Gorgias that, “It would be better for 
me that a lyre or a chorus I directed should be out of tune and loud with discord, and that 
multitudes of men should disagree with me rather than that I, being one, should be out of 
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harmony with myself and contradict me” (Gorgias, 482b). What Socrates here points to, on 
Arendt’s account, is the fact that what “we call consciousness (literally…‘to know with myself’) 
the curious fact that…I am not only for others but for myself, and in this latter case, I clearly am 
not just one. A difference is inserted into my Oneness” (LOM, 183).   
Recognizing with Husserl that consciousness is always consciousness of, or “the thinking 
ego does not think something but about something,” Arendt concludes that, “this [intentional, 
thinking] act is dialectical: it proceeds in the form of a silent dialogue” (LOM, 187). Arendt 
insists that although “thoughts do not have to be communicated in order to occur…they cannot 
occur without being spoken – silently or sounding out in dialogue, as the case may be” (LOM, 
99). When the communication occurs between oneself and her “other self,” as in thinking, what 
our epistemic agent must be able to imagine then, is her “other self.”  
However when the communication occurs between oneself and another, the imagination 
is no less engaged. As we earlier discussed, the prejudicial images from step #3 and the imagined 
images from step #4 must be associated with meanings that arise out of the conversation that 
occurs in step #5 – so images and the imagination are always a part of dialogues, whether with 
one’s self or another. And in dialogues, even if the goal is unity, as with Socrates’ quest for 
harmony with himself in the Gorgias, an essential prerequisite is the presence of a dis-unity – 
either in the form of ‘a difference that is inserted into one’s ‘Oneness’ or in the form of multiple 
interlocutors. 
Curiously, when the conversation involves oneself and another, the first thing that is 
‘absent’ and in need of ‘being made present’ is, again, one’s self – but in this case it’s one’s self 
for others, which means that its unity has been restored. This singular self is, on Arendt’s 
account, in a sense, absent from the “public realm” until her thoughts have been spoken there, for 
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“With word and deed we insert ourselves into the human world” (THC, 176). However, as 
always, Arendt’s emphasis is on plurality – in this case the plurality required for speech acts to 
occur in the first place. For Arendt, “Human plurality [is] the basic condition of both action and 
speech,” and since there can be no reflective judgment without both something to judge and 
something to say, plurality is also a basic condition of reflective judgment (THC, 175).  
Finally the last requirement needed to complete our six-step process toward arriving at a 
reflective judgment, which involves the faculty of remembrance, is also closely tied to the 
faculty of imagination. For Arendt, “thinking always implies remembrance; every thought is 
strictly speaking an after-thought,” if for no other reason than that, “In order for us to think about 
somebody, he must be removed from our presence” (LOM, 78). “Mnemosyne, Memory, is the 
mother of the Muses,” writes Arendt, “and remembrance, the most frequent and also the most 
basic thinking experience, has to do with things that are absent, that have disappeared from my 
senses” (LOM, 85). Even if, as earlier explained, the one whom we are remembering still stands 
before us, when thinking of her we are somehow ‘absent’, meaning that she has, in a sense, 
“disappeared from [our] senses” (LOM, 85). Importantly, even though Mnemosyne is a muse, 
Arendt adds the following caveat to all imaginings that are also remembrances: “Yet the absent 
that is summoned up and made present to my mind – a person, an event, a monument – cannot 
appear in the way it appeared to my senses, as though remembrance were a kind of witchcraft” 
(LOM, 85). Remembrance, which is really best considered a form of Imagination, does not 
“conjure up” exact replicas of the images formed in one’s social imaginary. Remembrance, like 
imagination, is always in some degree beholden to context: we imagine and remember in the 
midst of our everyday lives, and according to the particular needs of those lives, no matter how 
theoretical. 
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 Remembrance differs from imagination insofar as it possesses an additional capacity: if 
imagination and speech make present what is absent, it’s remembrance that makes those 
presentations durable. “Without remembrance…action, speech, and thought would lose their 
reality at the end of each process and disappear as though they had never been” (THC, 95). But 
in rendering initial speech acts visible and durable through the speech acts involved in 
remembrance, one is, as noted, re-presenting them according to the needs of the particular, 
socially situated circumstances that confront her. These re-presentations, no matter how 
“faithful,” are always interpretations of the original speech acts that they recall. In this way 
Arendt ties remembrance to meaning-making, insisting that, “The meaning of what actually 
happens and appears while it is happening is revealed when it has disappeared; remembrance… 
reveals the meaning in the form of a story” (LOM, 133). We will further investigate just how 
remembrance and meaning-making go hand-in-hand when we revisit the faculty of imagination 
towards the end of this chapter. 
Since, on our revised account of the process whereby an epistemic agent arrives at 
reflective judgments requires 1) Imagination, 2) Pluralism, and 3) Remembrance, and since 
reflective judgments are what can overcome both forms of epistemic injustice, it should come as 
small surprise that we will identify the ethico-epistemic failures involved in instances of 
testimonial and hermeneutical injustice as failures of imagination, pluralism, and remembrance. 
Let’s turn now to our revised account of hermeneutical and testimonial injustices. 
Part II: Hermeneutical and Testimonial Injustices As Failures of Imagination, Pluralism, 
and Remembrance 
 
When there seems to be no way to interpret one’s experiences because their character 
does not fit neatly into the existing categories of thought in one’s collective hermeneutical 
resources, it’s because there has been a failure of imagination – one cannot imagine new 
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categories of thought and thereby generate new hermeneutical resources in the form of new 
meanings. Similarly, when there seems to be no image upon which one can draw a just 
credibility assessment, it’s because there has been a similar failure of imagination – one cannot 
imagine perceiving certain hermeneutically marginalized epistemic agents as credible testifiers 
and thereby generate new testimonial resources in the form of new images for her economy of 
credibility to draw on. This means that both hermeneutical injustice and testimonial injustice are 
the result of failures of imagination. These failures of imagination occur, of course, at the level 
of imagination, or the social imaginary – where images and meanings collide. However it will be 
important to remember that these failures at the level of the social imaginary are presaged and 
followed by failures at the level of one’s ‘collective hermeneutical resources’ and her 
‘economies of credibility’. We will return to this point shortly. 
When it comes to the level of the social imaginary, as Fricker acknowledges,  
The social imagination is a mighty resource for social change, and this is significantly 
due to its capacity for informing thought directly, and thus independently of beliefs that 
may remain tainted with the prejudices of the day. But where it is the images themselves 
that are tainted by prejudice, the very same capacity to impinge on judgment directly and 
without the subject’s awareness can render the social imagination an ethical and 
epistemic liability. The collective social imagination inevitably contains all manner of 
stereotypes... (38) 
 
A ‘stereotype’, is, again, a “widely held association between a given social group and one or 
more attributes” (30, emphasis in original). Fricker emphasizes that she is using the word 
‘stereotype’ in a ‘neutral’ way, which means, among other things, that it can be reliable or 
unreliable, and can have either a positive or a negative valence.  
What I want to emphasize is the fact that the task of drawing an association between a 
social group and an attribute is an imaginative work of meaning-making. When one associates, 
for instance, the attribute ‘credible’ to a particular social group she is, among other things, saying 
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something meaningful about that social group – that they are credible testifiers, for instance. 
Fricker later asks us to “think of a social stereotype as an image which expresses an association 
between a social group and one or more attributes” (37). What the image expresses is something 
about what it means to belong to a particular social group – it expresses a preliminary judgment 
which simply affirms the relationship between a sensory input and a social meaning as originally 
learned or ‘inherited’. In other words, stereotypes are meaningful images, or what Fricker calls 
‘perceptual judgments’ and we are calling preliminary judgments. However, its important to note 
that what is ‘perceived’ in the image of a stereotype is a (meaningful) mental representation, not 
one’s sensory perception of an object in the physical world. This mental representation exists in 
the form of a stereotype, or a meaningful image, in ‘the collective social imagination’. 
I submit that the social imaginary is the source of both forms of epistemic injustice: if 
there is a hermeneutical lacuna in one’s collective hermeneutical resources, it’s because there is a 
meaningful image lacking in her social imaginary. This lack at the level of the social imaginary 
leaves a corresponding gap in one’ collective hermeneutical resources. And if one’s credibility 
assessments are prejudicial, it’s because either there is no meaningful image in her social 
imaginary of speakers who are at once hermeneutically marginalized and credible, or there are 
prejudicial meaningful images in her social imaginary “coloring” her credibility assessments in 
an unjust manner. But as Fricker suggests, the social imagination is also “a mighty resource for 
change” (38). In fact it seems as though one might best approach the problem of epistemic 
injustice as a whole by focusing squarely on social imaginaries and working to help populate 
them with meaningful images that are more epistemically just in order to combat both forms of 
epistemic injustice. This would include both revising and revaluating the meaningful images held 
there, and adding new meaningful images to it.  
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And in fact, this is more or less35 what Fricker attempts to do: since it’s the social 
imaginary that is corrupt and causing both forms of epistemic injustice, Fricker recommends that 
hearer’s cultivate a testimonial sensibility that is just. This just testimonial sensibility is, on 
Fricker’s account, a “form of rational sensitivity that is socially inculcated and trained by 
countless experiences of testimonial exchange, individual and collective,” and “instills in the 
virtuous hearer empirically well-grounded habits of epistemically charged social perception, and 
thus reliable perceptual judgments of speaker credibility” (5). The ‘virtuous hearer’ cultivates 
this just testimonial sensitivity by learning to correct for ‘the influence of prejudice in her 
credibility judgments” (5).  
Although Fricker’s account of hermeneutical injustice is, as previously indicated, all-too-
sparse, it is the cultivation of a just testimonial sensibility that also serves to remedy 
hermeneutical injustice on Fricker’s account. She suggests, that when it comes to making more 
just – or at least less unjust – intelligibility assessments, for instance, “Pro-active listening…does 
seem the kind of thing that one’s testimonial sensibility could be trained to trigger 
spontaneously… It may only be in respect of some virtuous responses, then, that the virtue of 
hermeneutical justice can be possessed in spontaneous form” (173).  
The one with a just testimonial sensitivity will, in other words, only correct for, not 
eliminate the influence of prejudicial images in her social imaginary in making both her 
credibility assessments and her intelligibility assessments. And because one’s social imaginary 
funds both her economy of credibility and her collective hermeneutical resources, this correction 
in one’s social imaginary will result in corrections to her economy of credibility and her social 
imaginary, ultimately leading to less unjust credibility assessments and intelligibility 																																																								
35 As will soon become clear, Fricker does not find testimonial sensibility capable of generating new 
meaningful images. We will focus on this issue of generating new meaningful issues shortly. 
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assessments. But I submit that this move to remedy both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice 
via a direct intervention at the level of imagination represents an illegitimate jump to the level of 
the social imaginary. It is based on the erroneous assumption that epistemic agents possess the 
autonomous ability to manipulate their social imaginaries by some form of sheer ethico-
epistemic will and without any “outside” intervention. But social imaginaries simply don’t work 
like that.  
Fricker’s premature jump to the level of the social imaginary further incorrectly assumes 
that the kinds of ethico-epistemic dissonance that might trigger such interventions can be made 
without the involvement of a plurality of significantly different others, others appealing to a 
plurality of social imaginaries, with whom to ethico-epistemically engage. And finally, it 
misrepresents the radically open-ended nature of thinking, which, “can never be stilled” on 
Arendt’s account, and can never decide once and for all what constitutes a just testimonial 
sensibility, or any other thing, for that matter – for what counts as a rational sensitivity, and even 
what counts as rational can never be a closed matter – not even on Kant’s account. As Arendt 
explains, “In the privacy of his posthumously published notes, Kant wrote: ‘I do not approve of 
the rule that if the use of pure reason has proved something, the result should no longer be 
subject to doubt, as though it were a solid axiom’; and ‘I do not share the opinion…that one 
should not doubt once one has convinced oneself of something. In pure philosophy this is 
impossible. Our mind has a natural aversion to it’” (LOM, 88, emphasis in original).  
Since what counts as rational speech is never predetermined, prior to any particular 
speech act, Fricker’s claim that one can cultivate a just testimonial sensibility simply by 
correcting for ‘alien…counter-rational’ prejudices is entirely spurious. Because she assumes that 
the unjust stereotypes in one’s social imaginary are only unjust because they have been corrupted 
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by ‘alien, counter-rational’ social forces, Fricker is confident that removing these social 
influences from one’s social imaginary will leave behind a more “pure” – that is, a non-social – 
imaginary resource for individual, rational epistemic agents to draw on. Incredibly, Miranda 
Fricker’s entire project, which purports to be a project in the line of Social Epistemology, rests 
on epistemic agents’ abilities to remove the social influences from their otherwise “just” 
individual imaginations. To say that I object to this line of thinking is quite the understatement. 
But the question remains: if Fricker’s path towards addressing the harms of epistemic injustice is 
not a viable one, what other paths are available to us? We will attempt to address this question as 
we now turn toward our proposed response to the problem of epistemic injustice. 
Three Pathways Toward Altering the Meaningful Images in One’s Social Imaginary 
The images that populate one’s social imaginary may indeed be mediated – if this were 
not the case then we would forever be doomed to epistemic injustice. But there are three distinct 
ways in which one might set about to meliorate one’s social imaginary: 1.) the hermeneutic track 
– which involves offering new meanings in the form of stories, narratives, or theoretical 
frameworks, with which to populate one’s ‘collective hermeneutical resources’ 2.) the 
testimonial track – which involves offering new images in the form of artworks, metaphors, or 
other forms of poetic language, with which to populate one’s ‘economy of credibility’ and 3.) the 
social imaginary track – which involves attempting directly to manipulate the meaningful images 
in one’s social imaginary. As we will see, Hannah Arendt takes the first path and Audre Lorde 
takes the second. And as we’ve seen, Fricker takes the third. I submit that only the first and 
second of these paths are viable.   
The first path – the hermeneutic track of Arendt’s – takes the task of coming to an 
understanding that can be shared with others to be the primary goal of one’s discourse. The 
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second path – the testimonial track of Lorde’s – takes the task of revealing of knowledges, both 
to oneself and to others, to be the primary goal of one’s discourse. Both of these paths employ 
the faculty of the imagination, but crucially, in a kind of inverse reflection of Plato’s Cave 
parable, both begin and end in the so-called “real world.” Fricker’s path understandably jumps 
right to the root of the problem – which, after all, really is in one’s social imaginary – parallels 
Plato’s Cave parable insofar as its “middle ground” is the “real world,” but its origin and 
conclusion lie squarely in the realm of “invisibles,” as Arendt puts it – which in this case is the 
social imaginary.  
A Non-Eternal Return: On the Linguistic and Temporal Aspects of Imagination and 
Remembrance 
 
To better see just how and why only Lorde’s and Arendt’s paths are viable, and Fricker’s 
is not, I propose that we return to our earlier discussion of the faculty of the imagination and 
remembrance and further flesh out just what employing it involves. But brace yourselves: there 
is no easy way linguistically to render the realm of “invisibles.” As it turns out, one of the most 
difficult things to “wrap one’s mind around” when it comes to the imagination is the way in 
which one’s linguistic utterances can “carry” (metapherein) the images held there across multiple 
boundaries, the most important of which, at least for our project, are temporal boundaries. In 
discussing the faculty of the imagination and its relationship to epistemic injustice, we will be 
focusing on two of the most oft discussed and yet still least understood topics ever to find their 
way onto the pages of philosophical treatises written within the Occidental tradition: language 
and time.  
According to Hermann Broch, these two topics simply belong together: “For him what is 
essential about language is that it syntactically indicates an abrogation of time ‘within the 
sentence’ because it necessarily ‘places subject and object in a relationship of simultaneity’” 
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(MDT, 133). Arendt explains that for Broch, the “‘the sole task of language’… is ‘to make 
cognitive units audible and visible’… Whatever is frozen into the simultaneity of the sentence – 
to wit, thought, which ‘in a single moment can comprehend wholes of extraordinary extent’ – is 
wrenched out of the passages of time” (MDT, 133). We will explore this ‘frozen…simultaneity 
of the sentence’ and the ways in which language ‘syntactically indicates the abrogation of time’ 
there in order better to apprehend the faculty of the imagination, and the ways in which its 
‘comprehend[ed] wholes’ are similarly ‘wrenched out of the passages of time’. And then we will 
revisit the faculty of remembrance to discuss the ways in which those ‘wholes’ are placed back 
into time.  
As noted, Arendt asserts that one cannot even think absent the faculty of the imagination, 
which she describes as occurring in “the gap between past and future” (BPF, 3). Although she is 
almost painfully aware of the fact that, when discussing such things as “thinking” her language 
tends toward the metaphysical, Arendt is no metaphysician.36 However to speak of such things as 
thinking, she finds, requires a hearkening back to, “what we would call today the ‘metaphysical 
fallacies’’’ (LOM, 12). As she puts it, 
None of the systems, none of the doctrines transmitted to us by the great thinkers may be 
convincing or even plausible to modern readers; but none of them…is arbitrary and none 
can be dismissed as sheer nonsense. On the contrary, the metaphysical fallacies contain 
the only clues we have to what thinking means to those who engage in it – something of 
great importance to us today and about which, oddly enough, there exist few direct 
utterances. (LOM, 12) 
 
Arendt has no designs on reviving metaphysics, and no interest in dismissing its subject matter as 
“unscientific” and therefore utterly disreputable. Since she finds no other, or perhaps simply no 
better, way to discuss the topic of thinking, and since she is quite intent on discussing it anyway; 																																																								
36 Arendt’s antipathy to metaphysics can be seen in her declaration that, “I have clearly joined the ranks 
of those who for some time now have been attempting to dismantle metaphysics, and philosophy with all 
its categories, as we have known them from their beginning in Greece until today” (LOM, 212). 
	 86	
Arendt chooses the language of metaphor as most appropriate to the task and forges ahead as 
best she can. Although she is no poet, Arendt’s prose can, at times, be quite beautiful. Still, she 
wields the language of poetry like the storyteller that she is: drawing novel meanings from dead 
metaphors. However, at times she ventures into the poetic arts and begins painting startlingly 
new pictures in language as ancient as philosophy itself. Either way, Arendt’s deliverances are 
often part séance, part new birth.  
  What Arendt attempts to capture in speaking of the activity of thinking is the fact that it 
is, “as Heidegger once observed, ‘out of order’. It interrupts any doing, any ordinary activities, 
no matter what they happen to be. All thinking demands a stop-and-think. Whatever the fallacies 
and the absurdities of the two-world theories may have been, they arose out of these genuine 
experiences of the thinking ego” (LOM, 78). All this is just to say that although Arendt was quite 
aware of the fact that to speak of a “gap in time” is to speak metaphorically, and that “Applied to 
historical or biographical time, none of these metaphors can possibly make sense because gaps in 
time do not occur there,” she was also aware of the fact that when it comes to the images one 
holds in her imagination, or “social imaginary,” the semblance that there is a kind of inviolable 
stasis to them is difficult to shake. Indeed, to think in images is to think in some sort of still 
pictures, even though thinking itself can never be stilled.  
 Philosophers, and I include Miranda Fricker in this group, have a tendency to make both 
more and less of these still pictures than they should. It’s not that they mistake metaphor for 
truth, it’s that they mistake truth for the singular goal of thinking. As it turns out, in describing 
truth as a “mobile army of metaphors,” Nietzsche may have said more than he knew; for in 
Nietzsche’s forked tongue these words formed an indictment, and spoke derision. But to call 
something a metaphor, a truth, or even “Metaphysics,” is to acknowledge that even in the “great 
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blooming, buzzing confusion” of our sense impressions there is a way for that “still small voice” 
to arrest us (James, 462). I find it striking that in the Biblical passage wherein we find that “still 
small voice,” what its asking is: “What doest thou here?” (1 Kings, 19:9).  
 The prophet Elijah, after wandering in the desert for forty days and forty nights, as 
prophets are apparently wont to do, seeks the voice of God on a mountaintop. What comes 
instead is a “great and strong wind” that “rent the mountains, and brake in pieces the rocks,” but 
of course, “the Lord was not in the wind; and after the wind an earthquake; but the Lord was not 
in the earthquake: And after the earthquake a fire; but the Lord was not in the fire: and after the 
fire a still small voice…[that] said unto him… “What doest thou here, Elijah?” (1 Kings, 19:11-
13).  
The Lord God, who surely knows exactly what Elijah “doest” there, asks Elijah anyway, “What 
are you doing here?” The Lord asks, in other words, for a story. And that is a picture of the 
relationship between knowledge and understanding; truth and meaning; Metaphysics and 
science; poetry and prose. What imagination does is bring these seemingly oppositional things 
together. Bear with me as we pivot to hermeneutical injustice here. Call it a “pirouette” if you 
like, for we will turn full circle and come right back to Elijah. But first I have some outrageous-
sounding things to assert about the nature of thinking and reason. 
 What thinking does, when viewed from within a science, a language, a meaning-
framework or a story, is to seek truths wherever it can find them. The goal of thinking within a 
‘collective hermeneutical resource’ is to seek out the still pictures out of which it has been 
stitched together. One’s collective hermeneutical resource comprises the thread holding these 
‘still pictures’ together, and following the thread leads from one picture to the next, forming a 
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kind of picturesque “thought-train.” But the goal of thinking set free37 – where it is often called 
“speculative reason” – is to seek meaning-frameworks within which the truths it has found can 
be set. The goal of speculative reason is to find a home for its still pictures that don’t fit neatly 
within one’s existing collective hermeneutical resource, to find a new collective hermeneutical 
resource wherein they can begin to make some sort of sense. Or, even more radically: to join 
with others in creating new collective hermeneutical resources so that one’s still pictures may 
begin to make a new kind of sense. These still pictures are bits of knowledge, or what many 
philosophers refer to as “truths.”  
 Since the linguistic army within which these truths march is, as Nietzsche put it, 
“mobile,” these still small bits of knowledge, or truths, can appear quite striking when placed or 
discovered within them. Imagine reading along, moving from still word-to-still word, still 
sentence-to-still sentence, without giving much thought to the motion of your reading. And then 
imagine coming across the name of a long lost love, a childhood friend, or some other whose 
absence makes itself present in the most arresting way. You stop on certain words. You re-read 
certain sentences. Certain words and certain sentences make you stop. Just like certain truths do.  
 Or, perhaps more pedantically, consider the learning processes we all go through from 																																																								
37 It makes no non-metaphorical sense to speak of thinking “set free.” Thinking always and only occurs 
within a particular context and its results are therefore always already part and parcel of a meaning-
context, theoretical framework, or a ‘collective hermeneutical resource’. That said, there is good reason to 
speak of a reason that is “speculative” and not simply “regulative.” We will delve into this issue more 
fully in the next chapter, but for now, suffice it to say that on Arendt’s interpretation of Kant, which we 
will again follow, Kant makes a very sharp divide between thinking’s cognitive capacities and its 
speculative or rational capacity. This unique understanding of what constitutes reason was touched on in 
the previous chapter and, as indicated, will be more thoroughly investigated in the next chapter. At this 
point, even though we are employing it, a fuller account of the nature of reason would take us too far 
afield. But to anticipate: our conception of reason draws on the faculty of imagination and brings Kant’s 
“enlarged mentality” into play. “To think with the enlarged mentality” Arendt explains, “means that you 
train your imagination to go visiting…” (LOM, 257). One can think of this ability to ‘go visiting’ as a 
version of reason that is “public,” and therefore “open to all sides” (LOM, 257). So speculative reason is 
not free in terms of being “free from all meaning-frameworks or sets of collective hermeneutical 
resources,” it’s instead free in terms of being “free to roam about between these frameworks, even while 
‘attached’ more fully to some than others.”  
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time-to-time. When learning most things there is a right and a wrong answer to many of the 
questions one has, certain facts or certain truths. We’ve grown accustomed to seeking them. We 
are practiced at it; for, beginning when we are very young, we learn to view these answers, facts, 
truths, as our “prizes” – the reward we get for thinking critically and carefully. Brain scans of 
thinkers diligently working through cognitive challenges light up like Christmas Trees whenever 
this precious goal comes within view. Dopamine floods, not just the nucleus acumbens (the 
“reward center” of the brain), but also the septum, amygdala, and prefrontal cortex, whenever a 
cognizer cognizes a truth. You know the feeling. The “A-ha” moment, or the calmer but still oh-
so-satisfying, “Yes, yes that’s it, that’s right.” You love the feeling. Of course you do. We are 
quite literally “wired” for this search and discovery mission.  
The danger for those who take on the mantle of “professional thinker” (and, as Arendt 
points out, Kant called philosophers Denker von Gewerke “not without irony”) is that, finding 
ourselves often quite adept at these cognitive challenges, we begin to lose sight of the reason we 
sought out these truths in the first place, not to mention losing sight of how /when /where they 
originated. We’ve learned to learn too well, and now seek truth as if it were an end in itself. But 
it’s not. We’ve lost the forest for the trees…But now it seems that I’ve lost something – the 
thread, perhaps? For we were on about the task of investigating the faculties of imagination and 
remembrance, and we wanted to know about them better to understand epistemic injustice, after 
all. But it seems all I’ve been doing is mixing my metaphors. So let’s begin to resolve some of 
them. Let’s complete the pirouette.  
 You are the prophet Elijah. (Didn’t see that coming, did you?) You are a fugitive, ratted 
out by Ahab and running from Jezebel for crimes too gruesome even to recount here. You seek 
the stillness. Truth Itself. Jehovah-El, the singular “Lord God of truth” (Psalms, 31:5). Selah. Se 
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– lah. According to the Amplified Bible “Selah” means “to pause and calmly think of that.” “It is 
a movement, and a rest,” if you buy into the gnostic gospels (GThom 84). You’ve had your 
movement, now you want your rest. You look for God on a mountaintop. Mountaintops are 
generally considered tranquil places. We can picture the Dali Lama perched on a mountaintop in 
full Lotus position, meditating peacefully. God, being the all-in-all and all, is surely in the 
stillness. A mountaintop is as good a place as any to pause and calmly listen for a word from The 
Word. But what you find is not stillness. It’s a wind that ‘rent the mountains and brake in pieces 
the rocks’.  
 Mountains are still, rocks are still, God is still. But it seems that the stillnesses have all 
been broken. If the wind hadn’t done it, surely the earthquake and the fire would have. Even God 
has been weathered down into a still, small voice. Like an arresting truth, a shiny chunk of 
knowledge, a picture from which you can’t wrest your gaze. “What are you doing here, Elijah?” 
State your business plainly, for I AM THAT I AM, and “for me, there is, I am trying to tell you, 
no time” (Dillard, 69). But you, Elijah. You do have time. Heaps of it. Dissertation deadline or 
no, you do have time. In fact, you have all of it. Time is like the wind, or an earthquake, or a fire. 
These things, whether hurricane-force or campfire-small, are what move you. But I AM She who 
has no time, and it’s me you’re looking for. Why do you care so much for this still, small 
questioning voice, anyway? What say you, Elijah? Here’s the thing: whatever you answer it will 
matter only because you’ll make it matter. And you’ll do that by telling a story.  
 It is not the case that truths are not important. They can come in the form of a mountain 
you’ll never summit, and God help you if there is a nearby boulder in need of a push. Or they can 
come in the form of a picture in your mind that brings a small smile to your lips every single time 
you conjure it up. Truths matter. Knowledge matters. But only because we time-bound creatures, 
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for better or for worse, make these things matter. “But surely,” you object, “my suffering, my 
pain, is REAL. Surely it matters.” But not hope, joy, pain, sorrow, not even love nor hate, not 
even your suffering, mean a thing without some time-bound creature telling a story about it. 
“There may be truths beyond speech,” writes Arendt, “and they may be of great relevance to man 
in the singular, that is, man in so far as he is not a political being, whatever else he may be. Men 
in the plural, that is, men in so far as they live and move and act in this world, can experience 
meaningfulness only because they can talk with and make sense to each other and to themselves” 
(THC, 4).  
 Hermeneutical resources are meaning-making resources, helping us better to understand 
the stillnesses – the truths, the knowledges – that confront us. Helping us to “come to terms 
with,” or make sense of them. And stories, narratives, and even theoretical frameworks move in 
time, however swiftly or slowly, like the wind or an earthquake or a fire. Pictures in our minds, 
truths, or any other still thing, are knowledge resources, helping us better to see. But like God in 
the wind or the earthquake or the fire, the truths are not in your stories – until you a-rest yourself, 
stop-and-think, then ‘freeze’ in time these ‘single moments[s] [which] can comprehend wholes 
of extraordinary extent’ by rendering your ‘cognitive units audible and visible’ in the form of a 
word or a sentence – in other words, until you place them there. And where and how you place 
your truths makes all the difference in the world.  
Audre Lorde, reflecting on the power of language, muses, “Words had an energy and 
power and I came to respect that power early. Pronouns, nouns, and verbs were citizens of 
different countries, who really got together to make a new world” (CWAL, 37). And indeed 
words and sentences, ‘pronouns, nouns, and verbs’ are the building blocks for creating a 
meaningful world. But Lorde never lost sight of the fact that such world building, though 
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employing the radical power of the imagination, always occurs in the clash of dialogues between 
significantly different others, and depends upon  
the interdependence of mutual (nondominant) differences [within which] lies that security 
which enables us to descend into the chaos of knowledge and return with true visions of 
our future, along with the concomitant power to effect those changes which can bring that 
future into being. Difference is that raw and powerful connection from which our 
personal power is forged…Without community there is no liberation, only the most 
vulnerable and temporary armistice between an individual and her oppression. But 
community must not mean a shedding of our differences, nor the pathetic pretense that 
these differences do not exist. (SO, 112)  
 
And here we come to the crux of my concerns about Miranda Fricker’s approach to the 
problem of epistemic injustice. By jumping into the “fight” at the level of the social imaginary, 
Fricker aims to bypass the world. For Fricker the ideal epistemic agent – the one who can 
cultivate a just testimonial sensibility – is one in conversation with only herself and her own 
‘social inheritance’ in the form of the meaningful images that populate her social imaginary.  
She is engaged in the cognitive enterprise of autonomously discovering discrepancies between 
her ‘individual stream of input’ and her ‘social stream of input’, and then sovereignly declaring 
either the one or the other more ‘rational’. But rationality and sovereignty, pace Fricker, simply 
don’t mix.  
As Lorde explains to the poet Adrienne Rich, in her interview with Rich:  
Rationality is not unnecessary. It serves the chaos of knowledge. It serves feeling. It 
serves to get from this place to that place. But if you don’t honor those places, then the 
road is meaningless. Too often, that’s what happens with the worship of rationality and 
that circular, academic, analytic thinking. But ultimately, I don’t see feel/think as a 
dichotomy. I see them as a choice of ways and combinations. (SO, 100-01) 
 
And Arendt bluntly insists that the kind of autonomy of which Fricker speaks is, by virtue of its 
claim to sovereignty through reason, patently unfree. “If it were true that sovereignty and 
freedom are the same,” explains Arendt, “then indeed no man could be free, because sovereignty, 
the ideal of uncompromising self-sufficiency and mastership, is contradictory to the very 
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condition of plurality. No man can be sovereign because not one man, but men, inhabit the earth” 
(THC, 234). Arendt goes on to explain that only in monological systems, like monotheism, or in 
one’s imagination, is the equation of freedom and sovereignty even possible. “In polytheist 
systems, for instance, even a god, no matter how powerful, cannot be sovereign; only under the 
assumption of one god (‘One is one and all alone and evermore shall be so’) can sovereignty and 
freedom be the same. Under all other circumstances, sovereignty is possible only in imagination, 
paid for by the price of reality” (THC, 235).  
In contrast to Fricker’s approach, both Lorde’s and Arendt’s approaches begin, as noted, 
with a thoroughgoing pluralism because they begin, not in the imagination but in the world. 
We’ve seen now why Fricker’s path – path #3, the social imaginary track – is not a viable option 
for mounting challenges to the problem of epistemic injustice. And we’ve begun to see how 
Lorde’s and Arendt’s paths offer far better approaches to the problem. As we continue to outline 
our Lordian and Arendtian-inspired approaches to the problem of epistemic injustice in the 
coming chapters, we will distance ourselves even further from Fricker’s monological approach. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Counter-narratives of Resistance – Making Meaning By Placing Old Truths into New 
Contexts 
 
Pearl Diver 
Full fathom five thy father lies, 
Of his bones are coral made, 
Those are pearls that were his eyes. 
Nothing of him that doth fade 
But doth suffer a sea-change 
Into something rich and strange. 
-The Tempest, I,2 
 
 
Introduction 
 In this chapter we will mine some of the writings of Hannah Arendt in order to identify 
and outline an Arendtian-inspired approach to the problem of epistemic injustice. Perhaps 
because she wrote before there was a determinate body of work called “social epistemology,” or 
perhaps because, although she was a very systematic thinker, she often quite intentionally chose 
not to present her theories systematically, Arendt’s thoughts on the matter are scattered 
throughout her works. We find them couched in theoretical examinations of politics, thinking, 
language, responsibility, judgment, etc. Our task is to unearth and gather together these 
seemingly disparate references into what will ultimately amount to a surprisingly comprehensive 
(but not closed) theoretical approach to the problem of epistemic injustice.   
In outlining our Arendtian-inspired approach, we will begin with the problem of 
hermeneutical injustice and proceed to the problem of testimonial injustice: a wholly intentional 
reversal of Miranda Fricker’s framework. Our Arendtian reconstruction of the problem of 
epistemic injustice takes hermeneutical injustice as the primary form of the harm, and testimonial 
injustice as a subspecies of it. Although we will begin with this reversal of Fricker’s overall 
framework, we will not leave our intervention into the problem of epistemic injustice at that. 
Ultimately, what I hope to show is that what’s needed in outlining a more just account of the 
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problem of epistemic injustice is more than just a reversal of what’s considered its primary and 
secondary forms of harm. What’s needed is an account of the ways in which ethico-epistemic 
judgments generate the very standards according to which those harms are judged.  
 Philosophical and Political Reversals of Thought 
To begin with a reversal is, on Arendt’s account, hardly revolutionary – for all of 
Western philosophy and politics hinge on reversals, on Arendt’s account. Plato, after all, began 
with a reversal: “Whoever reads the Cave allegory in Plato’s Republic in the light of Greek 
history will soon be aware that the periagoge, the turning-about that Plato demands of the 
philosopher, actually amounts to a reversal of the Homeric world order,” (THC, 292).   
Arendt contends that this reversal set a pattern that has dominated Western thought: 
[T]he Platonic tradition of philosophical as well as political thought started with a 
reversal…this original reversal determined to a large extent the thought patterns into 
which Western philosophy almost automatically fell wherever it was not animated by a 
great and original philosophical impetus. Academic philosophy, as a matter of fact, has 
ever since been dominated by the never-ending reversals of idealism and materialism, of 
transcendentalism and immanentism, of realism and nominalism, of hedonism and 
asceticism, and so on. (THC, 292) 
 
As radical as each of these reversals of thought appears to be, what concerns Arendt about them 
is their conservatism. As she argued time and again, reversals of thought fail to break out of the 
“structural elements involved” in whichever system of thought the reversal sought to overturn 
(THC, 293).  
Continuing with her critique of the limitations inherent in the kinds of reversals with 
which Western philosophy has concerned itself since Plato, Arendt clarifies: 
What matters here is the reversibility of all these systems, that they can be turned ‘upside 
down’ or ‘downside up’ at any moment in history without requiring for such reversal 
either historical events or changes in the structural elements involved. The concepts 
themselves remain the same no matter where they are placed in the various systematic 
orders. Once Plato had succeeded in making these structural elements and concepts 
reversible, reversals within the course of intellectual history no longer needed more than 
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purely intellectual experience, an experience within the framework of conceptual 
thinking itself. (THC, 292-3) 
 
Arendt finds the kind of “armchair philosophy” involved in the ‘purely intellectual experience’ 
of reversing systems of thought while leaving their ‘structural elements’ intact not only 
altogether too conservative, but also too dependent upon illusions of “detached” Archimedean 
points of view; and, perhaps most egregiously, too individualistic – capable of being made in the 
solitude of one’s own imagination. She further finds such reversals of thought all-too-common 
throughout the history of Western philosophy.  
Not even Marx, who, in his eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach, famously derided the 
philosopher’s penchant for “only interpret[ing] the world in various ways [when] the point is to 
change it,” is immune from Arendt’s critique of the conservatism inherent in theoretical reversals 
of thought. She complains that in “turning Hegelian dialectic upside down” Marx “is still 
[working] in the same tradition, the same intellectual game with paired antitheses that rules, to an 
extent, the famous modern reversals of spiritual hierarchies” (THC, 293). And as for Nietzsche’s 
“daring” revaluations of all values, Arendt finds his an “inverted Platonism” characterized by a 
“lack of radicalism…which, by putting things upside down or downside up, still keeps intact the 
categorical framework in which such reversals can operate” (LOM, 176).  
As we begin to review some of the more important ways in which Arendt’s account of 
the problem of epistemic injustice differs from Miranda Fricker’s, we will see that our 
Arendtian-inspired reconstruction of the problem of epistemic injustice begins with several 
reversals of Fricker’s interpretation of the problem. However, though these reversals are often 
initially presented in the form of certain contested dualisms, they proceed to move beyond those 
dualisms into creative re-imaginings of the categories of thought used to frame the ethico-
epistemic problems Arendt addressed. As we will see, these creative interventions, unlike the 
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time worn traditional reversals of thought we’ve been discussing, open up the space for novel 
interpretations of ancient ethical and epistemic problems. But before we begin outlining the 
reversals with which Arendt begins, and investigating the new concepts and conceptual 
frameworks she offers, a word on Arendt’s innovative method of theoretical investigation is in 
order. 
A Note on Arendt’s Method 
Although she drew little attention to it, Hannah Arendt, taking Nietzsche as a model of 
sorts, employed a version of his genealogical method that was rather unique. Had she taken the 
time to articulate her inventive method, much of the ink spilled in outraged contestations over the 
many distinctions made in her work may have been saved. As Arendt scholar Lisa Disch notes, 
“Arendt failed to explain what she herself termed a ‘rather unusual approach’…to political 
theory because she considered methodological discussions to be self-indulgent and irrelevant to 
real political problems” (108). Disch understatedly concludes, “She did herself a disservice by 
this reticence” (108).   
Disch extrapolates a “statement of epistemology or method” from Arendt’s “scattered 
remarks” on what she often self-effacingly referred to as “my old fashioned storytelling” (107). 
In such ‘storytelling’ Arendt finds a solution to the problem identified in previous chapters as 
crucial for any response to the problem of epistemic injustice to address: how to arrive at a 
response to the non-doxastic problem of epistemic injustice that yields epistemic assessments 
that are critical. In outlining her response to the problem of epistemic injustice, Miranda Fricker, 
recall, insisted that because identity prejudices, which, like all prejudices, are always non-
doxastic, underlie both forms of epistemic injustice (hermeneutic injustice and testimonial 
injustice), the problem of epistemic injustice requires a non-inferentialist solution. In other 
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words, since prejudices, by definition (pre-judgments), don’t rise to the level of conscious belief 
formation, the problem of epistemic injustice cannot be overcome through the formation of 
proper beliefs arrived at through sound inferential reasoning. Cultivating the virtue of epistemic 
justice, then, does not rely on, much less require, one’s acquisition of the epistemic skill of 
drawing correct inferences between types of speakers and/or their testimony and the epistemic 
categories of ‘credible’ or ‘intelligible’. It instead requires a non-inferentialist response. 
Fricker, as noted, turns to a virtue-epistemic approach for her non-inferentialist solution 
to the non-doxastic problem of epistemic injustice – one that entails the cultivation of the 
epistemic virtue of ‘testimonial sensitivity.’ On this account a hearer’s credibility assessments of 
a speaker and/or her testimony can remain critical, that is, non-arbitrary, non-relativist, and non-
prejudicial, by virtue of the fact that they can be measured against what is collectively considered 
to be a virtuous testimonial sensitivity. What I’m suggesting here is that Arendt has found a 
better solution to this problem in the form of her epistemological method of ‘old-fashioned 
storytelling.’   
On the face of it, the suggestion that critical epistemic judgments can, at times, best be 
made by the lights of some “good ‘ole fashioned storytelling” may (perhaps should) strike one 
as, at best, a bit odd. In discussing this aspect of Arendt’s method from a strikingly sympathetic 
standpoint, Georgetown Law Professor David Luban explains that, “the gap that separates her 
work from what has come to be the practice of political science in America is a function of a 
deep difference in methods and goals, rooted in Arendt’s understanding of the plight of politics 
in contemporary civilization” (215). These ‘deep differences in methods and goals’ result from 
Arendt’s belief that,  
Under certain historical circumstances, those she refers to as ‘dark times,’ even the most 
ingenious and plausible theories lose their role in human knowledge. Yet this does not 
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mean that no understanding is possible to us – rather, the role of theories can be assumed, 
imperfectly to be sure, by ‘ever-recurrent narration,’ frequently the narration of the 
stories of individual human beings. Eventually, narration can be reified poetically (and 
not scientifically), and this is the closest we can come to a true mastering of the past. 
(216).  
 
As sympathetic as he is to Arendt’s methodological approach, Luban nonetheless dryly 
concedes, “The bizarreness of this account need hardly be remarked” (216).  
It’s ‘bizarreness’ notwithstanding, Luban offers two compelling reasons not to dismiss 
Arendt’s rather unusual method of ‘old fashioned storytelling’ as an innovative means of arriving 
at ethico-epistemic understandings. “First is the notion that explanation…is radically time-
bound: historical circumstances determine not so much the character of explanation as its very 
possibility…[which serves to] sever the umbilicus between a timelessly true theory and the 
circumstances of its origin” (216). This reason aligns well with our approach, which, as indicated 
in chapter one, begins in media res, or ‘in the midst of things’ and aims to offer a contextualized 
account of the problem of epistemic injustice. Luban’s second reason for championing Arendt’s 
methodological approach is that it does not demand that “the activity of comprehension” require 
“the type of personal virtue…[of] scientific detachment, which Arendt, following Droysen, calls 
‘eunuchic objectivity,’ the ‘extinction of the self’; nor is the ability required cleverness or 
intelligence” (216). As Disch puts it, Arendt “argues for a redefinition of validity to be achieved 
not by abstract, neutral writing but by storytelling from a committed moral perspective” (668).  
As much as Arendt disavowed her feminist ‘credentials’ she did, at times, brazenly 
challenge mainstream perspectives on what counts as a “proper” theoretical approach to ethical, 
political, and epistemological topics from what can sensibly be described as a feminist approach 
– even though her practical alignment with feminist causes appears only accidental. Even Arendt 
understood most mainstream theoretical perspectives to be largely comprised of the opinions of 
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an overwhelmingly homogeneous group: one that is privileged, white, male, and of European 
descent. Sadly, most evidence points to the conclusion that this fact seemed only to bother her 
insofar as it impeded the progress of her own thought.38 In the case of her radical departure from 
standard methods of investigating historical and political phenomena, Arendt’s challenge to the 
mainstream, inspired by the difficulties she encountered in thinking through ethical, social, and 
political problems using existing categories of thought, came in the form of a devastating critique 
of epistemological absolutism and its dependence on the existence of some kind of supposedly 
universal, Archimedean “model of impartiality defined as detached reasoning” (Disch, 666).   
The common feminist critique of the use of supposedly immutable, universal categories 
of thought to stand in for what were always very particular, socially, politically, and 
economically situated articulations of those categories parallels Arendt’s epistemological critique 																																																								
38 The dearth of evidence supporting the notion that Arendt harbored any deep feminist commitments 
may, as most theorists argue, support the conclusion that she simply didn’t. I would caution against fully 
endorsing this conclusion only because I take seriously Arendt’s, clearly deep-felt, resistance to anything 
that might resemble the activities of those she called “Parvenu’s.” Her strong distaste for the kinds of 
“social climbing” embodied in her image of the Parvenu led Arendt down some ethically very dubious 
intellectual paths. Perhaps the most grievous example is her infamous “Essay on Little Rock,” in which 
Arendt, otherwise inexplicably – and even with an explanation, still outrageously – argued against federal 
enforcement of the Brown v. The Board of Education decision as it played out in Little Rock on grounds 
that education was a social good; therefore demands to integrate amounted to a desire for social climbing.  
I believe that this strong tendency to eschew all activities remotely related to Parvenu’s may have also 
underwritten Arendt’s disinclination to formulate feminist arguments against patriarchy in public arenas.  
Additionally, in various letters to friends, and in interviews, Arendt does give some indication that she at 
least perceives some of the more obvious problems of patriarchy, and finds them, if not oppressive then at 
least exasperating. Although much more can be said about the reasons why Arendt formed some 
questionable alliances and sabotaged other, one wants to say, much more ‘sensible’ – or even more 
ethical ones, such a discussion would go well beyond the scope of this dissertation.  Suffice it to say that 
Arendt’s uneasy alliances and seemingly inexplicable penchant for making adversaries out of those 
underprivileged or oppressed souls with whom she so often intended to ally, should not quickly be 
dismissed as evidence of her unequivocal subservience to, or agreement with, corrupt power in the forms 
of patriarchy, anti-Semitism, and white supremacy. As tangled as were her thought processes on 
Parvenu’s and Pariah’s, I honestly believe they were informed chiefly by her loves and her sorrows, not 
by any supposed depravity on her part. That said, Arendt was rightly taken to task for many of her more 
grievous pronouncements, which, along with her blatantly apparent obliviousness to certain aspects of her 
own privilege, generated ample reason to challenge Arendt’s work on several fronts. For more on 
Arendt’s complicated understanding of Parvenu’s and Pariah’s, see Tujia Parvikko’s excellent, The 
Responsibilities of the Pariah. For more on the extent of her racial insensitivity, and even the outright 
racist comments in her work, see Kathryn Gines’ powerful, Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question. 
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of appeals to the supposed universal immutability of certain categorical distinctions. However, 
Arendt’s approach to the first of these supposedly universal categorical distinctions that we will 
need to investigate caused many feminist theorists to balk at what appeared to be a reversal of 
their own challenge to an important categorical distinction: that between the public and private 
realms.  
Part I: An Alternative Account of Epistemic Injustice 
My understanding of Arendt’s approach to the problem of hermeneutical injustice begins 
with a description of what she refers to as the polis during times of widespread injustice, 
epistemic and otherwise. Arendt offers various interpretations of the meaning of the polis, but at 
its most basic, it is, for her, that public place of appearance, where “With word and deed we 
insert ourselves into the human world” (THC, 176). While there are several arenas in which 
human beings can appear to others, such as one’s family, social group, etc., appearing in the 
polis differs significantly from these according to Arendt. Drawing on an ancient Greek 
conception of politics, Arendt argues, “The rise of the city-state meant that man received 
‘besides his private life a sort of second life, his bios politikos. Now every citizen belongs to two 
orders of existence; and there is a sharp distinction in his life between what is his own (idion) 
and what is communal (koinon)’” (THC, 24).   
The Problematic Public / Private Distinction 
While Arendt’s ‘sharp distinction’ between the public and the private has caused much 
consternation among feminist philosophers arguing, with good reason, that “the personal is 
political;”39 avoiding the issues that invariably surface whenever this distinction is deployed will 
prove impossible for our task. We simply cannot make sense of Arendt’s understanding of 																																																								
39 See Carol Hanisch’s 1969 essay “The Personal Is Political,” one of, if not the, earliest articulations of 
this slogan of the early feminist movement.   
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epistemic injustice without first addressing certain aspects of the ways in which she 
distinguished between the public and the private. Although I have reservations about Arendt’s 
rigid distinction, I’m also sympathetic to her reasons for maintaining it. 
Historically speaking the reasons for declaring that the personal is political had 
everything to do with the problem of dealing with injustices occurring “in the privacy of one’s 
own home,” so-to-speak – away from the scrutiny of the public eye, and sometimes tragically 
beyond the reach of legal protection. Injustices such as domestic violence, for instance, were 
often considered private matters from which spectators should, in modesty, turn away. Through 
the powerful regulation of customs and mores, victims of violence in the private sphere of the 
home were effectively silenced whenever they attempted to air their private grievances in the 
public realm. Struggling even to gain a hearing for their concerns, women in particular were 
often left without recourse to legal means of bringing the perpetrators of the harms they suffered 
to justice. These clearly compelling reasons for defending the abolition the public/ private 
distinction altogether should not be hastily dismissed. However, on Arendt’s account this all-too-
common rendering of the distinction gets things turned rather upside down.   
As Arendt sees it, injustices occurring in the private realm should not summarily be 
barred from being discussed in the public realm. In a functioning democracy, private matters are 
seldom denied a hearing in the public realm of discussion/ debate, at least in principle. 40 In 
principle, private experiences can always appear in the public realm in the form of speech acts 
that describe them to listeners capable of receiving them. Of course in practice this is often not 
the case: as we have seen, capable listeners can be few and far between when public discussions 
center on the concerns of the hermeneutically marginalized. However, the practical failure of the 
airing of private grievances in public, or at least their uptake, does not arise out of the public/ 																																																								
40 There may be some important caveats to this general rule, speech acts that incite violence, for instance.	
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private distinction itself; it arises instead out of the kinds of epistemic injustices with which 
we’ve been dealing.   
Those attempting to give voice to their “private” experiences, such as their experiences 
with domestic violence, are often silenced, not because they dare to discuss private matters in 
public, but because the matters they wish to discuss are summarily dismissed by mainstream 
epistemic agents engaging in epistemically unjust practices. There are two equally important 
parts to this claim that should both be further explicated. First, Arendt insists that making a 
distinction between public and private realms does not entail that so-called private matters need 
remain private. In fact, Arendt seeks to maintain the public/ private distinction, not in order to 
bar private matters from entering into the public realm, but to bar the public realm from 
encroaching on the private.41 And she had good reason for concern over the extension of the 
public realm into all aspects of individual’s private lives. As she convincingly argues in The 
Origins of Totalitarianism, once the polis gains unfettered access to the private realms of all, the 
path has been all-too-smoothly paved for totalitarian forms of government. 
Second, the silencing that occurs whenever any epistemic agent’s credibility is 
prejudicially negatively assessed results not from the fact that a distinction is being made 
between the public and the private realms, but from the unjustness of the epistemic practices by 
which mainstream epistemic agents police the boundaries of what counts as credible testimony 
and/ or intelligible speech in the public sphere. In other words, the silencing of so-called private 
matters that occurs in the polis is a result of epistemic injustice, not of the public/ private 
distinction itself. The feminist outcry over Arendt’s strict maintenance of the public/ private 
distinction centers on the ways in which feminist issues are often dismissed as “private matters,” 																																																								
41 Carefully read, I believe that Carol Hanish’s “The Private is the Public” essay supports exactly this 
interpretation of the problems that have historically attended the firm separation of public and private 
realms.  
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not important enough to merit inclusion in public debates. But Arendt seeks to maintain this 
distinction, albeit in a transformed state, not in order to dismiss feminist concerns, or even any 
concern that has historically been deemed a ‘private matter’, as in principle politically irrelevant. 
As we will see, Arendt seeks to maintain the public /private distinct first and foremost in order to 
protect the only realm within which she is convinced that human beings can experience freedom.  
Arendt’s argument is twofold in that she asserts that (1) there are important reasons for 
maintaining the public /private distinction, and (2) the distinction itself is not responsible for the 
continued silencing of testimony regarding so-called private affairs. We will need to further 
flesh-out the first part of Arendt’s argument in order to determine whether the reasons she offers 
for maintaining the distinction outweigh its possible harms. This will be an important part of our 
overall approach to motivating our Arendtian-inspired response to the problem of epistemic 
injustice. But if the perceived harm of the distinction: that it renders the just concerns of certain 
oppressed groups either invisible or incoherent, is attributable to another cause, namely, 
epistemic injustice, then calls for its abolition appear to lack motivation. Feminist theorists 
objecting to Arendt’s commitment to maintaining the public / private distinction are left with the 
burden of offering an alternative account of the harm of the distinction if they wish to challenge 
Arendt’s reasons for keeping it. I submit that our energies are better spent battling what I’ve 
identified as the root of feminist concerns regarding the kinds of unjust silencing occurring in the 
public realm that motivated calls to abolish the public /private distinction in the first place: 
epistemic injustice. In this battle, we find an unlikely ally in Hannah Arendt.42 
																																																								
42 Arendt’s notorious disavowal of the early feminist movement remains a sore spot for feminist theorists, 
myself most definitely included.  However misguided her reasons for eschewing and even dismissing the 
movement, Arendt’s work has been reclaimed by many feminist theorists of late (see, for instance, the 
numerous essays in Bonnie Honig’s collection, Feminist Interpretations of Hannah Arendt), and with	
good reason.  I stand in a long line of feminist epistemologists in these reclamation efforts.  This work can 
be seen, in part, as a contribution to them.   
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Although she challenged a great many of the categories by which her peers organized and 
made sense of the world, Arendt was no theoretical anarchist. In fact, she probably created as 
many categories as she debunked, and the mainstream categories she left intact often took on 
radically new meanings in her work. This recounting of her handling of the public/ private 
distinction serves as an example of Arendt’s particular method of redeploying meaning. What’s 
so remarkable about the ways in which Arendt accomplished these rearrangements of old 
categories, along with the inventions of new ones, is the fact that she never settled for mere 
inversions of existing categories. Perhaps Arendt’s greatest accomplishment as a political 
theorist was her ability to think outside of the logic of sovereignty, and all of the dualisms it 
implies.   
That she accomplished this feat through re-deploying dualisms and reinventing a plethora 
of commonly agreed upon categories of thought speaks to her faith in the creative power of 
language, a faith she shared with Audre Lorde. In offering an explanation of her famous line, 
championed by feminist theorists across disciplines and across the globe, “the master’s tools will 
never dismantle the master’s house,” Lorde writes:  
It means different tools in language, different tools in the exchange of information, it 
means different tools in learning…It means that we do not require from each other the 
kinds of narrow and restricted interpretations of learning and exchange of knowledge that 
we suffered in the universities or that we suffered in narrow academic structures. It 
means that, while we are functioning in the old power, because we must know those 
tools, we cannot be ignorant of them, we are also in the process of redefining a new 
power, which is the power of the future. (151-2) 
 
Arendt’s faith in the power of language cashes out in her insistence that a plurality of citizens 
engaged in public speech acts possess the power to create a meaningful world.  
However, since all epistemic agents begin their world-building in media res, or, in the 
midst of things, they must also contend with a world they inherit. Before we further investigate 
	 106	
just how these kinds of ethico-epistemic world-building practices become possible, let’s turn first 
to the world epistemic agents might inherit. In the wake of WWII Arendt found the times in 
which she wrote to be, borrowing the term from Brecht, “dark times.” As David Luban explains, 
“for Brecht dark times are not merely times of horror but times of confusion in which theory no 
longer helps us to act…For Arendt as well, ‘Dark times’…are as such not identical with the 
monstrosities of this century…the phrase ‘dark times’ has an epistemological as well as a 
valuational meaning…In dark times traditional forms of explanation no longer explain anything” 
(218). I propose we adopt this ethico-epistemic understanding of what Arendt calls “dark times,” 
and apply it to our own times, for although we are not living in the wake of the monstrosities 
committed by Hitler’s brutal regime, we are living in times of pervasive epistemic injustice. 
Ethico-Epistemic Dark Times 
For Arendt, the public arena’s often harsh light ordinarily illuminates for us what we call 
“reality”: “…our feeling for reality depends utterly upon appearance and therefore upon the 
existence of a public realm into which things can appear out of the darkness43 of sheltered 
existence” (THC, 51). For the most part, this ‘darkness of sheltered existence’ cannot extend to 
the shared “space of appearances in which [men] (sic) can show in deed and word, for better and 
for worse, who they are and what they can do” (MDT, viii). However, during what Arendt, 
borrowing the term from Brecht, identifies as “dark times;” this extension of the so-called 
‘darkness’ into the public realm is just what occurs.   
																																																								
43 The use of the words “dark,” “darkness,” and “dark times” to denote something negative often carries 
racist overtones. In this section I will address the works of four authors, Hannah Arendt, Bertold Brecht, 
David Luban, and David Grossman, who all employ the phrase “dark times” to refer to the climate of 
ethical and epistemological corruption during Hitler’s rule, and all aim to extrapolate lessons and/or 
meanings from that time that can be applied to past and future times that are similarly corrupt. Although I 
find the metaphor in many ways problematic, since it isn’t being used in overtly racist ways in any of 
their texts I will use their chosen phrase throughout this section in order accurately to render the authors’ 
meanings.  
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In the preface to a collection of “intellectual biographies” she wrote on various public 
figures who lived between 1871 (Rosa Luxemburg) and 1965 (Randall Jarell), bearing the title 
Men in Dark Times, we find Arendt eager to point out that her subject is not the ‘dark times’ 
themselves, it is rather the men and women who were able to illumine even the darkest of times 
through their lives and works. She cautions that even though “the historical time, the ‘dark times’ 
mentioned in the title, is, I think, visible everywhere in this book…Those who are on the lookout 
for representatives of an era, for mouthpieces of the Zeitgeist, for exponents of History (spelled 
with a capital H) will look here in vain” (MDT, viii).  
Within this framework, it is the times themselves that are dark, and what little 
illumination that exists emanates “less from theories and concepts than from the uncertain, 
flickering, and often weak light that some men and women, in their lives and their works, will 
kindle under almost all circumstances” (MDT, ix). I propose that we adopt this framework as an 
analogous inversion of Fricker’s epistemological framework from within which to consider the 
problem of epistemic injustice. According to Fricker, light from ‘theories and concepts,’ by 
which we usually make inferential judgments, is, as in Arendt’s account, lacking. For Fricker 
this need not be a problem: so long as epistemic agents can make virtuous non-inferential 
judgments, then all is well. Based on numerous references to politics in what she would call 
“ordinary times,” I submit that Arendt would agree with this assessment. But in times of 
widespread injustice, epistemic and otherwise, “when the chips are down,” so-to-speak, Fricker’s 
and Arendt’s accounts diverge significantly.   
 For Fricker, the ‘gaps in the [singular] hermeneutical resources’ ‘darken’ or obscure the 
meanings by which heremeutically marginalized epistemic agents can make sense of their lives. 
This makes inarticulateness a property of the public speech acts of hermeneutically marginalized 
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speakers, who struggle to express meanings eclipsed by “the hermeneutical darkness…[in their] 
minds…wrongfully preventing [them] from understanding a significant area of [their] social 
experience, thus depriving [them] of an important patch of self-understanding” (Fricker, 149). 
On this account, unintelligibility is an epistemic hurdle for these same epistemic agents to 
overcome within their testimonial exchanges with mainstream epistemic agents in the public 
realm. But on Arendt’s account, speaking from the vantage point of a hermeneutically 
marginalized subject, in ‘dark times’ what has become obscured are a whole host of meanings, 
first and foremost those that make adequate sense of the lives of mainstream, or privileged 
epistemic agents.    
According to Arendt the, once meaningful, proclamations made in the public spaces have 
succumbed to the inarticulateness of what has become everyday public discourse – that of 
mainstream and/or privileged epistemic agents. Their words have become “jargon” or “the 
highly efficient talk and double-talk of nearly all official representatives who, without 
interruption and in many ingenious variations, explain away unpleasant facts and justified 
concerns” (MDT, viii). This account makes inarticulateness a property of the speech acts of 
mainstream epistemic agents, those hermeneutically privileged epistemic agents who follow the 
‘official representatives’ whose meaningless speech they have adopted. Once public spaces 
become inundated with such speech, once mainstream epistemic agents have adopted it 
wholesale – in other words, once it becomes the habit of the many – the times become 
inarticulate and “dark” because the public space between human beings has lost its 
meaningfulness.  
In speaking of the particular social, political, and epistemic injustices present in the 
infamously “dark times” of the rule of the Third Reich, Arendt notes, “All this was real enough 
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as it took place in public; there was nothing secret or mysterious about it.  And still, it was by no 
means visible to all, nor was it at all easy to perceive it” (MDT, viii). While I’ll concede that any 
analogy to the Third Reich is bound to be fraught, I would argue that the difficulties in 
perceiving epistemic injustices during Hitler’s reign arose from the same sources as the 
difficulties in perceiving epistemic injustices in present day mainstream epistemic exchanges, 
wherein epistemic injustice is pervasive. As the writer David Grossman, in his essay, “Writing in 
the Dark,” explains,  
[In times of] trauma, a disaster situation, on a society and on a nation as a whole… 
[citizens respond with] apathy, cynicism, and above all despair…[which] can fuel a 
distorted reality for many years, sometimes generations…we suspend our moral 
judgment and…give up on understanding what we ourselves think…protect[ing] 
ourselves…with a little indifference, a little repression, a little deliberate blindness. 
(Grossman, 22-24) 
 
On Grossman’s account, difficulties in perceiving injustices arise when large sections of the 
public become so traumatized by the unjustness of the reality that confronts them that they turn 
away from it in a variety of defensive movements aimed at blunting the force of the trauma, from 
suspending moral judgments, to indifference, and even to deliberate blindness.  
The primary vehicle used to achieve these defensive postures is, as Grossman proceeds to 
point out, language. Language is, for Grossman as for Arendt, a double-edged sword: it is a tool 
used both to reveal and to conceal meanings. Its concealing power becomes dominant in ‘dark 
times’ for reasons Grossman eloquently identifies: “human language’s natural richness and its 
ability to touch on the finest nuances of existence can be truly hurtful in a state of conflict 
because they constantly remind us of the exuberant reality that we have lost, of its complexities 
and subtleties. The more hopeless the situation seems the shallower the language becomes, the 
more public discourse dwindles” (25).   
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In this ‘dwindling’ of public discourse, clarifying linguistic utterances are traded for “a 
series of clichés and slogans…jargon…shrewd language designed to tell audiences the most 
palatable story…erecting a barrier between everything the state does…and the way its citizens 
choose to see themselves” (Grossman, 24). These, in Hobbes’ colorful phrase, “abuses of 
language” serve not only to protect and numb, but also to maintain the status quo – for who 
would object to such a benign, non-confrontational world as described in the clichés of the 
unreflective? Any attempt even to articulate such objections in the public realm would likely 
appear nonsensical.   
To put the problem in Arendt’s language, it’s the ‘highly efficient talk and double-talk’ of 
the officials and their followers aimed at explaining away ‘unpleasant facts and justified 
concerns’ that both creates and maintains the ‘dark times.’ Such double-speak, on our Arendtian-
inspired account, lies at the heart of hermeneutical injustice – for it obscures meanings that are in 
the interest of hermeneutically marginalized epistemic agents to render visible. But this 
hermeneutical injustice results from what Arendt calls “credibility gaps” – gaps in the credibility 
of the hermeneutically privileged – it does not result from the unintelligibility of the speech of 
the hermeneutically marginalized, as Fricker suggests.  
As Arendt, clearly extrapolating lessons for other ‘dark times’ from the dark period of 
Hitler’s reign, explains: 
When we think of dark times and of people living and moving in them, we have to take 
this camouflage, emanating from and spread by “the establishment” – or “the system,” as 
it [has been] called…into account. If it is the function of the public realm to throw light 
on the affairs of men by providing a space of appearances in which they can show in deed 
and word, for better and worse, who they are and what they can do, then darkness has 
come when this light is extinguished by “credibility gaps” and…by speech that does not 
disclose what is but sweeps it under the carpet, by exhortations, moral and otherwise, 
that, under the pretext of upholding old truths, degrade all truth to meaningless triviality. 
(MDT, viii) 
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As we can see, in Arendt’s case it is the credibility of “the establishment” that is in question, not 
its resistors. And far from being the result of an ethico-epistemic vice on the part of the 
hermeneutically marginalized, this negative credibility assessment of “the establishment” reflects 
a reasoned, reflective judgment based on experiential evidence that is in principle, available 
(even if not fully perceived or understood) to all who enter the public realm. Nonetheless, this 
negative credibility assessment is indicative of the presence of an epistemic injustice – but it’s 
not a testimonial injustice, it’s a hermeneutical injustice.  
 On this much, Arendt’s and Fricker’s accounts align: when confronted with a public 
realm permeated by untrustworthy words and clichés, hermeneutically marginalized subjects will 
indeed encounter difficulties in having their testimony understood by mainstream epistemic 
agents. They further agree that these difficulties may not result from the unreliability or 
unintelligibility of their testimony. Arendt’s view diverges significantly from Fricker’s in her 
insistence that in ‘dark times,’ from the point of view of the hermeneutically marginalized 
subject, the dissonance that arises between their speech and that of ‘the [epistemic] 
establishment’ results from the fact that the epistemic establishment’s speech is untrustworthy, or 
non-credible – that it ‘does not disclose what is but sweeps it under the carpet…[ultimately] 
degrad[ing] all truth to meaningless triviality.’ And it’s this ‘degradation of truth to meaningless 
triviality’ on the part of the ‘epistemic establishment’ that constitutes the hermeneutical injustice 
suffered by the hermeneutically marginalized.  
Hermeneutical injustice occurs when the ‘camouflage, emanating from and spread by ‘the 
establishment’ – or ‘the system’ causes ‘gaps in collective hermeneutical resources’ that 
extinguish the light that the public realm throws on ‘the affairs of men by providing a space of 
appearances in which they can show in deed and word, for better and for worse, who they are 
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and what they can do’. As Arendt explains, the ‘darkness has come when this light [of the public 
realm] is extinguished by ‘credibility gaps’ – the credibility gaps produced and maintained by 
‘the [ethico-epistemic] establishment’ whose ‘speech…does not disclose what is but sweeps it 
under the carpet, by exhortations, moral and otherwise, that, under the pretext of upholding old 
truths, degrade all truth to meaningless triviality’. Since we take our bearings in the world by 
telling stories that can help make sense of the ‘truths’ – the facts as they appear to us – what we 
lose when those truths are ‘degraded…to meaningless triviality’ is our ability to make sense of 
the world – to appear in public through meaningful speech acts. At base hermeneutical injustice 
causes what Arendt calls a “loss of world” (MDT, 13).  
Part II: World-Building In Dark Times 
 In contrasting the point of view of the hermeneutically marginalized with the point of 
view of the hermeneutically privileged, Arendt is offering a “standpoint theory” of sorts.  
However, it’s not a standpoint theory of truth, but meaning. In calling it a theory of meaning I do 
not mean to imply that the view Arendt endorses follows any of the so-called “traditional” 
epistemological theories of meaning – although it is related to them. The theory of meaning to 
which I refer I take largely from Hannah Arendt’s unfinished final work, The Life of the Mind, 
wherein Arendt aimed, not to articulate a full-blown theory of meaning as such, but only to 
investigate the phenomenon of thinking. Arendt was particularly interested in what had, during 
Hitler’s reign, become what she considered to be the widespread problem of thoughtlessness as 
embodied, most consummately in the figure of Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann, but also, 
more controversially, in the wider German public.   
 What Arendt found so “banal” about the evil of Eichmann44 was its source in 																																																								
44 See Arendt’s famously controversial work, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil 
for more on this. 
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thoughtlessness, as evidenced in the “cliché-ridden language [Eichmann] produced on the stand” 
(LOM, 4). She notes, “It was this absence of thinking – which is so ordinary an experience in our 
everyday life, where we have hardly the time, let alone the inclination, to stop and think – that 
awakened my interest [in Eichmann]” (LOM, 4). Arendt ties this phenomenon of thoughtlessness 
to language, not just in Eichmann’s case, but across the board, echoing Grossman’s claims in her 
assertion that: 
Clichés, stock phrases, adherence to conventional, standardized codes of expression and 
conduct have the socially recognized function of protecting us against reality, that is, 
against the claim on our thinking attention that all events and facts make by virtue of their 
existence. If we were responsible to this claim all the time, we would soon be exhausted; 
Eichmann differed form the rest of us only in that he clearly knew of no such claim at all. 
(LOM, 4)   
 
To be clear: Arendt doesn’t believe that thinking can cause virtuous behavior, only that the lack 
of thinking may open the door to all manner of vice. And it is this concern that caused her to 
wonder, “Could the activity of thinking as such, the habit of examining whatever happens to 
come to pass or to attract attention, regardless of results and specific content, could this activity 
be among the conditions that make men abstain from evil-doing or even actually ‘condition’ 
them against it?” (LOM, 5)    
Arendt is fully aware of the fact that most philosophers consider thinking the activity of 
the few, the “professional thinkers.”  But she aligns her view on this with Kant’s, pointing out 
that he “almost alone among the philosophers – was much bothered by the common opinion that 
philosophy is only for the few…because of its moral implications” (LOM, 13). While Kant 
thought that immorality, or “wickedness,” was caused by “stupidity,” Arendt instead suggests 
that, “absence of thought is not stupidity; it can be found in highly intelligent people, and a 
wicked heart is not its cause; it is probably the other way round, that wickedness may be caused 
by absence of thought” (LOM, 13).   
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Vernunft  and Verstand / Reason and Intellect / Understanding and Knowledge 
 These reflections led Arendt to investigate Kant’s important distinction between Vernunft 
and Verstand or reason and intellect (while the German “Verstand” is often rendered in English 
versions of Kant’s work as “understanding” Arendt finds this a mistranslation45) which he drew 
“after he had discovered ‘the scandal of reason,’ that is, the fact that our mind is not capable of 
certain and verifiable knowledge regarding matters and questions that it nevertheless cannot help 
thinking about” (LOM, 14). This so-called ‘scandal’ caused Kant famously to “deny knowledge 
[in order] to make room for faith,” (Critique of Pure Reason) but Arendt counters, “he had not 
made room for faith; he had made room for thought, and he had not ‘denied knowledge’ but 
separated knowledge from thinking” (LOM, 14).   
Arendt argues that thinking and knowing are “two altogether different mental activities” 
aimed at “two altogether different concerns, meaning…and cognition” (LOM, 15). The desire for 
knowledge, on this account, comes from the faculty of the intellect, which concerns itself with 
matters of cognition such as truth claims and credibility assessments. However Kant’s famous 
“need of reason” is, Arendt insists, “not inspired by the quest for truth, but by the quest for 
meaning. And truth and meaning are not the same” (LOM, 15, emphasis in original). While the 
implications of this proclamation are manifold, we will at this point primarily concern ourselves 
with the fact that theories of meaning tend not to be exclusive in ways that theories of truth often 
are: a plurality of meanings need not entail contradiction in the way that a plurality of truths 
often might.     
 In taking up a standpoint theory of meaning, Arendt is not committing herself to a 
relativist approach to truth because she is not suggesting that truth is relative to particular 
individuals. Quite the contrary, in her standpoint theory of meaning what we might call truth is 																																																								
45 See pages 13-14 of the Life of the Mind for more on this. 
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relative only to the meanings that guide all inquiry from within any particular meaning-
framework, be it a theory, story, or conceptual scheme. And ‘what we might call truth’ are the 
perceptions that a diversely situated group of individuals would agree are common within any 
given meaning-framework.  In other words, truth is relative to a framework of meaning, but not 
to each individual who subscribes to that framework of meaning.    
Within any given meaning-framework (and truth is certainly not a concern outside of any 
of them), the ‘quest for truth’ is a quest to identify appearances that are common, which 
culminates in knowledge. Such knowledge isn’t the kind that Descartes so earnestly sought, it 
isn’t fixed once and for all time. But it is durable insofar as the ‘truths’ of a group are not 
commodities to be exchanged or consumed. They instead constitute the background assumptions 
of a group that are only questioned either by those appealing to a different set of truths, or from, 
in Arendt’s felicitous phrase, those “doubters and skeptics” living within the borders of the group 
in times of upheaval or crisis. In other words, these ‘truths’ aren’t immutable, but neither are 
they easily uprooted, for they are often defended with an existential intensity among the 
‘respectable’ members of one’s group.   
 Conversely, a ‘quest for meaning’ is a quest to identify the contours of a meaning-
framework by imagining what might constitute truth (identifying which appearances are 
common to their group) from the standpoint of another and then attempting to identify the 
meaning-framework they might be employing in order to make sense of the common 
appearances, or truths, that confront them. This process of imagining oneself standing in the 
position of another and identifying their meaning-framework, if successful, culminates in 
understanding.  
In Fricker’s language, images or appearances that are common constitute the ‘shared 
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hermeneutical resources’ of, apparently, everyone. But if there exist a plurality of shared 
hermeneutical resources or social imaginaries, some can and often will contain meanings or 
senses that are common only to a particular group. This means that the opportunity for 
misunderstanding between groups is always present, because even if Donald Davidson is right 
that in principle we cannot make sense of a plurality of conceptual schemes that can’t always be 
translated one to another, in practice (because we are such finite creatures) such translations will 
sometimes simply not be possible.46 And in fact, as Arendt passionately argues, to think of 
arriving at an understanding of the meaning-framework that makes sense of another’s truths as a 
work of translation is to fundamentally misunderstand both the method and the goal of 
understanding. In attempting to imagine a meaning-framework that can make sense of the 
knowledges that another expresses when identifying their truths we do not translate their 
knowledges into the language of our own meaning-framework – for what we are after – an 
“image” of the meaning-framework of another – is in fact, not just untranslatable, but unsayable.  
The Ineffability of Meaning-Frameworks 
The fact that meaning frameworks are ineffable does not mean that they cannot 
intelligibly be discussed, but it does mean that in discussing them our speech may at times border 
on the poetic. We will turn to a poet – Audre Lorde – for aid in fleshing out such things as 
meaning-frameworks in the next chapter. But for now, we will turn, not to a poet, but a 
philosopher, for help in expressing “that which cannot be said”: Ludwig Wittgenstein. While the 
																																																								
46 See Davidson’s highly influential essay, On The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme for more on this. 
As Davidson so elegantly argues, logically speaking the ‘very idea’ of the existence of competing 
conceptual schemes (and therefore the ‘very idea of a conceptual scheme’ in the first place) is inconsistent 
and therefore incoherent. But this is only to say that in principle the concept of a conceptual scheme is 
unintelligible. In fact – because we are finite creatures and therefore incapable of ever achieving the kind 
of linguistic coherence about which Davidson speaks – the concept of a conceptual scheme is, as 
countless epistemologists since at least W.V.O. Quine (with whom Davidson was in conversation) have 
convincingly shown time and again, is quite useful and therefore meaningful.    
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meaning-frameworks within which epistemic agents make sense of their worlds can be 
expressed, they cannot be rendered in the form of propositional statements. However the truths 
that that comprise an epistemic agent’s knowledge can be formulated in propositional statements. 
As Wittgenstein explains in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,  
Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot represent what they must 
have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it – logical form. In order to 
be able to represent logical form, we should have to be able to station ourselves with 
propositions somewhere outside of logic, that is to say outside the world. Propositions 
cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them. What finds its reflection in 
language, language cannot represent. What expresses itself in language, we cannot 
express by means of language… Propositions show the logical form of reality. They 
display it…What can be shown, cannot be said” (Tractatus, 4.12- 4.121).47 
 
If we take ‘the whole of reality’ to mean the sum total of an epistemic agent’s knowledge, which 
is derived from their perceptions of the world as it appears to them, then we can agree with 
Wittgenstein that, at least in principle, propositions can represent it. And if we take ‘what 
[propositions] must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it – logical 
form’ to mean a meaning-framework, then we can further agree with Wittgenstein that (1) 
‘propositions cannot represent’ it, and (2) it ‘can be shown’.  
Meaning-frameworks cannot be represented in language, but they are that which 
‘expresses itself in language’ whenever we tell a story involving the truths that can be 
represented in language. It’s important to note that in speaking of ‘reality’ we are adopting an 
Arendtian definition of it: reality is, for Arendt, simply the way the world appears in common to 
any particular social group as expressed by its members in the public realm. It is the meaningful 
world they create and maintain through the power of their public speech acts. And it’s equally 
important to note that in speaking of meaning-frameworks, we are again adopting an Arendtian 																																																								
47 Although in the Tractatus Wittgenstein’s account appears monological, it nonetheless offers important 
insights. I would argue that the basic structure of Wittgenstein’s views on language remained remarkably 
consistent throughout all of his works, even though he (thankfully) explicitly pluralized his Tractarian 
account in Philosophical Investigations. 
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definition of them: they are the sum of the meanings that are common to any particular group at 
the particular place and time in which they are expressed, and they form the yardsticks according 
to which ethico-epistemic judgments regarding the intelligibility of each other’s speech acts are 
made.  
When it comes to the ethico-epistemic practice of arriving at understanding, what we are 
attempting to do is identify the meaning-frameworks according to which our interlocutors are 
formulating their intelligibility assessments. And it is only after we have identified, at least a 
basic outline, of the contours of another’s meaning-framework that we can embark on the ethico-
epistemic task of assessing their truth-claims, and subsequently begin to make credibility 
assessments about the speakers whose truth claims we are assessing. To better understand just 
how this Wittgensteinain construction relates to our overall understanding of epistemic injustice, 
let’s cash this out in the terminology we’ve been using throughout this chapter. 
Even if one can give an account of her reasons for a particular epistemic judgment after 
the fact, that does not mean that her original judgment was made based on doxastic criteria. 
Nonetheless, we storytelling creatures can identify /create /surmise either a logical or a narrative 
structure (a meaning-framework) that makes sense of our epistemic judgments. If we strike upon 
a meaning-framework that seems to ‘work’, that is, makes sense of another’s or our own 
epistemic judgments, we may have identified something akin to their /our overall meaning-
framework. That is to say, we may have gained invaluable insight into their /our ways of making 
meanings.  
Logical Form by Analogy 
The simplest way to determine a logical form/structure is by way of analogy: Horse is to 
Cart as Reindeer is to Sleigh. These four things are not related to each other in any logically 
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necessary way (i.e. a horse is still a horse with or without a cart), however we can identify 
certain relations between them. The relationships we identify say much about our own identity, 
but they don’t say anything about themselves – we can see these relationships, but they aren’t at 
all articulated in the analogy itself, since all it references are four things.   
We may attempt to shed some light on the logical structure/ form of the analogy by 
saying that the relationship between a horse and cart is that a horse pulls a cart, and the 
relationship between a reindeer and sleigh is that a reindeer pulls a sleigh, so what makes these 
things analogous is an animal’s ability to pull things. But then all we’ve done is provide a 
measuring stick, which itself appears nowhere in the analogy, by which to measure likenesses 
between two animals. This measuring stick – the ability to pull things – provides the logical 
structure of the analogy, but it is only shown not said: there is no reference to an ability to pull 
things in the original analogy. It’s important to note that the ability to pull things isn’t the only 
possible yardstick by which to measure likeness. I could just as easily argue that a horse can’t 
pull a cart when wounded and a reindeer can’t pull a sleigh when wounded, so these things are 
related by the measuring stick of an inability to pull things when wounded. And then, of course, 
the logical structure of the analogy is changed.   
If we can determine the yardsticks by which people measure things (whether they are 
aware of them or not), we’ve come a long way in understanding their “form of life,” to borrow 
another Wittgensteinian phrase. For instance: if we know that animals are often judged according 
to their ability or inability to pull things among a particular group, we may then begin to make 
some informed hypotheses about the overall meaning-framework within which that particular 
group makes sense of their lives: they see animals as useful in terms of their ability pull things, 
perhaps. The ability to pull is, in other words, meaningful to them. Since reindeer are pulling 
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sleighs in the analogy, we may conjecture that a jolly fat man who brings toys to little children 
plays a meaningful role in the wintertime myths and rituals of the ones who crafted the analogy. 
We can begin to shape our understanding of people and the groups to which they belong by the 
lights of the logical structures that are employed in their speech, which reveal what is meaningful 
to them.   
To recap: in Arendt’s theory of meaning, truths are agreed upon perceptions: those 
images or appearances to which epistemic agents within a given meaning-framework appeal in 
order to make sense of their lives. Arriving at agreement on these perceptions is a work of 
cognition, and it provides a common sense among those who more or less agree on how things 
appear. The sum of these truths equals an epistemic agent’s ‘reality’ about which they can have 
knowledge. And meanings are the measuring sticks used to judge these knowledges and the 
credibility of the epistemic agents expressing them. The sum of these meanings /measuring sticks 
equals the sum of the meanings that comprise an epistemic agent’s background framework, about 
which they can have understanding (although no epistemic agent ever possesses perfect 
knowledge of the sum of her own meaning-frameworks). Determining the measuring-sticks by 
which a group makes their ethico-epistemic judgments is a work of what Arendt calls thinking, 
and it provides a shared meaning-framework among those who more or less agree on how things 
ought to be judged. The faculty of the intellect yields truths; the faculty of reason yields 
meanings.   
The Sociality of Knowledge-Production and Meaning-Making Practices 
There are a few things about this account of truths and meanings that immediately beg for 
clarification. First, there can be no solipsistic account of either truth or meaning: as noted, truths 
are relative to meaning-frameworks, and meaning is not something that any individual can create 
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or maintain alone. Second, there can be no account of either truths or meanings that are 
“ineffable.” Arendt sums these two points up succinctly, “There may be truths beyond speech, 
and they may be of great relevance to man in the singular, that is, to man in so far as he is not a 
political being, whatever else he may be. Men in the plural, that is, men in so far as they live and 
move and act in this world, can experience meaningfulness only because they can talk with and 
make sense to each other and to themselves” (THC, 4). ‘Men’ (sic) can surely ‘talk with and 
make sense to each other and to themselves’ in small or large groups that do not constitute an 
“official” polis. But in order to enter the polis, that public space of appearances, one must belong 
to a group.   
One’s group consists of others who have, more or less, adopted a meaning-framework 
similar to which she appeals in order to make sense of her life and experiences. One can, and I 
submit always does, have more than one group. We each appeal to meanings from within the 
standpoints of several groups, as we each stand at various intersections of difference (i.e. “gay 
and privileged,” and/or “black and female”) and thereby have access to more than one social 
imaginary.  Some of our social imaginaries cross multiple intersections (i.e. “lover of classical 
music and female” who is also” black and economically underprivileged,” etc.). But in order for 
the meanings of a particular group to enter into “public discourse” within the polis Arendt 
conceives, they must be articulated to members of other groups. In other words, one must testify 
to the meanings that make sense of their life to and among significantly different others in order 
for those meanings to appear in the polis. Just as individuals cannot make meanings absent a 
group of others, so groups cannot make meanings appear in the public realm absent the presence 
of other groups. What’s important to remember is that each group has access to their own social 
imaginary, which means that each individual has access to a plurality of social imaginaries, and 
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it is from within these that meanings either appear or fail to appear in the polis.  
Many of the meanings to which hermeneutically marginalized subjects appeal are indeed 
obscured by the darkness of the gaps in hermeneutical resources of mainstream epistemic agents, 
in this much Fricker is right. But if they have access to alternative epistemic resources, 
alternative social imaginaries, those hermeneutically marginalized within mainstream epistemic 
practices and/or the polis may understand their own speech perfectly well, and have no trouble 
accessing the shared meanings that help make sense of their lives from within these alternative 
social imaginaries.  
If their interlocutors are unable to understand them, they may yet be harmed in a socially, 
politically, or economic way: they may not fare well within the mainstream within which many 
important social, political, and economic goods are distributed. But these are not ethico-
epistemic harms; however socially, politically, or economically unjust, being denied access to 
social, political and economic goods is not epistemically unjust. The epistemic injustice that 
hermeneutically marginalized (within the mainstream) subjects often suffer in ‘dark times’ stems 
primarily, not from the inability of either hermeneutically marginalized speakers or 
hermeneutically privileged hearers to understand the lives of hermeneutically marginalized 
subjects, it stems rather from the inability of hermeneutically privileged hearers to understand 
their own lives and the myriad ways in which their privilege has served to shape the social, 
political, economic, and epistemic circumstances surrounding them. 
Charles Mills offers us a stark example of the kind of “privilege blindness” to which I’m 
referring in The Racial Contract, wherein the racially privileged (whites) sign on to “an inverted 
epistemology, an epistemology of ignorance, a particular pattern of localized and global 
cognitive dysfunctions (which are psychologically and socially functional), producing the ironic 
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outcome that whites will in general be unable to understand the world they themselves have 
made” (Mills, 18). In other words, blindness to one’s own privilege, and here I’m highlighting 
epistemic privilege in the context of mainstream epistemic practices, often benefits those 
hermeneutically privileged, or in Mills’ case white, subjects both psychologically and socially – 
they may believe themselves to be, for instance, perfectly aware of their conditions, 
psychologically “whole” and socially adept – and yet render them epistemically impoverished in 
terms of understanding the world in which they live, and have at least in part helped to construct.  
Mills continues, “Part of what it means to be constructed as ‘white’…to become a white 
person…is [to adopt] a cognitive model that precludes self-transparency and genuine 
understanding of social realities. To a significant extent, then, white signatories will live in an 
invented delusional world, a racial fantasyland… located in real space” (Mills, 18).   
It is this kind of lack of self-transparency to which I’m referring, one that results in 
hermeneutically privileged hearers becoming unable even to adequately perceive, much less 
comprehend, themselves and the world(s) in which they live. And I’m suggesting that it is the 
lack of self-understanding that results from these compromised perceptual abilities on the part of 
privileged epistemic agents that lies at the heart of epistemic injustice. Such failures of 
perception (which are, as we have seen in the previous chapter, are failures of imagination) often 
result in false representations of one’s self in the public space of appearances – false insofar as 
they are not the faithful renderings of one’s self that a more perceptive, self-reflective epistemic 
agent would reveal in the public arena.   
Conclusion 
When the self-images of privileged epistemic agents become distorted by the kind of 
privilege blindness outlined by Mills above, many of them tend to project images of themselves 
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that are overly optimistic, and corresponding images of underprivileged or oppressed epistemic 
agents that are unduly harsh. Further exacerbating this problem, these privilege-blind epistemic 
agents, just as Grossman and Arendt warn, often maintain their insularity by embarking on a 
process of severely restricting the scope of their vision so as to avoid being confronted by any 
evidence that contradicts their ‘false’ self-image. These actions are compounded when 
mainstream epistemic agents bring their social/ political/ economic power to bear in their 
attempts to police the boundaries of the appearances they deem fit for the polis, resulting in 
epistemic injustice. This kind of epistemic injustice is often motivated by the same things that 
motivate mainstream epistemic agents engage in misrepresentations of themselves within their 
own groups: they cannot rectify the ‘reality’ that confronts them with their own self-images, and 
so turn a blind eye to all appearances that serve to undermine them. In these cases a multitude of 
meanings are lost, and the very ‘reality’ of the public realm can become suspect.  
While this particular brand of, perhaps entirely accidental, hypocrisy on the part of 
hermeneutically privileged subjects may not strike one as immediately threatening to 
hermeneutically marginalized subjects, if Arendt is right that, “…our feeling for reality depends 
utterly upon appearance and therefore upon the existence of a public realm into which things can 
appear out of the darkness of sheltered existence” (THC, 51) then what is threatened when 
appearances become false is in fact the “reality” that constitutes the public realm, within which 
epistemic agents can appear, bearing whichever meanings they carry with them from their 
multiple and varied social imaginaries. The reality is first corrupted by the hypocritical self-
images mainstream epistemic agents project in the public arena. It is then compounded when 
those same epistemic agents turn a blind eye to the images projected by underprivileged or 
oppressed epistemic agents. In Arendtian terms, this corruption of appearances in the polis 
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resulting in ‘dark times’ amounts to a “loss of world,” a tragedy almost unparalleled in her 
estimation, and one that, if it becomes widespread and/or long-lasting, can lead human beings 
into all manner of vice, epistemic and otherwise.  
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Chapter 4 
A Lordian-Inspired Approach to Combatting Epistemic Injustice: More Poetry Than Prose 
There is a timbre of voice 
That comes from not being heard 
And knowing   you are not being 
Heard   noticed only 
By others   not heard 
For the same reason 
 -Audre Lorde, “Echoes” 
 
Introduction 
 
In her interview with the poet Adrienne Rich, Audre Lorde recalls an earlier telephone 
conversation she had with Rich during which Rich grew frustrated by Lorde’s singular focus on 
attempting to articulate her ‘intuitions’. Having trouble grasping just what Lorde sought to 
describe, Rich impatiently insisted that Lorde “document” her intuitions. Reflecting upon Rich’s 
request during the interview, Lorde muses, “I’ve never forgotten the impatience in your voice 
that time on the telephone, when you said, ‘It’s not enough to say to me that you intuit it.’ Do 
you remember? I will never forget that. Even at the same time that I understood what you meant, 
I felt a total wipeout of my modus, my way of perceiving and formulating” (SO, 103-4).  
Rich initially objects to Lorde’s characterization of her request for documentation as a 
‘wipeout of [Lorde’s] modus’, protesting that “There are times when I simply cannot assume that 
I know what you know, unless you show me what you mean” (SO, 104). But Lorde will have 
none of this. In the exchange that follows Lorde outlines a striking approach to combatting what 
we now refer to as epistemic injustice by identifying Rich’s request for documentation as a 
paradigmatic instance of it. She begins by focusing on testimonial injustices, and proceeds to 
incorporate the ways in which hermeneutical injustice goes hand-in-hand with testimonial 
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injustice by revealing how both forms of epistemic injustice were present in her earlier encounter 
with Rich. 
Throughout this process, Lorde leans heavily on important distinctions she draws 
between the epistemic practices of producing knowledges and arriving at understandings. 
Pointing out that Rich’s aspiration to ‘know what Lorde knows’ is in many ways driven by a 
markedly different ethico-epistemic goal than Rich’s desire to have Lorde ‘show [Rich] what she 
means’, Lorde distinguishes the former, which has to do with knowledge production, from the 
latter, which has to do with the task of coming to understand. Lorde’s masterful grasp of these 
distinctions will be the focus of this chapter, for exploring them will illuminate a Lordian-
inspired path toward combatting the problem of epistemic injustice along the lines of what we 
referred to in chapter two as the “testimonial track.”  
Lorde begins to draw the crucial distinctions between knowledge and understanding 
immediately following the above-recorded exchange. In asking Lorde to document her intuitions 
before Lorde had the chance even to articulate and begin really to perceive them, Rich was 
asking Lorde to embark upon a work of understanding before engaging, or continuing to engage, 
in the work of knowledge production. In rejecting Rich’s request for documentation, Lorde was 
insisting upon her right to continue working in the vein of knowledge-production before tackling 
the markedly different task of understanding. As we will see, for Lorde much hinges on this 
point, for although the language of social epistemology was not yet available for Lorde to draw 
on at the time of the interview, Lorde was able nonetheless to recognize Rich’s epistemic request 
as ethically suspect.  
Careful to stake out the space within which her knowledge production practices can 
flourish, Lorde is intent on staving off the demand to make sense of them according to existing 
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mainstream frameworks of understanding – at least until she has the time adequately to articulate 
the knowledges she is in the process of producing. Lorde’s objection to Rich’s request for 
documentation was an attempt to carve out the space she needed to further explore her intuitions, 
and begin to articulate them so that they might form her knowledge. Countering Rich’s 
protestation that she ‘cannot know what [Lorde] knows unless [Lorde] shows [her] what she 
means’, Lorde explains, “But I’m used to associating a request for documentation as a 
questioning of my perceptions, an attempt to devalue what I’m in the process of discovering” to 
which Rich replies, “It’s not. Help me to perceive what you perceive. That’s what I’m trying to 
say to you” (SO, 104).  
Lorde responds by beginning to draw out the distinctions between knowledge and 
understanding that will be our focus in this chapter. Tying perception to knowledge and 
documentation to understanding, Lorde critiques Rich’s request for documentation by clarifying: 
“But documentation does not help one perceive. At best it only analyzes the perception. At 
worst, it provides a screen by which to avoid concentrating on the core revelation, following it 
down to how it feels. Again, knowledge and understanding. They can function in concert, but 
they don’t replace each other” (SO, 104).  
In this chapter we will review certain portions of the interview between Rich and Lorde 
in some detail in order to draw out the ways in which knowledge and understanding ‘function in 
concert’ but ‘don’t replace each other’. We will further examine what documentation, 
perception, analysis, revelation, and feeling have to do with each of these ethico-epistemic 
concepts. Once outlined, we will employ Lorde’s distinctions between knowledge and 
understanding in the service of identifying just how testimonial and hermenetical injustices also 
‘function in concert’ yet remain two distinct subsets of the problem of epistemic injustice. We 
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will then look to Lorde’s work as a guide to devising an effective response to the problem of 
epistemic injustice as a whole. 
Part I - The Interview 
Drawing Distinctions – Knowledge vs. Understanding, Perceiving vs. Documenting, Poetry 
vs. Prose 
 
In leveling the charge of “wiping out her modus…her way of perceiving and 
formulating” against Rich, Lorde attempts to explain just how Rich’s request for documentation 
can be viewed as exemplary of what she refers to as “patriarchal thinking.” Such thinking 
involves “the worship of rationality and that circular, academic, analytic thinking” which, among 
other things, serves often to occlude the introduction of novel knowledges into public spaces 
(SO, 100). Although she finds such thinking useful, Lorde is adamant that it be put to use in the 
service of “the chaos of knowledge” (SO, 100). “Rationality is not unnecessary,” Lorde explains, 
“It serves the chaos of knowledge. It serves feeling. It serves to get from this place to that place. 
But if you don’t honor those places, then the road is meaningless” (SO, 100).  
For Lorde, rationality is a tool used to arrive at understandings: one comes to understand 
her experiences in the world by ‘documenting’ them, that is, by rationally constructing or 
reconstructing a framework of understanding within which those experiences begin to make a 
certain sense, or convey particular meanings. And just as rationality is a tool used to arrive at 
understandings, understanding is, on Lorde’s account, also a tool. One engages in the project of 
understand in order to “build roads” between various ‘chaotic’ knowledges: “What 
understanding begins to do,” writes Lorde, “is to make knowledge available for use, and that’s 
the urgency, that’s the push, that’s the drive” (SO, 109).  
What understanding does not do, according to Lorde, is reveal a monolithic, immutable 
meaning-frameworks of understanding capable of circumscribing just what counts as knowledge 
	 130	
and why prior to the exchanges wherein knowledge is produced through the articulation of one’s 
intuitions or perceptions. Lorde fights to retain certain hard-won knowledges, no matter how 
‘chaotic’ they may seem from within existing meaning-frameworks of understanding, suggesting 
that often times the understanding framework within which those knowledges are judged might 
itself be in need a critique. In Lorde’s view, when one’s framework of understanding does not 
make an adequate sense out of the knowledges she is forming, she ought first to question, not the 
knowledges she is in the process of forming, but the meaning framework of understanding 
according to which those knowledges might be judged.  
Let’s return for a moment to the interview in order to flesh out this potentially gestalt-
shifting insight: Early on in the interview, Rich asks Lorde about her relationship to language, 
especially with regard to the differences between her poetry and the prose works that Lorde was, 
at the time, really just beginning to write.48 Lorde explains to Rich how poetry always came 
naturally to her, while prose took much longer and was much harder for her to master. In her 
poetry Lorde sought to “preserve [her] perceptions – pleasant or unpleasant, painful or whatever” 
so that they might begin to form the inner knowledge upon which she relied for her sense of self, 
and self-direction (SO, 81). In her prose works, Lorde aimed instead to ‘document’ those 
perceptions and thereby begin better to understand them. Poetry, in other words, was Lorde’s 																																																								48	At the time of the interview, August 30, 1979, Lorde had already written some very powerful essays 
that would become landmark works for second wave feminists, including “Poetry is Not a Luxury” and 
“Uses of the Erotic.” She would go on to contribute many more important essays following the interview. 
Additionally, at the time of the interview Lorde was in the	process of writing what would become her 
“mythobiography” – Zami, A New Spelling of My Name. As we can see, Lorde was clearly already well 
on her way to becoming more comfortable with writing the prose that would prove central to feminist, 
race, and queer theorists for years to come when she paused to engage in the discussion with Rich 
recorded above. The interview, however, offered her a rare opportunity to reflect upon her progression 
toward making the knowledge she shared in her poetry ‘available for use’ by forming understandings in 
her prose works. The interview, therefore, provides a unique look into the thought processes that led 
Lorde to begin in earnest to perfect her prose form – and this thought process is what provides the fodder 
for our intervention into the problem of epistemic injustice along what we’ve identifyied as the 
testimonial track.  
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vehicle for conveying the perceptions of her experiences that would, upon reflection, form her 
knowledge, and prose was Lorde’s vehicle for documenting those perceptions in such as way as 
to create a meaning-framework of understanding within which those perceptions-turned-
knowledges could make a coherent sense.  
Lorde learned to trust the language of poetry at a very young age, finding it capable of 
preserving, not only her ‘perceptions’– perceptions that were often shot-through with some 
rather intense feelings – ‘pleasant or unpleasant, painful or whatever’, but also her very self. “I 
kept myself through feeling. I lived through it…When someone said to me, ‘How do you 
feel?’…I would recite a poem, and somewhere in that poem would be the feeling, the vital piece 
of information. It might be a line. It might be an image. The poem was my response” (SO, 81-2). 
Lorde goes on to explain how the language of prose took her longer to trust: “I was busy feeling 
out other ways of getting and giving information and whatever else I could because talking 
wasn’t where it was at. People were talking all around me all the time – and not either getting or 
giving much that was useful to me” (SO, 81-2).  
What Lorde had always found useful was to appeal to poetic imagery in order to identify 
and articulate her feelings, perceptions, and intuitions. Although she may not have walked 
around spouting poetry at every turn, Lorde was able to translate her poetic capabilities into a 
kind of everyday parlance. When attempting to initially articulate her intuitions, for instance, 
Lorde drew on the power of metaphor, and trusted in the familiar cadence and rhythms of her 
knowledge producing practices – which in her case began, as with her poetry, with attempts to 
put words to images, feelings, perceptions, or intuitions.  
Where prose had failed Lorde was in its often all-too-conservative configurations of those 
images, feelings, perceptions, and intuitions into existing frameworks of understanding, 
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meaning-frameworks that seem to belie the knowledges that Lorde was still in the process of 
forming. And whenever Lorde was able to achieve the transformation of her intuitions, feelings, 
perceptions, into language, she found that the knowledges that these intuitions, feelings, 
perceptions created at times fared quite poorly when viewed from within existing frameworks of 
understanding. She explains: 
Lorde: “…there were inescapable conclusions or convictions I had come to about my 
own life, my own feelings, that defied thought. And I wasn’t going to let them go. I 
wasn’t going to give them up. They were too precious to me. They were life to me. But I 
couldn’t analyze or understand them because they didn’t make the kind of sense I had 
been taught to expect through understanding. There were things I knew and couldn’t say. 
And I couldn’t understand them.  
Rich: In the sense of being able to take them out, analyze them, defend them?  
Lorde: …write prose about them. Right…All I had was the sense that I had to hold on to 
these feelings and that I had to air them in some way. 
Rich: But they were also being transformed into language.  
Lorde: That’s right. When I wrote something that finally had it, I would say it aloud and 
it would come alive, become real. It would start repeating itself and I’d know, that’s 
struck, that’s true. Like a bell. Something struck true. And there the words would be. 
(SO, 87-8) 
 
At this point in the interview there are a couple of important things occurring: first, Lorde 
– together with Rich – is beginning in earnest to draw a conceptual dividing line between the 
ethico-epistemic concepts of knowledge and understanding. On the knowledge side of the divide, 
Lorde places such practices as airing one’s feelings, transforming one’s convictions or 
‘inescapable conclusions’ into language, striking upon an apt word or phrase and repeating it in 
the imagination, and writing poetry. On the understanding side of the divide being drawn here 
we find such practices as engaging in dialectical conversations, thinking, analyzing one’s 
knowledges and defending them, documenting, and speaking in prose. The second important 
thing to note about what’s occurring in the above exchange is the fact that Lorde’s interviewer, 
her old friend Adrienne Rich, is dynamically engaging with Lorde in a back-and-forth, give-and-
take dialogue.  
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 At this point in the interview Rich is able insightfully to recognize that some conclusions, 
convictions, perceptions, feelings, etc. may initially defy analysis, thought, or even 
documentation, particularly before they have been ‘transformed into language’. However by the 
time Lorde turns toward critiquing Rich’s prior, epistemically unjust, engagement with her on 
the telephone, Rich’s penetrating insights and observant recognitions come to an abrupt halt, and 
she grows defensive, unsure, and decidedly undiscerning. This shift from insightful interlocutor 
to perpetrator of epistemic injustice against Lorde is striking; but a short while later in the 
interview we find Rich herself, in particularly self-reflective and vulnerable moment, able 
eventually to diagnose what caused her averse reaction to Lorde’s charge.  
 We will continue to explore the divide Lorde begins to draw here between knowledge 
and understanding in some detail in the coming pages. Doing so will not only help us better to 
appreciate just why Lorde reacted so strongly to Rich’s seemingly innocuous request for 
documentation in the way that she did. It will also help us to formulate a diagnosis of the 
problem of epistemic injustice that is uniquely useful for creatively combatting it along the lines 
of the “testimonial track.” But first, let’s turn to Rich’s pivotal flash of insight in regards to her 
earlier ethico-epistemic misstep by briefly reviewing key moments leading up to Rich’s 
insightful confession, followed by the confession itself. 
Confessions of Resistance: Rich’s Self-Reflective Concession and What it Means 
 
Rich’s interview with Lorde is long and covers a wide array of topics, many of which 
have been addressed at length either in Lorde’s poetry, or the essays she had begun to write 
shortly before the interview. Since Lorde’s work had been generating quite a buzz among 
feminist thinkers at the time of the interview, Rich unsurprisingly asks about how some of 
Lorde’s works had been received among members of the various communities with which Lorde 
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self-identified. Rich hearkens back to a personal memory of Lorde participating in a poetry 
reading in the early 1970’s “on the Upper West Side, [at] a coffeehouse at 72nd Street,” where 
Lorde read “Love Poem” (SO, 98). Since “Love Poem” includes explicitly lesbian imagery, and 
since, in the early seventies, and perhaps particularly in Black communities, being an “out” 
lesbian was still a rarity, Rich recalls Lorde’s reading with more than a touch of awe, explaining, 
“It was the first time I’d heard you read it…It was incredible. Like defiance. It was glorious” 
(SO, 98).  
 Lorde responds by first confirming that ‘defiant’ was exactly how she felt when reading 
the poem that day, “because as bad as it is now, the idea of open lesbianism in the Black 
community was…totally horrible” (SO, 99). As Lorde pauses to reflect upon the vulnerability 
she also felt while reading the poem, she clarifies some of the reasons why she felt particularly 
vulnerable reading the poem in the company of other Black women. She explains,  
When a people share a common oppression, certain kinds of skills and joint defenses are 
developed. And if you survive you survive because those skills and defenses have 
worked. When you come into conflict over other existing differences, there is a 
vulnerability to each other which is desperate and very deep. And that is what happens 
between Black men and women because we have certain weapons we have perfected 
together that white women and men have not shared…When you share a common 
oppression you have certain additional weapons against each other because you’ve forged 
them in secret together against a common enemy. It’s a fear that I’m still not free of and 
that I remember all the time when I deal with other Black women: the fear of the ex-
comrade. (SO, 99) 
 
Immediately following this exchange, Rich inquires into certain accusations that she 
knows have been leveled at Lorde for “restating the old stereotype of the rational white male and 
the emotional dark female” which leads Lorde to reflect on how difficult it can be to formulate 
certain knowledges when the meaning-frameworks within which they might make the kinds of 
sense she aims to create simply do not yet exist (SO, 100). She explains, “I do think that we have 
been taught to think, to codify information in certain old ways, to learn, to understand in certain 
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ways. The possible shapes of what has not been before exist only in that back place, where we 
keep those unnamed, untamed longings for something different and beyond what is now called 
possible, and to which our understanding can only build roads” (SO, 101).  
 It was in the wake of these reflections that Rich ventured into the realm of the 
epistemically unjust, which begins with Lorde’s reminiscence about the telephone conversation 
wherein Rich demanded ‘documentation’ for the intuitions she was just beginning to form. After 
Lorde explains that Rich’s request left her feeling “a total wipeout of my modus, my way of 
perceiving and formulating,” Rich objects,  
Rich: “Yes, but it’s not a wipeout of your modus. Because I don't think my modus is 
unintuitive, right? And one of the crosses I've borne all my life is being told that I'm 
rational, logical, cool - I am not cool, and I'm not rational and logical in that icy sense. 
But there's a way in which, trying to translate from your experience to mine, I do need to 
hear chapter and verse from time to time. I'm afraid of it all slipping away into: “Ah, yes, 
I understand you.”…There are times when I simply cannot assume that I know what you 
know, unless you show me what you mean. 
 
The first problem with Rich’s response is that she fails to acknowledge Lorde’s feeling 
about how Rich had undermined her ‘way of perceiving and formulating’ by denying that she 
had called Lorde’s ‘modus’ into question at all. The second problem with Rich’s response is that 
she insists that in order for her to acknowledge the intuitions Lorde had been attempting to 
articulate, and accept them as the nascent knowledges that they were, she would require Lorde to 
accompany her nascent knowledge articulations with explanations or justifications of their 
meanings. It is at this point that, as described above, Lorde objects and begins to draw out the 
differences between the ethico-epistemic practice of producing knowledges, and the practice of 
arriving at understandings.  
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 In order better to appreciate Lorde’s later remarks regarding the distinctions she makes 
between knowledge and understanding, let’s return to where we left off of the above exchange 
for more from Lorde on this: 
Lorde (cont.): At certain stages that request for documentation is a blinder, a questioning 
of my perceptions. Someone once said to me that I hadn’t documented the goddess in 
Africa, the woman bond that moves throughout The Black Unicorn. I had to laugh. I’m a 
poet, not a historian. I’ve shared my knowledge, I hope.  Now you go document it if you 
wish. I don’t know about you, Adrienne, but I have a difficult enough time making my 
perceptions verbal, tapping that deep place, forming that handle, and documentation at 
that point is often useless. Perceptions precede analysis just as visions precede actions or 
accomplishments. It’s like getting a poem…” (SO, 104-5)  
 
Lorde uncharacteristically lets her thoughts trail off here and returns later, as we have 
already begun to see, to take up this thread about the possible link between perceptions, visions, 
and ‘getting a poem’. But at this point Lorde goes on to explain how she’s had to fight her whole 
life to preserve her “perceptions of how things are…in the face of tremendous opposition and 
cruel judgment,” which at times caused her to question her own “perceptions and interior 
knowledge” (SO, 105).  
It is at this point in the interview that Rich finally concedes that there was more to her 
request for “chapter and verse” during their earlier telephone conversation than she had been 
willing to admit.  Rich confesses, “I’ve had great resistance to some of your perceptions. They 
can be very painful to me. Perceptions about what goes on between us, what goes on between 
Black and white people, what goes on between Black and white women. So it’s not that I can just 
accept your perceptions unblinkingly. Some of them are very hard for me” (SO, 105). I submit 
that Rich’s initial resistance to accepting Lorde’s perceptions ‘unblinkingly’ has much to do with 
both forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice.  
In order better to see how Rich’s request for documentation was epistemically unjust, we 
will return once again to the distinctions Lorde draws between knowledge and understanding. As 
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will soon become clear, there is an intimate relationship between the ethico-epistemic practices 
of knowledge production and the generation of understandings, and the ethico-epistemic failures 
involved in instances of testimonial and hermeneutical injustices. By reviewing Lorde’s account 
of the ways in which Rich’s request struck Lorde as epistemically unjust, we will begin to see 
just why Lorde chose what we referred to in chapter two as the ‘testimonial track’ in her attempts 
to combat the problem of epistemic injustice as she understood it. In order more fully to 
appreciate the richness of Lorde’s unique approach to the problem of epistemic injustice, we will 
subsequently  turn briefly to Gail Polhaus’ recent work on the problem of testimonial injustice. 
Polhaus’ work will help to clarify, and in some ways even redefine, the problem in ways that 
highlight the genius of Lorde’s response to it.   
Part II - The Interview 
 
Taking Steps: On the Roles of Trust, Imagination, and Novelty in Combatting Epistemic 
Injustice 
 
Lorde highlights one of the most insidious aspects of what we now refer to as epistemic 
injustice when she explains that, “The way you get people to testify against themselves is not to 
have police tactics and oppressive techniques. What you do is build it in so people learn to 
distrust everything in themselves that has not been sanctioned, to reject what is most creative in 
themselves to begin with, so you don’t even need to stamp it out” (SO, 102). When meaning-
frameworks of understanding are viewed as “sanctioning” frameworks – delimiting what counts 
as knowledge and why prior to certain attempts at knowledge production – they render certain 
testimony unintelligible or “irrational” from the outset. This makes it incredibly difficult to bring 
new knowledges – knowledges that don’t fit into existing meaning-frameworks – into public 
places wherein mainstream meaning-frameworks of understanding reign over knowledge 
producing practices.  
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This insight is part and parcel of what Lorde’s famous dictum that “the master’s tools 
cannot dismantle the master’s house” is all about. As Lorde explains,  
It means different tools in language, different tools in the exchange of information, it 
means different tools in learning. It means that we use the tools of rationality, but we do 
not elevate it to the point that it is no longer connected to our lives. It means that we do 
not require from each other the kinds of narrow and restricted interpretations of learning 
and the exchange of knowledge that we suffered in the universities or that we suffered in 
the narrow academic structures. It means that we recognize that, while we are functioning 
in the old power, because we must know those tools, we cannot be ignorant of them, we 
are also in the process of redefining a new power, which is the power of the future. 
(CWAL, 151-2) 
 
This turn toward what might become a redefined, new power, ‘the power of the future’, stands 
behind Lorde’s desire to stake out new ground upon which the knowledges she aims to convey 
may grow and flourish.  
Not content to accept an epistemic status quo that she knows all too well can smother 
attempts to convey novel knowledges, Lorde pushes back on the notion that only certain 
predetermined, mainstream meaning-frameworks of understanding can ‘sanction’ one’s 
descriptions of her experiences such that those descriptions can rise to the level of being 
considered knowledge-conveying. What counts as knowledge and why, is, in other words, never 
a closed question for Lorde. And it is the right to convey one’s intuitions without requiring that 
they fit neatly into existing meaning-frameworks of understanding for which Lorde fights. 
“I…think that we have been taught to think, to codify information in certain old ways, to learn, 
to understand in certain ways,” writes Lorde. She then acknowledges how impoverished these 
‘old ways’ of understanding will remain unless they are questioned, challenged, and expanded to 
include novel knowledges. She explains that, “The possible shapes of what has not been before 
exist only in that back place where we keep those unnamed, untamed longings for something 
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different and beyond what is now called possible, and to which our understanding can only build 
roads” (SO, 101).  
The Primacy of Knowledge-Production Practices In Lorde’s Approach 
To import these insights regarding the ‘road-building’ nature of understanding into our 
discussion of the above recorded exchange between Rich and Lorde, we might say that in 
rejecting Rich’s demand to ‘document’ her intuitions, Lorde is attempting to carve out the space 
within which novel knowledges might begin to find a fit home in a meaning-framework of 
understanding that can make a new kind of sense of them. Lorde is continually challenging Rich 
throughout the interview to move beyond the circular, analytic thinking that characterizes so 
much of academic discourse. And all the while Lorde is articulating a view of the nature of the 
relationship between knowledge and understanding that privileges the process of coming to 
know over the process of coming to understand.  
Put within the framework outlined in chapter two, we can say that throughout this 
important interview, Lorde is describing what it means to pursue what we referred to as the 
“testimonial track.” She is engaged in the task of articulating her perceptions of her experiences, 
which will constitute her knowledge. She is offering novel images of her experiences by painting 
of pictures through words. The images she creates, if acknowledged as part of a meaningful 
framework of understanding by herself and others, will become part of the ‘economy of 
credibility’ according to which other images can be judged.  
Lorde may, for instance, describe an experience she has had, like the experience of 
perceiving her relationship with a partner as “precious to both [partners…and something both] 
were still committed to build” (Zami, 231). In the context of a meaning framework wherein such 
an image makes sense – one wherein both partners really are committed to building their 
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relationship, and counting it ‘precious’ – other perceptions can be judged against this perception. 
If one’s committed partner stays up late talking to an ex on her living room couch, considered 
from within the context of a meaning-framework of understanding about one’s relationship that 
includes the image of it being ‘precious’ and something both partners are committed to build, 
this experience will be perceived, not as a threat to the relationship but instead as simply a chat 
between friends. If one perceives it as anything other than a harmless chat between friends, since 
that perception does not fit well with one’s other perceptions of her relationship, it is judged 
erroneous and perhaps then simply dismissed as a non-credible perception or a misperception.  
This ability to judge other perceptions according to one’s knowledge – which is 
constituted by the perceptions one holds as in some way “firm” – allows us to make sense of our 
experiences. The framework of understanding we have constructed out of those perceptions we 
hold as firm offers a way to make sense of new perceptions. Whenever we see an experience as a 
certain type of experience – say, as a harmless chat between friends – insofar as that perception 
does not contradict or in some way call into question one’s firmly held perceptions it is generally 
accepted as a credible perception and not a misperception. However, as Lorde points out, if one 
holds one’s meaning-frameworks of understanding to be somehow beyond revision, then she will 
likely begin to contort the logic of her meaning-framework into all manner of striking shapes in 
order to make sense of certain perceptions that don’t fit well within such a meaning-framework. 
Lorde suggests that instead of engaging in such logic-bending understanding practices, we might 
be better served by allowing our perceptions of our experiences to call into question the very 
meaning-frameworks according to which they are initially perceived. 
 In describing the betrayal she suffered when her former partner Muriel cheated on her 
with her ex on the couch where she had left them locked in conversation the night before, Lorde 
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conveys the shock of having to reassess one’s meaning-framework of understanding. She writes 
of waking “with a start in horror and disbelief” to the sound of her partner’s and her ex’s love-
making (Zami, 231). Even though “the muffled sounds coming from the next room were 
unmistakable,” Lorde’s brain (and heart) balked at accepting her present perception of the 
experience she was having, listening to what was occurring in the next room. She had to form the 
words that would offer the truest image of what she was experiencing slowly, deliberately. 
“Muriel. Muriel and Jill were making love on the middle-room couch. I lay rigid, trying not to 
hear, trying not to be awake or there at all, trapped like some wild animal…NO EXIT” (Zami, 
231).  
In disbelief, Lorde had to repeat the words to herself all throughout the next day, as if to 
make sure that she really did experience what she experienced. Looking out of her kitchen 
window at the signs of the dawning season, Lorde thought to herself that, “Spring was coming on 
inexorably and Muriel had slept with Jill on our middle-room couch a few hours ago” (Zami, 
232). In what followed Lorde’s acceptance of this gestalt-altering perception of the nature of her 
relationship with Muriel, there was what Lorde describes as a “very guarded and tender” silence 
between them in regards to the infidelity, “as if [they] were both acknowledging with [their] 
silence what was irretrievable” (Zami, 233). Ultimately, there proved no way to bridge the 
distance between them with new understandings of their relationship that might at once provide a 
new home for their perceptions of their experiences that can make a tolerable sense of them, and 
to save the relationship from ending. Lorde describes how, “What was lying between us had 
moved beyond our old speech, and we were both too lost and too frightened to attempt a new 
language” (Zami, 233-4).  
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To attempt the creation of a new meaning-framework of understanding is akin to what 
Lorde piercingly perceived as necessary for maintaining her relationship with Muriel – it is like 
‘attempt[ing] a new language’, as Lorde so aptly put it. Lorde’s and Muriel’s need for a new 
language lay in the fact that their old framework of understanding could not make an adequate 
sense of their new experiences. The very meanings of words, basic words, even oft used and 
seldom reflected upon shorthand words and phrases – the kind that can so beautifully and easily 
crop up between lovers and intimate friends – no longer quite fit the feelings that Lorde and 
Muriel originally coined them to convey. As the fact of their estrangement from, not only each 
other, but also their former selves – themselves as well-loved, and one half of a committed, and 
happy relationship – dawned on Lorde, the feelings that accompanied the fact struck true long 
before the meaning of it all did. She found herself lamenting, “My heart knew what my head 
refused to understand. Our life together was over” (Zami, 235).  
Unable to construct a new meaning-framework of understanding with Muriel, one 
capable of making a sense out of their newfound relationship to each other with which both 
could live, Lorde determined that she must construct a new meaning-framework of 
understanding on her own. This new meaning-framework of understanding would need restore 
her sense of self, and make a new sense of the world that better fit the new facts of her life. Ever 
mindful of the cost that alterations to one’s meaning-framework of understanding might have, 
Lorde appreciates the fact that in order to maintain the meaning-framework of understanding that 
she can constructed with Muriel, she would need to change her self-conception and begin to view 
herself in a new light. Lorde remarks, “This was the second time in my life that something 
intolerable was happening; I could do nothing to affect it, nothing to help myself in it. I could do 
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nothing to encompass it, nor to alter it. I was too beside myself to consider altering me” (Zami, 
236).  
Ultimately, a change to Lorde’s self-conception or self-definition would prove impossible 
to avoid. Whenever one’s perceptions of her experiences in the world prompt her to make 
substantial changes to the ways in which she views the world – changes to the meaning-
frameworks of understanding according to which she makes sense of it – many identities are 
suddenly on the line, including her own. When one’s love is lost, she is no longer one half of a 
loving, committed relationship, and as her framework of understanding adjusts to compass this 
fact, her self-definition is inevitably altered. Whether she may retain the status of one ‘well-
loved’ (by others) and happy remains to be seen. Regardless, she becomes, in certain concrete 
ways another self – redefined. This fact recently hit home for me, when my father died. As I 
adjusted my new meaning-framework of understanding to incorporate this new knowledge – 
knowledge of the fact of my father’s death – I was surprised (although I probably should not 
have been) by the fact that those adjustments had, in some important ways, changed my self-
definition. I am not now one with a father from whom she is estranged, but one without a father 
– an “orphan” of sorts. 
 Of course not all one’s experiences in the world prompt changes to their meaning-
frameworks of understanding in such fundamental and devastating ways. Nonetheless, the 
potential for trauma is ever-present when epistemic agents attempt to incorporate new 
knowledges into their existing meaning-frameworks of understanding. And it is for this reason 
that so many, so often, fail to the hard work of seeing – perceiving uncomfortable truths, feeling 
difficult feelings, intuiting things one would rather not know – these are all potential pitfalls for 
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one committed to articulating her perceptions, intuitions, feelings, and thereby embarking on the 
ethico-epistemic task of producing new knowledges.  
 Although Adrienne Rich appears not to have ever fully appreciated just what it was that 
Lorde was on about in regards to their earlier telephone conversation in their interview, she was 
at least able to begin to grapple with the fact that her resistance to Lorde’s intuitions was 
grounded in fear. Rich admits to the fearing Lorde’s perceptions because “they can be very 
painful to me,” and because “some of them are very hard for me” (SO, 105). While this 
confession may offer a starting-point for Rich to begin to reflect further on the harm she can (and 
did) cause by attempting to silence other’s nascent knowledges whenever the perceptions that 
might lead to those knowledges are too painful or simply too difficult to accept, Rich’s 
confession alone simply does not go far enough.  
While Miranda Fricker is right to suggest that the perpetrators of the harms of epistemic 
injustice are the ones who should be held most accountable for combatting it, she also 
acknowledges how incremental improvements on this front might be. As Rich’s responses to 
Lorde in the interview suggest, Fricker is right to harbor concerns over this issue. However, as 
Lorde’s responses to Rich indicate, there is much room for hope in looking to hermeneutically 
marginalized epistemic agents for insights into combatting the problem of epistemic injustice. As 
in previous chapters, I want here to stress that this fact in no way translates into a license to hold 
those suffering most from the harms of epistemic injustice accountable for overcoming it. 
However, since there have been many voices issuing from positions of hermeneutical 
marginalization throughout the history of the spoken and written word, I do want to suggest that 
we all (whether as perpetrators or sufferers of epistemic injustices) would do well to honor those 
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voices by simply listening to the wisdom they may offer in regards to such problems as epistemic 
injustice.  
Before we conclude with our review of the ethico-epistemic insights we can glean from 
the interview between Adrienne Rich and Audre Lorde, I’d like to review some of Lorde’s own 
exhortations and conclusions about the project of combatting epistemic injustice, and then apply 
them to instances wherein hermeneutically privileged epistemic agents might find themselves 
suffering from certain forms of epistemic injustice. We will draw on recent work by the social 
epistemologist Gail Polhaus in order to draw out the ways in which questions of identity lay at 
the heart of the problem of epistemic injustice.  
Although Fricker does agree that at bottom both forms of epistemic injustice result from 
identity prejudices, her gross misrepresentation of the possible agency a hermeneutically 
marginalized epistemic agent may possess renders her analysis of the role identity prejudices 
play in epistemic injustice rather skewed. I argue that Polhaus offers us a better account of the 
role identity prejudices play in epistemic injustices. While this corrective to Fricker’s account 
will not leave us with hard and fast rules to apply to instances of epistemic injustice, it will serve 
to better situate the problem itself, and highlight the insights about self-identity offered by Lorde 
– some of which have been shared above.  
Revealing Novel Knowledges and Making Senses That Are New 
 Reflecting on the daunting challenge of revealing something new – some new bit of 
knowledge, or a unique way of making a new sense out of certain knowledges, Lorde insists that 
women are especially skilled at “birthing” these nascent ‘possible shapes of what has not been 
before.’ That women are the bearers and the bringers of new things. She confides to Rich: 
That the human race is evolving through women…I believe that this power exists in men 
also but they choose not to deal with it...But I’m not saying that women don’t think or 
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analyze. Or that white does not feel. I’m saying that we must never close our eyes to the 
terror, to the chaos which is Black which is creative which is female which is dark which 
is rejected which is messy which is…[Rich jumps in here and offers, “Sinister…” which 
Lorde accepts, continuing] sinister, smelly, erotic, confused, upsetting… (SO, 101)   
 
Having been taught to understand according to mainstream senses of understanding that belied 
her own knowledge, Lorde is eager to convey her conviction that there are times when attempts 
to articulate ‘the possible shapes of what has not been before’ must precede attempts to discover, 
or if necessary, create, the meaning-frameworks within which they can begin to make the kinds 
of sense one aims to generate. Lorde insists that in order for “that knowledge deeply born” to 
make its appearance in public and perhaps even to thrive there, one must be willing first to see, 
perceive, feel – in other words to know, for oneself (SO, 56). This ethico-epistemic task will 
require at least some kind of articulation – the knowledge must be shared, even if only to an 
“other self” within that silent inner dialogue we call ‘thinking’ – before it can truly be known, on 
Lorde’s account.   
These articulations of one’s knowledges are both ethical and epistemic imperatives for 
Lorde – to acknowledge one’s own inner knowledge, especially in the face of tremendous 
opposition to it, is nothing short of a duty for her – incumbent on all who find themselves 
somehow able to do it. As is the task of sharing at least some of that knowledge with others to, 
“speak those truths for which [we are] still seeking…[making] contact with other women while 
we examined the words to fit a world in which we all believed, bridging our differences” (SO, 
41). Lorde seeks to create the space for new concepts, ideas, images, in short new knowledges, 
by measuring the adequacy of various modes or methods of understanding according to their 
ability to make a useful kind of sense out of the novel knowledges with which Lorde simply will 
not part.  
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Instead of attempting to align her knowledge with existing “meaning structures,” many of 
which are quite antithetical to the ‘chaotic’ knowledges Lorde vows never again to ‘close her 
eyes to,’ Lorde seeks either to find, or if necessary, to create the kinds of public spaces that will 
allow for the expression of those knowledges so deep and so ‘dark’ that they appear to many to 
threaten the destruction of mainstream or “traditional” meaning structures, or methods of 
understanding, and which they therefore attempt prejudicially to rule out. 
While acknowledging the importance of understanding, Lorde insists that it for it to be 
useful and not restrictively narrow, it must grow out of  ‘that knowledge deeply born’ of 
experience. Such knowledge, particularly when born of the experiences of marginalized actors, is 
not always in accord with certain preconceived methods understanding. In fact, often times “the 
chaos of knowledge” derived from the life experiences of marginalized epistemic agents can be 
so discordant with mainstream methods understanding that it cannot even be perceived as 
knowledge.  
Part III: On the Role of Identity Prejudices in the Problem of Epistemic Injustice 
Mirana Fricker indicates that in the case of testimonial injustice, it is the group identity of 
the speaker, not the content of her testimony, that is unfairly judged, and in the case of 
hermeneutical injustice, it is either the content of one’s testimony, or the way in which she 
delivers that content, that is judged unfairly. However, I would argue that should a marginalized 
epistemic agent offer testimony that either leaves unchallenged, or even outright supports, the 
understanding of mainstream epistemic agents, her testimony is unlikely to be prejudicially 
negatively assessed – regardless of her group identity. For instance: a Black person testifying to 
the criminality of another Black person may well find her credibility positively assessed by the 
police, even though, as Fricker points out, due to widespread epistemic injustice often times “the 
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police [may] not believe you because you are black” (1). In other words, so long as one’s 
testimony does not disrupt mainstream sensibilities or challenge mainstream understandings, the 
credibility of her specific knowledge claims may be positively assessed, even if she belongs to an 
epistemically marginalized group, calling into question Fricker’s assertion that in cases of 
testimonial injustice it is the speaker’s group identity that leads to the epistemic harm.   
This is not to suggest that identity prejudices play no role in the problem of testimonial 
injustice, for identity prejudices are indeed very much a part of them. However, instead of 
playing a causal role, as Fricker suggests, I submit that in cases of testimonial injustice, identity 
prejudices serve as evidential support – either in favor of or against certain knowledge claims. In 
other words, when testimonial injustice is present, one’s membership in an epistemically 
marginalized group may (unjustly) count as evidence against the credibility of her knowledge 
claims, but cannot on its own determine whether any of her individual knowledge claims should 
be considered credible or non-credible.   
Treating their testimony like a broken clock that is right at least twice daily (depending 
on whether one uses a 12 or a 24 hour clock), mainstream epistemic agents may come to expect 
that epistemically marginalized speakers may, from time to time, offer reliable testimony.  
Unlike the clock, however, such speakers, pace Fricker, retain at least some of their status as 
epistemic subjects; for even when epistemic injustice is most rampant, they are not completely 
objectified. Marginalized epistemic agents may, for instance, possess the capacity, not only to 
articulate or testify to certain facts about the world, but also to offer evidence in support of their 
testimony. The clock strikes one but cannot say how or why or what the hour might mean; but a 
marginalized epistemic agent, regardless of how discounted or ignored her words might be, may 
yet give an account of her descriptions or testimony regarding her perceptions of her 
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experiences.49 In other words, while epistemic objects might reasonably be characterized as 
offering descriptions of certain facts about the world (i.e. that it is one o’clock), they cannot 
sensibly be viewed as making sense of, or understanding it.  The same cannot be said for 
marginalized epistemic agents.   
Derivitized Epistemic Subjects – Polhaus’ Approach 
Gail Polhaus, drawing on the work of Anne Cahill, brilliantly explicates this important 
point in her challenge to Fricker’s assessment that marginalized epistemic agents are treated as 
‘objects’ and not ‘subjects’ in her essay on “Discerning the Primary Epistemic Harm in Cases of 
Testimonial Injustice.”50 Polhaus convincingly argues that epistemically marginalized speakers 
are “derivatized” epistemic subjects, insisting that their epistemic agency, while truncated, is not 
entirely destroyed. They are instead epistemic “others” or  
semi-subjects whose sole purpose is to provide epistemic support for navigating the 
experienced world of those deemed subjects. In this relation, those persons treated as 
‘other’ serve to recognize and maintain epistemic practices that make sense of the world 
as experienced from dominant subjectivities, but do not receive the same epistemic 
support with regard to their distinct lived experiences in the world. (105)   
 
This means that whenever a derivatized epistemic subject testifies ‘with regard to their distinct 
lived experiences in the world,’ insofar as her testimony regarding those experiences represents a 
departure from mainstream testimonial accounts of mainstream experiences in the world, she is 
likely to find little evidential support that meets mainstream criteria for what counts as evidence 
in favor of her descriptions of her experiences – for her own testimony, as well as any testimony 
that calls into question mainstream accounts of mainstream experiences, will automatically be 
deemed unreliable according to mainstream methods of arriving at understanding.   																																																								
49 The successes of such descriptions rely on whether the speaker is able, first to make sense of her 
knowledge to herself, and sometimes also on her ability to make sense to others, both of which practices 
can often prove challenging.   
50 “Social Epistemology: A Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Policy”, published online November 5th, 
2013 
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Curiously, this also means that whenever a mainstream epistemic agent testifies ‘with 
regard to their distinct lived experiences in the world,’ insofar as their testimony calls into 
question the bulk of mainstream testimony regarding mainstream experiences in the world, they 
too will suffer a dearth of evidential support that meets mainstream criteria for what counts as 
evidence.  In other words, if it is the content of one’s testimony that triggers negative credibility 
assessments and not identity prejudices, then what Fricker is calling testimonial injustice begins 
to look less like an actual injustice and more like a healthy skepticism towards certain types of 
testimony. But before we jump to dismiss the problem of testimonial injustice as a chimera, let’s 
assume that Polhaus is right in her assertion that “Identifying the kind of information stymied in 
testimonial injustice allows us to highlight the structural aspects of testimonial injustice without 
losing sight of the fact that it is an injustice, something that Fricker herself claims that her model 
cannot do” (109). This turn toward the structural aspects of testimonial injustice lies at the heart 
of what Polhaus is eager to (and expertly does) convey in her essay: the fact that while identity 
prejudices play a key role in both forms of epistemic injustice, in the case of testimonial 
injustice, that role is not a causal, but an explanatory one.   
In the case of hermeneutical injustice, I believe that Fricker is correct to conclude that 
identity prejudices play a causal role. However in the case of testimonial injustice that is not 
necessarily the case. In fact, I would be so bold as to suggest that in cases of hermeneutical 
injustice, identity prejudices are both a necessary and a sufficient cause of it. Any gaps in 
hermeneutical resources not predicated on identity prejudices would not count as instances of 
hermeneutical injustice, which makes identity prejudice a necessary condition for hermeneutical 
injustice. And prejudices against another qua social type is, in the case of hermeneutical 
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injustice, sufficient reason to bar any new content into the hermeneutical resources of a 
community that might conflict with mainstream testimonials to mainstream experiences.  
For instance, if I hold an identity prejudice against you because of your social type, I 
might strenuously object to allowing your evidence that that prejudice is unfounded into the 
social imaginary that constitutes our shared hermeneutical resources. However, in the case of 
testimonial injustice, identity prejudice is neither a necessary nor a sufficient cause for it. 
Instead, identity prejudices manifested in unwarranted negative credibility assessments are 
among the “master tools,” which he uses to maintain the systematic epistemic marginalization of 
certain speakers – namely those persistently offering testimony that either challenges or simply 
does not sit well with mainstream knowledges and understandings in communities where 
hermeneutical injustice exists, regardless of the speaker’s social, political, or economic status.   
Identity Prejudices and Mainstream Epistemic Agents 
We can begin to see this more clearly by returning to the case of the mainstream 
epistemic agent whose testimony runs against the grain of mainstream epistemic experiences.  
For instance, if a middle-to-upper class, white, heterosexual male testifies to the continued 
existence of Jim Crow Laws in the U.S. in the form of unjust policing and incarceration practices 
aimed at dominating Black bodies, he may well find himself a victim of testimonial injustice.  
While his mainstream group identity may shield him from immediate dismissal as an 
incompetent knower for a time, should he persist in testifying against the grain, additional steps 
might be taken against him by those invested in maintaining what they perceive to be the 
integrity of the boundaries between what counts as knowledge and who counts as a credible 
giver of it. He may, for instance, find himself disqualified as a member of mainstream epistemic 
groups by virtue of the fact that he is now viewed as a “race traitor.” His subsequent testimony 
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would then be prejudicially negatively assessed by virtue of his group identity as a ‘race traitor,’ 
making him a victim of testimonial injustice.51   
If this account is correct, then whenever one articulates her experiences or ‘verbalizes her 
perceptions’ in communities wherein hermeneutical injustice exists, she opens herself to the 
possibility of testimonial injustice whenever those descriptions depart from and/ or call into 
question mainstream testimony regarding mainstream experiences in the world. If one belongs to 
an epistemically marginalized group, her group identity will count as evidence against the 
reliability of her descriptions in cases of testimonial injustice whenever those descriptions 
undermine mainstream descriptions. If one belongs to an epistemically mainstream group, she 
places her epistemic group identity on the line whenever her descriptions of experiences in the 
world depart significantly from mainstream descriptions of the world. “Evidence” of her 
unworthiness to remain in an epistemically mainstream group mounts with every such 
description, until eventually she comes to be regarded as an ‘honorary’ member of the 
epistemically marginalized group with whose testimony hers more closely aligns.  
Once this rebranding occurs, even previously epistemically mainstream actors can suffer 
testimonial injustice, for their honorary status as a member of an epistemically marginalized 
group can then be deployed against them in the form of testimonially unjust prejudicially 
negative credibility assessments. As circular as this logic is, I submit that just such ‘logic’ is in 
fact in play in hermeneutically unjust communities, making hermeneutical injustice the driver of 
testimonial injustice. It is upon the scaffolding of hermeneutically unjust social imaginaries, 
																																																								
51 I am not at all trying to equate the gravity or even violence of these instances of testimonial injustice 
against mainstream epistemic agents with the severity of the harms perpetrated against marginalized 
epistemic agents whose testimony is so often unfairly judged. I’m simply suggesting that the intensity 
with which the content of certain testimony is denied a fair hearing, or even any hearing at all, may in 
some cases cause testimonial injustice to cross over boundaries of race, sex, religion, gender, sexual 
orientation, etc.   
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wherein epistemically prejudicial images of certain identity groups lie, that the identity 
prejudices involved in testimonial injustice are built.   
Conclusion: More Poetry Than Prose 
 When asked to address the charge of “simply restating the old stereotype of the rational 
white male and the emotional dark female,” in her work, Lorde addresses the sterility of “the 
worship of rationality and that circular, academic, analytic thinking” aimed at silencing 
“different” or novel knowledges or ways of knowing (SO, 100). She explains, “If you’re 
traveling a road that begins nowhere and ends nowhere, the ownership of that road is 
meaningless. Leaving rationality to the white man is like leaving him a piece of that road that 
begins nowhere and ends nowhere” (SO, 100). Resisting the usual “think/feel dichotomy” in 
favor of “a choice of ways and combinations,” Lorde acknowledges, “Rationality is not 
unnecessary. It serves the chaos of knowledge. It serves feeling. It serves to get from this place to 
that place. But if you don’t honor those places, then the road is meaningless” (SO, 100).   
 The only way to break out of these limited and limiting circular ways of thinking is to 
allow the content of one’s thought to dictate the road to its comprehension instead of deploying a 
static set of meaning structures by which all content must be understood. It was poetry that 
allowed Lorde, not only to articulate and thereby come to know and feel her perceptions of her 
experiences, it also illuminated paths toward understanding them that might otherwise have 
remained unseen. Lorde explains, “I had a very emotional relationship with poetry when I was 
young because I was very inarticulate. I didn’t speak…I couldn’t stutter because I got hit if I 
stuttered. So writing was the next best thing…I used to get stoned on poetry when I was a kid. 
When life got just too difficult for me, I could always retreat into those words. If they didn’t exist 
I made them up…So poetry is very important to me in terms of survival” (CWAL, 35-6). In 
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reflecting further on her childhood self, Lorde exclaims, “That child didn’t understand anything 
at all, but she knew a great deal…In those days when I could not afford to know what I was 
feeling, I wrote a great deal. In that way I could write down what I was feeling and it stood me in 
good stead” (CWAL, 37).  
Learning the role of understanding came later to Lorde than learning the role of 
knowledge, especially self-knowledge, did. This makes a beautiful kind of sense to me, 
considering the fact that, on her own account Lorde’s very first language was poetry, and she 
only undertook the task of honing her prose skills later in life, in what I imagine was a rather 
arduous act of love. For that place ‘where knowing and understanding mesh’ has, for Lorde, 
everything to do with the place where poetry and prose meet: the explicit goal of Lorde’s prose 
works was to provide a framework of understanding within which she might make the 
knowledges revealed in her poetry ‘available for use’. Make no mistake; Lorde’s first and truest 
love was love of  “the Black mother in each of us, the poet” (SO, 100). But by the time she wrote 
her first long prose piece, her “Autobiomythography” called Zami, A New Spelling of My Name, 
she was committed to the process of coming to “understand what [she] knew and also mak[ing] it 
available to others” (SO, 109).   
Reflecting on the intimately connected practices of articulating one’s perceptions, or 
identifying and revealing one’s knowledge; and making sense of, or coming to understand that 
knowledge – one could say, ‘documenting’ it – in ways that help facilitate one’s own and others’ 
understandings of it, Lorde muses, “Inseparable processes now. But for me, I had to know I 
knew it first – I had to feel” (SO, 109). Just as describing a work of art helps one to really see it, 
so too does acknowledging one’s knowledge (‘I had to know that I knew it first’) help one to feel 
its import (‘– I had to feel’). Importantly, Lorde relegates the role of understanding, through 
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analysis, translation, and evaluation, to a secondary status – insisting on the primacy of 
description / acknowledgment in knowledge producing practices. She explains, “understanding is 
a handmaiden which can only wait upon, or clarify, that knowledge deeply born” (SO, 56).   
 Case in point: when Adrienne Rich demanded ‘documentation’ from Lorde in support of 
the perceptions Lorde had been trying to articulate to her, she was asking Lorde to provide 
evidential support for her descriptions of her experiences in the world. But Lorde, knowing all-
too-well that the only testimony that would count as rising to the level of credible evidence was 
testimony that corroborated mainstream experiences in the world, adroitly maneuvered around 
Rich’s request. If she had conceded to Rich’s demand for ‘documentation’ before having taken 
the opportunity simply to articulate her experiences – both to herself and to Rich – in order for 
them both to better perceive them, Lorde would have had to edit her descriptions of her 
experiences in order to make them fit the only evidence that counted if she wanted to render 
them intelligible to Rich: they would need not to call into question mainstream experiences of 
the world. In other words, Lorde would have had to lie in order for her testimony to be 
considered intelligible, for her truths simply would not fit that mold.  
Lorde is wary of being roped into attempting to explain, justify, or make sense of her 
experiences in the world before taking the time to really perceive and begin to know them. By 
giving herself room to articulate her experiences without attempting to fit them into any pre-
formed meaning-frameworks, Lorde is giving them primacy of place: she tries to stay true to her 
experiences, letting them suggest new ways of understanding instead of putting understanding 
first, and describing her experiences only in ways that do not call into question mainstream 
methods of understanding of the world.  
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By requiring ‘documentation’ up front, Rich was asking Lorde to represent her 
perceptions in an orderly fashion, according to the lights of mainstream methods of 
understanding. But Lorde instead insisted on generating her own light, and found poetry to offer 
the truest way of forming it: “This is poetry as illumination, for it is through poetry that we give 
name to those ideas which are – until the poem – nameless and formless, about to be birthed, but 
already felt. That distillation of experience from which true poetry springs births thought as 
dream births concept, as feeling births idea, as knowledge births (precedes) understanding” (SO, 
36). In refusing to ‘document’ her perceptions before taking the time to know or feel them 
through the poetic process of describing them, Lorde attempts to set right what she sees as an 
inverted epistemic order: she places the practice of articulating knowledges ahead of the practice 
of making sense of, or coming to understand it. In other words, in the battle against epistemic 
injustice, Lorde seems to suggest that what’s initially needed may be more poetry than prose. 
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